

CONTRACT NO. NAS8-37137

**VOLUME II  
APPENDIX 1  
TRADES STUDIES**

(NASA-CR-183601) LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
STUDY. VOLUME 2, BOOK 2, APPENDIX 1: TRADES  
STUDIES Final Report, Nov. 1987 - Feb. 1988  
(General Dynamics Corp.) 374 p CSCL 21H

N90-10136

Unclas

G3/20 0204304

**LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY  
FINAL REPORT**

**GENERAL DYNAMICS**  
***Space Systems Division***

CN24L ( 0 ) ( 2 )  
TURNER J/PUBLICATION  
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER  
HUNTSVILLE AL.

RETURN ADDRESS CN22D



INITIAL TRADE STUDIES  
ON  
LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTERS  
FOR THE STS SYSTEM

Under Contract NAS8-37137, during the time period November 1987 through February 1988, the following major trade studies were performed with formal direction by the GDSS Engineering Review Board.

Some conclusions have subsequently changed, as noted in the "updates". They are provided as background information.

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
SPACE SYSTEMS DIVISION





Under DR-10, "Configuration Evaluation and Criteria Plan", fifteen level one trades were planned. Figure 1 lists these trades plus a sixteenth on separation.

Attached are the results of this work which was completed in February 1988. Note that:

1.4 "Degree of Recovery/Reuse" was combined with 1.13 "Recovery System Selection".

1.11 "Flight Control Implementation" is not included because it is really an analysis, not a trade, involving the use of a six degree of freedom flight simulation model to analyze required gimbal angles and rates.

Since they were so closely related, trades 1.7 (Chamber Pressure), 1.12 (Tank Config.) and 1.14 (Pressurization System) are grouped together.

These trades all used the same selection criteria, emphasizing safety and reliability as shown in Figure 2. Much of this data fed into vehicle concept selection which was made based on the same criteria. One of the indirect advantages of the formal trade/ERB review process was to include the whole study team in discussions of LRB requirements, constraints, assumptions and selection criteria.

## LRB TRADE STUDY ASSIGNMENTS AND STATUS

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>TRADE STUDY</u>	<u>LEADER</u>	<u>SYSTEMS</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
8	1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION	D. SMITH	G.FARMER	FINAL 7 DEC 87 WRITING REPORT
26	1.2 NO OF ENGINES & ENGINE OUT	G. MEHTA	G. FARMER	FINAL 7 DEC 87 WRITING REPORT
52	1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION	J. PATTON	G. FARMER	INITIAL 12 NOV 87 INTERIM 7 DEC 87 INTERIM 14 JAN 88
86	1.5 PUMP FED - PROPEL SELECTION	T. NGUYEN	M. VACCARO	FINAL 4 DEC 87 WRITING REPORT
104	1.6 PRESS FED - PROPEL SELECTION	T. NGUYEN	M. VACCARO	FINAL 4 DEC 87 WRITING REPORT
114	1.7 PRESS FED - CHAMBER PRESSURE SELECTION	W. PIERCE	M. VACCARO	INITIAL 5 NOV 87 FINAL 12 JAN 88 WRITING REPORT
160	1.8 PUMP FED - ENGINE PERFORM/SELECTION	G. MEHTA	L. PENA	INITIAL 8 DEC 87
172	1.9 PRESS FED - ENGINE PERFORM/SELECTION	G. MEHTA	L. PENA	INITIAL 8 DEC 87
200	1.10 PROPULSION - IGNITION SEQ AND HOLD DOWN	J. DAVIS	L. PENA	INITIAL 17 NOV 87
120	1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION	T. SACZALSKI	L. PENA	INITIAL 11 DEC 87 INTERIM 15 JAN 88
232	1.13 RECOVERY SYSTEM SELECTION	A. ORILLION	G. FARMER	(REVIEW VIA PHONE) INITIAL 15 JAN 88
146	1.14 PRESS FED - PRESS SYSTEM SELECTION	W. PIERCE	M. VACCARO	INITIAL 1 DEC 87
270	1.15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION	J. WASHBURN	L. PENA	INITIAL 5 NOV 87
290	1.16 SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION	P. BRENNAN	L. PENA	COMPLETED
349	1.17 LRB STIFFNESS	V. SHEKHER		COMPLETED

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
Trade Studies

Listing and Descriptions

TS #	Trade Study Title	Trade Study Description
1.1	Length - Diameter Optimization	Determine the optimum length to diameter ratio (L/D) and configuration of the LRBs to achieve required performance and maintain acceptable aerodynamic loads on the Orbiter wings.
1.2	Number of Engines & Engine Out Trade	Perform an analysis of Orbiter and LRB engine-out capability resulting in a definition of required LRB total impulse (and thrust level). Selection of the appropriate sized engine (and the number of engines required) are based on thrust requirements.
1.3	Abort Mode Optimization	Determine improved STS abort modes and scenarios which can be implemented with the use of LRBs. Provide recommend abort modes for all ascent flight phases. Abort modes should offer greater mission flexibility and/or reduced (STS) LCC.
1.4	Degree of Recovery/ Reusability	Selection of no recovery, P/A module recovery, and/or tank recovery modes. Determine the degree of reusability and refurbishment of recovered equipment.
1.5	Propellant Selection	Select propellants based on performance, safety, and LRB configuration constraints (L/D) for a pump fed propellant system. Present alternatives are: LO <sub>2</sub> /LH <sub>2</sub> , LO <sub>2</sub> /CH <sub>4</sub> , LO <sub>2</sub> /C <sub>3</sub> H <sub>8</sub> , LO <sub>2</sub> /RP-1, LO <sub>2</sub> /CH <sub>4</sub> /LH <sub>2</sub> , LO <sub>2</sub> /C <sub>3</sub> H <sub>8</sub> /LH <sub>2</sub> , LO <sub>2</sub> /RP-1/LH <sub>2</sub> , N <sub>2</sub> O <sub>4</sub> /A-50, N <sub>2</sub> O <sub>4</sub> /MMH.
1.6	Propellant Selection	Selection of propellants based on performance, safety, and LRB configuration constraints (L/D) for a pressure fed propellant system. Present alternatives are: (see T.S. 1.4)

TS #	Trade Study Title	Trade Study Description
1.7	Chamber Pressure Selection	Selection of the optimum tank and chamber pressures to obtain minimum engine, tank and propellant weight for a pressure fed LRB propulsion system.
1.8	Engine Performance/ Selection	Selection of the appropriate pump fed engine based on propellant selection and thrust (also dependent on number of engines) requirements.
1.9	Engine Performance/ Selection	Selection of the appropriate pressure fed engine based on propellant selection and thrust (also dependent on number of engines) requirements.
1.10	Ignition Sequence and Hold Down	Investigate ignition sequence, thrust build-up, and release characteristics to minimize the "twang" prior to lift-off.
1.11	Flight Control Implementation	Selection of source of flight control. The sources are LRB (autonomous control), Orbiter GPCs (as SRMs), or a combination.
1.12	Tank Configuration Selection	Selection of the recommended tank config. & materials including consideration of insulation and thermal protection. Both Pump and pressure fed systems will be investigated and a recommendation will be provided for each type of propellant system.
1.13	Recovery Systems Selection	Selection of the recommended LRB recovery systems including consideration of separation, trajectory, thermal protection, deployment, control, landing impact attenuation, landing sites, and reusability / refurbishment.
1.14	Pressurization System Selection	Select method and systems for pressure fed propulsion system's tank pressurization.
1.15	Facility Optimization	Determine the best launch/MCS concepts to be used to process and launch the Liquid Rocket Booster while minimizing interface impacts with the STS.

# PRIMARY SELECTION CRITERIA

We have defined selection criteria we believe reflect the principal thrust of the LRB systems study. Although no weighting factor is associated with a given criterion, safety, reliability, STS compatibility, and performance are viewed as primary. These are basically go / no-go screening criteria. The remaining criteria, including cost, are viewed as secondary. Although important, secondary criteria may not be used to select a candidate LRB concept that does not sufficiently satisfy the primary criteria.

Each trade study and the concept selection process used these same criteria. For example, we have not necessarily selected the lightest or highest performance system or concept, but rather aimed for the safest and most reliable. Foremost in our mind was the fact that LRB must integrate into the manned STS and improved safety and reliability.

Traditional methods of applying a numerical score and weighting factor to a subjective criterion do not provide the necessary insight into why one LRB concept fared better than another. The rationale must be clearly stated in written form; this will allow NASA to evaluate the thought process by which the evaluation was made, and will serve as an important step in evaluating and selection process documentation.

# PRIMARY CRITERIA MATRIX

*DDP*  
LRB

SELECTION CRITERION	SELECTION CRITERION DEFINITION	SELECTION CRITERION ELEMENTS
SAFETY / ENVIRONMENTAL ACCEPTABILITY	EXTENT TO WHICH LRB CONCEPT MINIMIZES HAZARDS TO STS, LAUNCH FACILITIES, RANGE, AND PERSONNEL. EXTENT TO WHICH INTRODUCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANTS OR OTHER DETRIMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS IS AVOIDED. EXTENT TO WHICH LAUNCH DEBRIS IS MINIMIZED.	• PROPELLANT TOXICITY/EXPLOSIVE HAZARD
		• ABORT FEASIBILITY & OPERATIONAL CONTINGENCY MODES
		• NON-CORROSIVE, NON-TOXIC PROPELLANTS
		• MINIMIZES RE-ENTRY DEBRIS
		• MINIMIZES AIR, WATER, AND NOISE POLLUTION
RELIABILITY / SIMPLICITY	DEGREE TO WHICH LRB CONCEPTS INCORPORATE RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENTS. DEGREE TO WHICH LRB CONCEPTS REDUCE OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY, REQUIREMENTS, OR PROCEDURES IN AN EFFORT TO STREAMLINE LRB PROCESSING.	• DESIGN MARGINS AND SIMPLICITY VS COMPLEXITY
		• ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY
		• EXCESS PERFORMANCE
		• DEGREE OF SYSTEM REDUNDANCY
		• BUILT IN TEST AND CHECKOUT
STS COMPATIBILITY (VEHICLE)	DEGREE TO WHICH CANDIDATE LRB MINIMIZES IMPACTS TO ORBITER AND EXTERNAL TANK	• A / EXPERT SYSTEMS FOR LAUNCH PROCESSING
		• PROPELLANT / PROPULSION PROBLEMS
		• MINIMIZES CONSTRAINTS, SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
		• ORBITER AND ET INTERFACE MODIFICATIONS
		• SIZE RELATED PROBLEMS (SUCH AS WING LOADS)
STS COMPATIBILITY (FACILITIES)	DEGREE TO WHICH CANDIDATE LRB MINIMIZES IMPACTS TO EXISTING GROUND/LAUNCH FACILITIES	• PROCESSING/LAUNCH FACILITY MODIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
		• LRB PROGRAM PHASE-IN FEASIBILITY DURING ONGOING KSC OPERATIONS
		• ENGINE / PROPULSION SYSTEM EFFICIENCY
		• LRB GROSS LIFTOFF WEIGHT
		• MARGINS
PERFORMANCE	ABILITY OF LRB CONCEPT TO MEET OR EXCEED REQUIRED PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY	• SIZE (LRB LENGTH AND DIAMETER)

# SECONDARY CRITERIA MATRIX

 LRB

SELECTION CRITERION	SELECTION CRITERION DEFINITION	SELECTION CRITERION ELEMENTS
NONRECURRING COST	INCLUDES ALL COSTS INCURRED DURING THE DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION (DDT&E) PHASE. EXCLUDES PRODUCTION OF ALL FLIGHT HARDWARE.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST &amp; EVALUATION</li> <li>DEVELOPMENT COSTS TO FLIGHT VEHICLE IOC</li> <li>GROUND FACILITY ACTIVATION COSTS</li> <li>LRB TEST FLIGHTS</li> </ul>
RECURRING COST	COST (UNDISCOUNTED) STARTING WITH COMPLETION OF FIRST LRB TEST FLIGHTS AND PROCEEDS THROUGH ITS DEFINED LIFE CYCLE. INCLUDES PRODUCTION COSTS OF REUSABLE HARDWARE, RECURRING OPERATIONS COSTS, AND COSTS FOR UNRELIABILITY.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PRODUCTION OF FLIGHT HARDWARE</li> <li>RECOVERY, REFURB, AND RESUPPLY OF REUSABLE LRB HW</li> <li>ALL OPS &amp; MAINT COSTS FOR LRB FLT AND GRD SYSTEMS</li> <li>COST FOR LOSSES BASED ON UNRELIABILITY</li> </ul>
PROGRAM RISK	AREAS OF GREATEST COST RISK WILL BE IDENTIFIED BY ANALYZING THE SENSITIVITY OF COST TO KEY DESIGN AND PROGRAM PARAMETERS. THE LIKELIHOOD THAT REQUIRED LRB SYSTEMS CAN BE DEVELOPED AND ACQUIRED ON SCHEDULE. THE LIKELIHOOD THAT TECHNICAL ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RISKS IN SUCCESSFULLY INTEGRATING LRB INTO STS</li> <li>RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH FACILITY MODIFICATIONS</li> <li>RISKS DUE TO DEPENDENCY ON ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY</li> <li>RISKS IN MANUFACTURING</li> <li>RISK FOR TECH DEVL PMT AND INTEG INTO LRB ON NEEDED DATE</li> <li>LONG LEAD PROCUREMENT</li> <li>ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT</li> <li>RISK IN MEETING PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS</li> <li>SENSITIVITY TO FAULTS, ENVIRONMENTS, ETC</li> <li>SUPPORTABILITY AND LOGISTICS</li> <li>PROCESSABILITY AND PRODUCTIBILITY</li> <li>MAINTAINABILITY / REUSABLE COMPONENT TURNAROUND TIME</li> </ul>
OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY	DEGREE TO WHICH LRB CONCEPTS WILL BE OPERATIONALLY READY TO SUPPORT STS MISSIONS	
GROWTH POTENTIAL	ABILITY OF THE CANDIDATE LRB CONCEPT TO ACCOMMODATE INCREASES IN STS LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS ABILITY OF LRB CONCEPT TO EVOLVE TO SATISFY BOOSTER REQUIREMENTS OF FUTURE LAUNCH VEHICLE SYSTEMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PERFORMS INCREASED STS PAYLOAD/FLIGHT RATE REQUIREMENTS</li> <li>GROWTH COMPATIBILITY FOR SDV, ALS, OR SHUTTLE II</li> <li>LEVEL OF LRB GROWTH POTENTIAL</li> </ul>

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
DECEMBER 7, 1987

TRADE STUDY 1.1  
FINAL ERB

# CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION

STUDY LEADER: DONNA SMITH

SYSTEMS ENGINEER: GREG FARMER

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division



# 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION

## Planning Sheet 1

### OBJECTIVE:

DETERMINE THE OPTIMUM LENGTH TO DIAMETER RATIO (L/D) AND CONFIGURATION OF THE LRBs TO ACHIEVE REQUIRED PERFORMANCE AND MINIMIZE STS IMPACTS (INCLUDING MAINTAINING ACCEPTABLE LOADS ON THE ORBITER WINGS)

### GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES:

- LO2/H2 AND LO2/HC (RP-1, C3H8, CH4) ARE PREFERRED PUMP-FED PROPELLANTS (TS 1.5)
- LO2/RP-1 IS PREFERRED PRESSURE-FED PROPELLANT (TS 1.6)
- 400 PSI OPTIMUM CHAMBER PRESSURE FOR PRESSURE-FED BOOSTER (TS 1.7)
- 4 ENGINES PER BOOSTER

## 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 2

### REQUIREMENTS:

- 70 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION  
WITH ORBITER SSME's LIMITED TO 100% PL
- 59 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION  
WITH ORBITER SSME's LIMITED TO 104% PL


### CONSTRAINTS:

- MINIMIZE IMPACTS TO ET, ORBITER, LAUNCH SITE, AND GSE
- ORBITER WING LOADS LIMITED TO CURRENT LEVELS
- STS TRAJECTORY CONSTRAINTS ON MAX Q, LIFTOFF T/W,  
MAX G, Q-ALPHA, ETC.
- 200 FT BOOSTER LENGTH LIMIT DUE TO VAB STRUCTURE
- 50 INCH NOZZLE EXIT DIAMETER FOR NO IMPACT TO MLP
- 90 INCH NOZZLE EXIT DIAMETER FOR NO IMPACT TO FLAMETRENCH

# 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION

## Planning Sheet 4

# Trade Tree LRB CONFIGURATION




① VARIATIONS OF THE CONFIGURATION SHOWN WILL ALSO BE CONSIDERED

② ELIMINATED BY ERB DIRECTION (HIGH COST AND TECHNICAL RISK)

# 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION Results: Pump-Fed LRB Sizes


PC = OPTIMIZED, NOZZLE DIAMETER = 50 IN

NOTE: ALL TANKS ARE  
CONVENTIONAL CYLINDERS



# 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION Results: Pressure-Fed LRB Sizes

PC = 400 PSI, NOZZLE EXIT DIAMETER = 90 IN



## 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION OPTION 1 EVALUATION (MSFC option #4)


### LRB DIAMETER REDUCTION NEAR ORBITER WING

#### ADVANTAGES:

- MAINTAINS CURRENT CLEARANCE BETWEEN BOOSTER AND ORBITER WING, AS LONG AS SMALLER DIAMETER IS KEPT TO 12.2 FEET
- INCREASES AVAILABLE PROPELLANT VOLUME

#### DISADVANTAGES:

- UNORTHODOX SHAPE DIFFICULT TO MANUFACTURE - HIGH DEVELOPMENT AND RECURRING COSTS
- POSSIBLE BUFFETING DURING THE TRANSONIC REGIME WOULD NEED TO BE INVESTIGATED IN UPCOMING WIND TUNNEL TESTS
- FLOW ATTACHMENT AROUND HAMMERHEAD AREA QUESTIONABLE - WOULD ALSO NEED TO BE CHECKED IN WIND TUNNEL TESTS
- THIS CONFIGURATION DOES NOT SOLVE ALL VOLUME PROBLEMS - FOR EXAMPLE, A PUMP-FED L02/LH2 BOOSTER OF 160 FT LENGTH WOULD NEED AN UPPER DIAMETER OF 23 FT



## 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION OPTION 2 EVALUATION


### FLOWFIELD MODIFICATION DEVICES

#### ADVANTAGES:

- INCREASES THE ENERGY OF THE FLOW UNDER THE WINGS IN AN EFFORT TO DECREASE THE LOADS ON THE ORBITER WINGS
- IF THIS WORKED, A LARGER DIAMETER LRB COULD BE ACCOMMODATED

#### DISADVANTAGES:

- AERODYNAMIC EFFECTIVENESS QUESTIONABLE - NO WIND TUNNEL TESTING PLANNED
- INVOLVES IMPACT TO EXTERNAL TANK STRUCTURE - LOADS WOULD NEED TO BE TRANSMITTED FROM THE FIN OR STRAKE TO THE ET



## 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION OPTION 3 EVALUATION (MSFC options #2 & 3)


### ORBITER STANDOFF MOUNT MODIFICATION

#### ADVANTAGES:

- MAINTAINS CURRENT CLEARANCE BETWEEN BOOSTER AND ORBITER WING BY MOVING THE ORBITER AWAY FROM THE BOOSTER
- DECREASES WING LOADS VIA TWO EFFECTS (SEPARATION DISTANCE AND ANGLE OF ATTACK)

#### DISADVANTAGES:

- AFFECTS INTERFACE LOADS BETWEEN ORBITER AND ET
- INVOLVES REDESIGN OF ORBITER PROPELLANT FEEDLINES
- CHANGE IN ORBITER INCIDENCE ANGLE WOULD CHANGE SSME THRUST VECTOR AND THUS AFFECT THE TRAJECTORY
- MODIFICATION TO ORBITER COULD DELAY LAUNCH SCHEDULE





## 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION OPTION 4 EVALUATION (MSFC option #5)


### PIGGYBACK OR TANDEM TANK ARRANGEMENT:

#### ADVANTAGES:

- INCREASES AVAILABLE PROPELLANT VOLUME WITHOUT CHANGING CLEARANCE BETWEEN BOOSTER AND ORBITER WING
- LRB NOZZLES COULD BE PLACED IN SAME POSITION AS CURRENT SRB NOZZLES, THUS MINIMIZING IMPACT TO FLAMETRENCH
- SIDE-BY-SIDE TANKS INCREASE THE BENDING STIFFNESS OF THE STACK, PERHAPS REDUCING THE "TWANG" PROBLEM AT IGNITION
- LARGE PERFORMANCE MARGINS AVAILABLE WITH PUMP-FED HYDROCARBON PROPELLANT CONCEPTS

#### DISADVANTAGES:

- COMPLEX CONFIGURATION TO DESIGN AND BUILD
- LIMITED ADAPTABILITY TO OTHER VEHICLES
- HEAT TRANSFER BETWEEN PARALLEL TANKS - ADDITIONAL INSULATION MAY BE REQUIRED FOR CRYOGENIC PROPELLANTS



## 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION OPTION 5 EVALUATION


CONVENTIONAL STACKED TANKS - LONGER THAN 149 FT (D=12 FT)

**ADVANTAGES:**

- LOWEST IMPACT TO ORBITER, ET, AND FACILITIES OF ALL THE OPTIONS CONSIDERED
- GREATER LENGTH INCREASES AVAILABLE PROPELLANT VOLUME:

**DISADVANTAGES:**

- LENGTH LIMITED TO 200 FT, DUE TO VAB STRUCTURE
- DRAG AND AEROHEATING INCREASE AS BOOSTER APPROACHES ET HEIGHT
- ACCEPTANCE OF LONGER LRB DICTATED BY STRUCTURAL AND CONTROLS CONSIDERATIONS



# 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION OPTION 6 EVALUATION (MSFC option #1)


## ROTATING LRB'S AWAY FROM ORBITER

### ADVANTAGES:

- INCREASES DISTANCE BETWEEN BOOSTER AND ORBITER WING BY ATTACHING THE LRB'S TO A DIFFERENT POINT ON THE ET, THUS ACCOMODATING A LARGER DIAMETER
- MINIMUM IMPACT TO ORBITER
- SMALL ROTATION ANGLES REQUIRED FOR HYDROCARBON PROPELLANT CONCEPTS (ABOUT ONE DEGREE)
- GROWTH POTENTIAL FOR STAND-ALONE BOOSTER
- MODIFICATIONS TO ET STRUCTURE NEED NOT AFFECT STS LAUNCH SCHEDULE

### DISADVANTAGES:

- INVOLVES MODIFICATION TO ET STRUCTURE AND POSSIBLE REQUALIFICATION
- MODIFICATIONS TO BOOSTER WORK PLATFORMS



## 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION OPTION 7 EVALUATION


### NON-CYLINDRICAL TANKS

#### ADVANTAGES:

- A NON-CYLINDRICAL TANK SHAPE (SUCH AS AN ELLIPTICAL CROSS SECTION) INCREASES TANK VOLUME WITHOUT CHANGING CLEARANCE BETWEEN BOOSTER AND ORBITER WING

#### DISADVANTAGES:

- DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE TO MANUFACTURE
- GREATER STRUCTURAL WEIGHT THAN AN EQUIVALENT CYLINDRICAL TANK - MORE PROPELLANT REQUIRED



Criteria Applicability Matrix worksheet (Rev-A)			Trade Study No. 1.1	Page 1 of 2	Applicability
SELECTION CRITERION	SELECTION CRITERION DEFINITION	SELECTION CRITERION ELEMENTS			
SAFETY	EXTENT TO WHICH LRB CONCEPT MINIMIZES HAZARDS TO STS, LAUNCH FACILITIES, RANGE, AND PERSONNEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PROPELLANT TOXICITY/EXPLOSIVE HAZARD</li> <li>• ABORT FEASIBILITY &amp; OPERATIONAL CONTINGENCY MODES</li> <li>• FAILURE DETECTION</li> </ul>			X
RELIABILITY FEATURES	DEGREE TO WHICH LRB CONCEPTS INCORPORATE RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DESIGN MARGINS</li> <li>• ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY</li> <li>• EXCESS PERFORMANCE</li> <li>• DEGREE OF SYSTEM REDUNDANCY</li> </ul>			X
STS COMPATIBILITY	DEGREE TO WHICH CANDIDATE LRB MINIMIZES IMPACTS TO EXISTING STS, INCLUDING ORBITER, EXTERNAL TANK, AND GROUND/LAUNCH FACILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• STS INTERFACE MODIFICATIONS</li> <li>• MAINTENANCE OF STS/SRB LAUNCH CAPABILITY</li> <li>• PROCESSING/LAUNCH FACILITY MODIFICATION REQUIREMENTS</li> <li>• LRB PROGRAM PHASE IN FEASIBILITY DURING ON-GOING STS OPERATIONS</li> </ul>			X
PERFORMANCE	ABILITY OF LRB CONCEPT TO MEET OR EXCEED REQUIRED PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ENGINE/PROPULSION SYSTEM EFFICIENCY</li> <li>• LRB LIFT OFF WEIGHT</li> <li>• MARGINS</li> </ul>			X
NONRECURRING COST	INCLUDES ALL COSTS INCURRED DURING THE DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION (DDTAE) PHASE. EXCLUDES PRODUCTION OF ALL FLIGHT HARDWARE.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RESEARCH, DVL/PMT, TEST &amp; EVALUATION</li> <li>• DEVELOPMENT COSTS TO FLIGHT VEHICLE IOC</li> <li>• GROUND FACILITY ACTIVATION COSTS</li> <li>• LRB TEST FLIGHTS</li> </ul>			X
RECURRING COST	COST (UNDISCOUNTED) STARTING WITH COMPLETION OF FIRST LRB TEST FLIGHTS AND PROCEEDS THROUGH ITS DEFINED LIFE CYCLE. INCLUDES PRODUCTION COSTS OF REUSABLE HARDWARE, RECURRING OPERATIONS COSTS, AND COSTS FOR UNRELIABILITY.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PRODUCTION OF FLIGHT HARDWARE</li> <li>• RECOVERY, REFURB, AND RESUPPLY OF REUSABLE LRB HW</li> <li>• ALL OPS &amp; MAINT COSTS FOR LRB FLT AND GRD SYSTEMS</li> <li>• COSTS FOR LOSSES BASED ON UNRELIABILITY</li> </ul>			X
COST RISK	AREAS OF GREATEST COST RISK WILL BE IDENTIFIED BY ANALYZING THE SENSITIVITY OF COST TO KEY DESIGN AND PROGRAM PARAMETERS.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RISKS IN SUCCESSFULLY INTEGRATING LRB INTO STS</li> <li>• RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH FACILITY MODIFICATIONS</li> </ul>			

Criteria Applicability Matrix worksheet (Rev-A)			Trade Study No. 1.1	Page 2 of 2	Applicability
SELECTION CRITERION	SELECTION CRITERION DEFINITION	SELECTION CRITERION ELEMENTS			
SCHEDULE RISK	THE LIKELIHOOD THAT REQUIRED LRB SYSTEMS CAN BE DEVELOPED AND ACQUIRED ON SCHEDULE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RISK FOR TECH DVL PMT AND INTEG INTO LRB ON NEED DATE</li> <li>• LONG LEAD PROCUREMENT</li> </ul>			X
TECHNICAL RISK	THE LIKELIHOOD THAT TECHNICAL ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT</li> <li>• RISK IN MEETING PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS</li> </ul>			X
OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY	DEGREE TO WHICH LRB CONCEPTS WILL BE OPERATIONALLY READY TO SUPPORT STS MISSIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• INSENSITIVITY TO FAILURES, ENVIRONMENTS, ETC</li> <li>• SUPPORTABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY</li> <li>• PROCESSABILITY AND PRODUCIBILITY</li> </ul>			X
OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY	DEGREE TO WHICH LRB CONCEPT REDUCES OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY, REQUIREMENTS, OR PROCEDURES IN AN EFFORT TO STREAMLINE LRB PROCESSING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• REUSABLE COMPONENT TURNAROUND TIME</li> <li>• BUILT IN TEST &amp; CHECKOUT</li> <li>• AI/EXPERT SYSTEMS FOR LAUNCH PROCESSING</li> <li>• MISSION CONTROL SYSTEM</li> <li>• MINIMIZES HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS</li> <li>• ACCESSIBLE COMPONENTS</li> </ul>			
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCEPTABILITY	EXTENT TO WHICH LRB CONCEPTS AVOID INTRODUCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANTS OR OTHER DETRIMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS. EXTENT TO WHICH LAUNCH DEBRIS IS MINIMIZED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NON CORROSIVE, NON-TOXIC PROPELLANTS</li> <li>• MINIMIZES RE-ENTRY DEBRIS</li> <li>• MINIMIZES AIR, WATER, AND NOISE POLLUTION</li> </ul>			
GROWTH POTENTIAL	ABILITY OF THE CANDIDATE LRB CONCEPT TO ACCOMMODATE INCREASES IN STS LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS ABILITY OF LRB CONCEPT TO EVOLVE TO SATISFY BOOSTER REQUIREMENTS OF FUTURE LAUNCH VEHICLE SYSTEMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PERFORMS INCREASED STS PAYLOAD/FLT RATE REQMTS</li> <li>• GROWTH COMPATIBILITY FOR SDV, ALS, OR SHUTTLE #</li> <li>• LEVEL OF LRB GROWTH POTENTIAL</li> </ul>			X
Additional Criteria	Additional Criteria Definition				

# 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 7

## Comparison Matrix

ELIMINATED BY  
ERB DIRECTION

+ Good o Average - Bad	Conf. 1	Conf. 2	Conf. 3	Conf. 4	Conf. 5	Conf. 6	Conf. 7	Conf. 8
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Safety	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Reliability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
STS Compatibility	+	0	-	0	+	0	0	
Performance	0	0	-	+	0	+	0	
Non-Recurring Cost	+	-	-	0	+	-	0	
Recurring Cost	-	0	+	-	+	0	-	
Technical Risk	-	-	0	0	+	0	-	
Operational Availability	-	0	+	0	+	0	-	
Growth Potential	0	+	+	-	+	+	-	

# 1.1 CONFIGURATION OPTIMIZATION

CONCLUSIONS: (see "Update" - next page)

BEST CONFIGURATION APPEARS TO A COMBINATION OF ROTATION WITH INCREASED LENGTH AND DIAMETER:

- A CONVENTIONALLY-SHAPED BOOSTER, LONGER THAN THE CURRENT SRB (149 FT), BUT NOT TALLER THAN THE ET (179 FT). AVOIDS NEEDING A NEW SWING ARM FOR THE ET LOX VENT, AND MINIMIZES ET-BOOSTER SHOCK INTERACTIONS,
- DIAMETER SIZED TO MEET PROPELLANT VOLUME REQUIREMENTS, AND
- ROTATED A SMALL ANGLE AROUND THE ET TO MAINTAIN THE SAME CLEARANCE BETWEEN THE BOOSTER AND ORBITER WING

## RECOMMENDATIONS:

- ANALYSE EFFECT OF LRB LENGTH ON LONGITUDINAL STABILITY, TO DETERMINE A LENGTH LIMIT
- DETERMINE OF STRUCTURAL LENGTH LIMIT
- OBTAIN WIND TUNNEL DATA PLOTS OF ORBITER WING SHEAR, TORSION, AND BENDING MOMENT AS A FUNCTION OF ANGLE OF ATTACK, TO DETERMINE WHICH LOAD LIMITS VEHICLE DESIGN, AND TO SEE IF THE WING LOADING PROBLEM CAN BE SOLVED BY TRAJECTORY SHAPING ALONE.



## UPDATE ON TS 1.1 CONFIGURATION

Configuration Optimization involves 2 related areas:

a) To avoid overloading the Orbiter wing (and other constraints) at max  $\alpha$  q, non-standard LRB arrangements were considered. MSFC performed wind tunnel tests which directly related to those questions.

This trade study recommended rotating (or clocking) the large LRB so that the distance from the LRB skin to the Orbiter wing remained 15 feet at the mean aerodynamic chord. Later wind tunnel data indicated this concept is not as effective as hoped and disturbs the lateral aerodynamics. Based on subsequent wind tunnel data & loads analyses our current (5/13/88) recommendation to relieve wing loads is to reduce max  $\alpha$  q for larger diameter and longer LRB's which are located on the ET centerline.

b) The second area involves optimum length and diameter dimensions. The SRMs have an L/D of 12.2. The attached memo explains why we feel this is roughly OK for LRB.

This trade is subject to updating & refinement.

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
DECEMBER 7, 1987

TRADE STUDY 1.2  
FINAL ERB

## ENGINE OUT/NUMBER OF ENGINES

STUDY LEADER: GOPAL MEHTA / CLYDE WILEY

SYSTEMS ENGINEER: GREG FARMER

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division

## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

### OBJECTIVE: • Establish LRB engine-out requirements

- Perform an analysis to determine minimum number of engines required to satisfy engine-out considerations
- Provide guidelines for selecting number of engines

### GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES:

- Safety, not cost etc., has the highest priority. Safety here means safe abort.
- Mission success (70K payload to 105 N.M. circular orbit) is the minimum goal. Nominal T/W with engine out is assumed to be 1.25 to achieve this goal
- Assume design T/W = 1.4 with no LRB engines out at L/O. (Same as current SRB case, and hence would at least keep current abort mode capability).
- All LRB engines have the same thrust.

## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

### REQUIREMENTS:

- 1) Nominal performance shall provide 70k payload to 150 x 150 nm East w/100% SSME's
- 2) Maintain Orbiter/ET trajectory constraints (g's,Q, etc)
- 3) Safety of the STS shall be improved over the current STS safety level.

### CONSTRAINTS:

This analysis shall be limited to the LRB configurations which have one booster on each side.

## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

### INPUTS:

- MINIMUM THRUST TO WEIGHT WITH ENGINE OUT AT L/O
  - FROM WINDLOADS AND NEAR GROUND MANEUVERING CONSIDERATIONS
  - FROM SAFE ABORT CONSIDERATION (INCLUDING FOOTPRINTS)
- DESIRED THRUST TO WEIGHT WITH ALL ENGINES AT LIFT-OFF
  - TRAJECTORY OPTIMIZATION WITH 70K P/L
  - MAXIMUM TW ALLOWABLE BY ET AND ORBITER AT LIFTOFF
  - ENGINE COST, THROTTLING CAPABILITY REQUIRED
- FACILITY IMPACT
- ENGINE COST, WEIGHT, RELIABILITY

### OUTPUTS:


- ENGINE OUT REQUIREMENTS
- MINIMUM NUMBER OF ENGINES TO SATISFY ENGINE-OUT CONSIDERATIONS
- IMPACT OF INCREASING NUMBER OF ENGINES

### OTHER TRADES AFFECTED:

- ALL TRADES


# 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

## RESULTS - ENGINE OUT CONSIDERATION QUALITATIVE




SRB (CURRENT)

- SIMPLE
- CURRENT CONFIGURATION (NO IMPACT)
- NO THROTTLING FLEXIBILITY
- NO ABORT MODE DURING BOOST
- FAILURE CATASTROPHIC



SINGLE ENGINE LRB

- MORE COMPLEX
- LOWER DENSITY IMPULSE (AND HENCE WOULD HAVE IMPACT) IMPACT ON STS)
- THROTTLING FLEXIBILITY (BETTER TRAJECTORY OPT. AND CONTROL)
- LIMITED ABORT MODE DURING BOOST
- ENGINE CUT-OFF POSSIBLE IN EMERGENCY
- SAFER
- STS SYSTEM RELIABILITY MAY INCREASE




MULTI-ENGINE LRB

- INCREASED COMPLEXITY
- LOWER DENSITY IMPULSE (AND HENCE WOULD HAVE IMPACT)
- THROTTLING FLEXIBILITY (BETTER TRAJECTORY OPTIMIZATION & CONTROL)
- INCREASED ABORT FLEXIBILITY / SAFETY
  - SAFE ABORT WITH ENGINE OUT~ CAPABILITY POSSIBLE AT ALL TIMES
  - MISSION SUCCESS POSSIBLE WITH ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY FOR SOME CASES
  - STS SYSTEM RELIABILITY MAY INCREASE

## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
SPACE SYSTEMS DIVISION

### RESULTS - ENGINE OUT CONSIDERATION QUALITATIVE (CONTINUED)




- GOING FROM SRB TO LRB SATISFIES REQUIREMENT OF INCREASED SAFETY  
- WITH SHUTDOWN
- SINGLE ENGINE LRB PROVIDES SAFE ABORT OVER PART OF THE BOOST PHASE
- MULTIPLE ENGINES (WITH ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY) ON LRB CAN PROVIDE SAFETY THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE BOOST PHASE

## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

### RESULTS - ENGINE OUT CONSIDERATION

### RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

- ANALYSIS BASED ON  $R = 0.99$  AND CORRELATION OF 0.05 (EXAMPLE)
- PRESSURE FED SHOULD HAVE HIGHER RELIABILITY THAN PUMP FED BECAUSE OF LACK OF TURBO-MACHINERY
- RELIABILITY SHOULD BE BASED ON AFTER IGNITION AND TRANSIENT EFFECTS (BECAUSE HOLD DOWN CAPABILITY OF LRB)
- TREND, NOT ABSOLUTE NUMBERS, IMPORTANT AT THIS POINT



BASICALLY SAYS ONE ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE A GOAL FOR SMALLER NUMBER OF ENGINES AND TWO ENGINES OUT FOR GREATER NUMBER.



## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

RESULTS - ENGINE OUT CONSIDERATION

QUANTIFY (SUBJECTIVE) PRELIMINARY REQUIREMENT AS:

<u>ENGINE TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF ENGINES</u>	<u>ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY AT LIFT-OFF</u>
F-1 ENGINE	2	1 LRB ENGINE OR 1 SSME
ALL OTHER ENGINES	> 2	1 LEFT LRB ENGINE & 1 RIGHT LRB ENGINE OR 1 LRB ENGINE & 1 SSME ENGINE

W  
W

RELIABILITY - REQUIREMENT OR ASSUMED REQUIREMENT ON  
FAILURE TOLERANCE:

NONE

## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

### MINIMUM NUMBER OF ENGINES

ANALYSIS (RESTRICTED HERE TO LRB ENGINE FAILURE;  
CAN BE EASILY EXTENDED)

#### DEFINITIONS

$T_{wd}$  = DESIGNED THRUST/WEIGHT AT LIFTOFF

$T_{wm}$  = MINIMUM THRUST/WEIGHT AT LIFTOFF

$F_{boost}$  = TOTAL BOOSTER THRUST

$F_{ssme}$  = TOTAL SSME THRUST

$N$  = TOTAL NUMBER OF BOOSTER ENGINES

$Z$  = TOTAL NUMBER OF ENGINES OUT

#### DEVELOPMENT

$$T_{wd} = \frac{F_{boost} + F_{ssme}}{W} \quad T_{wm} = \frac{F_{boost}}{N} (N-Z) + \frac{F_{ssme}}{W}$$

$$T_{wd} / T_{wm} = (F_{boost} + F_{ssme}) / \left( \frac{F_{boost}}{N} (N-Z) + F_{ssme} \right) \Rightarrow \frac{F_{boost}}{N} (N-Z) + F_{ssme} = (F_{boost} + F_{ssme}) \frac{T_{wm}}{T_{wd}}$$

$$\frac{F_{boost}}{N} (N-Z) = (F_{boost} + F_{ssme}) \frac{T_{wm}}{T_{wd}} - F_{ssme} \Rightarrow F_{boost} - Z/N F_{boost} = (F_{boost} + F_{ssme}) \frac{T_{wm}}{T_{wd}} - F_{ssme}$$

$$ZN F_{boost} = F_{boost} - (F_{boost} + F_{ssme}) \frac{T_{wm}}{T_{wd}} + F_{ssme} \Rightarrow N = Z F_{boost} / (F_{boost} - (F_{boost} + F_{ssme}) \frac{T_{wm}}{T_{wd}} + F_{ssme})$$

## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

### MINIMUM NUMBER OF ENGINES ANALYSIS (CONTINUED)

HENCE MINIMUM NUMBER OF ENGINES CAN BE DETERMINED BY A SIMPLE EQUATION

$$N = \frac{Z}{(1 + F_{ssme} / F_{booster}) (1 - T_{wm} / T_{wd})}$$


IF WE KNOW :

Z = NUMBER OF BOOSTER ENGINES OUT  
F<sub>ssme</sub> = TOTAL ORBITER THRUST  
F<sub>booster</sub> = TOTAL BOOSTER THRUST  
T<sub>wm</sub> = T/W WITH ENGINE OUT  
T<sub>wd</sub> = DESIGN T/W

# 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

## MINIMUM NUMBER OF ENGINES

RESULTS:



### • LRB FAILURE EFFECTS:

- 1 LRB OUT = 2 ENGLRB (4 TOTAL) REQD
- 2 LRB OUT = 4 ENGLRB (8 TOTAL) REQD

\*NOTE: APPLICABLE TO L/O T/W = 1.05 & 1.1

- ASSUME DESIGN (NO LRB FAILURE) T/W = 1.4 SATISFIES (CURRENT) SSME FAILURE ABORT CAPABILITY
- ASSUME LRB TOTAL THRUST CONSTANT @ 3.0 MLBF EA.


# 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

## FACILITY IMPACT:

15 Ft DIA LRB, 4 ENGINES/LRB  
MAX ENGINE NOZZLE EXIT PLANE DIAMETERS  
WITH NO CHANGE TO ETR FLAME TRENCH.

ASSUMPTIONS:  
FOUR ENGINES, SYMMETRICAL AROUND LRB CL  
LRB ENGINE PLUME EXPANSION IS  
SIMILAR TO SSUE.  
ENGINES GIMBAL IN UNISON EVEN WITH ONE OUT.  
SPACE BETWEEN NOZZLES IS 10% OF EXIT DIA.

CONCLUSION:  
MAX EXIT PLANE DIA=7.5 FT (90 IN.)




DAVE HAYS  
NOV 18, 1987  
FILE 411 P-LRB

## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

### FACILITY IMPACT:

INITIALLY THOUGHT TO BE DRIVER. BUT NOT SO IF USE IS MADE OF RECTANGULAR SHAPE OF FLAME TRENCH.





- NO CHANGE IN MLP & FLAME TRENCH: ALLOWS 4-50" EXIT DIA NOZZLES. MOST PUMP FED, EXCEPT RP-1, SHOW LITTLE SENSITIVITY TO NOZZLE SIZE OPTIMIZATION BECAUSE CRAMER PRESSURES ALLOWED/SELECTED ARE HIGH



(10° GIMBAL ANGLE)

68


- MODIFIED/NEW MLP BUT NO CHANGE IN FLAME TRENCH. (1) ALLOWS EXISTING ENGINES PUMP FED (4-109% SSME35, 2-F-1 ENGINES, 10-RJ23-13L ENGINES) AND BACK PRESSURE OPTIMIZED PUMP FED LOX/RP-1 ENGINE




## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

### FACILITY IMPACT (Contd):

(2) ALLOWS 4-90% EXIT DIA NOZZLES. ALL PRESSURE FED SYSTEMS AT OPTIMIZED CHAMBER PRESSURE SHOW LITTLE SENSITIVITY TO NOZZLE SIZE OPTIMIZATION BECAUSE OF REASONABLE EXPANSION RATIO.



- OTHER ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE USED TO INCREASE THE EXIT DIAMETER



## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

### DESIRED NUMBER OF ENGINES

OPTIMIZATION PARAMETERS	REMARKS
• FACILITY IMPACT	MINIMUM IMPACT OF INCREASE IN ENGINES (WITHIN REASONABLE BOUND)
• SYSTEM WEIGHT	ENGINE SYSTEM WT. FIRST INCREASES AND THEN DECREASES
• CONTROL AUTHORITY	LESS GIMBAL & THROTTLING REQUIREMENT WITH MORE NUMBER OF ENGINES
• COST PER BOOSTER	WILL HAVE MINIMAL IMPACT AT CERTAIN NUMBER OF ENGINES (BECAUSE OF TESTING, MANUFACTURING, ETC.)
• GROUND OPS	INCREASES WITH NUMBER OF ENGINES
• COMPLEXITY/RELIABILITY	COMPLEXITY INCREASES BUT RELIABILITY OF LRB MAY NOT SUFFER BECAUSE OF INCREASED ENGINES OUT CAPABILITY



## 1.2 ENGINE OUT / NUMBER OF ENGINES

### SUMMARY

- AN LRB INHERENTLY PROVIDES ENHANCED SAFE ABORT OVER SRB
- MULTI-ENGINE LRB ARE PREFERRED CONFIGURATION AS THEY CAN PROVIDE ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY, WHICH RESULTS IN GREATER RELIABILITY (GREATER CHANCE OF SAFE ABORT AND MISSION SUCCESS)

A -

- AN ASSUMED REQUIREMENT FOR ENGINE OUT SUGGESTED IS

<u>NUMBER OF ENGINES</u>	<u>ENGINES</u>	<u>ENGINES OUT</u>
2	F-1	1 LRB OR 1 SSME
> 2	NEW	1 ENGINE/BOOSTER (TOTAL 2) OR 1 LRB & 1 SSME

- FOR INITIAL TRADES, USE MINIMUM NO. OF ENGINES WHICH GIVES ABOVE MENTIONED ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY.

## UPDATE ON T.S. 1.2 NUMBER OF ENGINES

The attached memo is a continuation and update of the original trade study on the number of engines. It was initially assumed that the Shuttle crew must be able to safely perform a contingency abort if one LRB engine failed. This leads to the basic requirement for a minimum of 2 engines per LRB.

We believe that LRBs must have superior mission reliability to SRBs, if the program is to be "sold". Therefore we are currently (5/13/88) sizing LRBs to meet the extra requirement of abort to orbit with one engine out. Minimum thrust-to-weight at launch to clear the tower with one engine out and nominal T/W at launch for minimum GLOW are vital considerations. So is the throttle range.

The attached memo summarizes our belief that 4 engines are the best (safe and reliable) choice for LRB. More recent performance runs with new constraints for the ET aft bulkhead are showing requirements for throttling >35% which impacts engine costs and may be a development risk for LOX/RP.

This trade should be reevaluated.

4/1/88

To: Dan Heald

From: Gopal Mehta & Paul R. Brennan

Subject: Assessment Of Number Of Engines Required

Reference: Memo L. Wear 3/18/88. Results Of LRB Configuration Selection Review

This memo is a response to the above action item, and presents our reassessment of the number of engines per LRB. 3, 4 and 6 engine arrangements as shown in Figure 1.0 were evaluated. The results discussed herein are mainly based upon analyses conducted using the LO2/JP-1 pump-fed booster. However the trends represented are considered valid for the other selected LRB concepts. Any significant differences between concepts are discussed. Based on results to date, we conclude that 4 engines should be used on all three LRB concepts.

The criteria by which the number of engines was chosen are summarized below. These criteria are the same as those used for the configuration trade studies, and are ranked in order of importance.

1) Safety/Reliability: The reliability of the propulsive system to accomplish a given mission diminishes as the number of engines increases. To improve safety, or better the chances of saving the crew and payload in the event of an engine failure, it is desirable to have engine-out capability. If engine out capability is designed into the booster, the reliability of the propulsive system to meet the desired mission is improved. Examine Figure 2.0. The GD goal is to size the LRBs such that if a booster engine fails during ascent, it is still possible for the orbiter to deliver full payload to a reduced "safe" orbit and return the crew. Table I shows reliability values with and without engine-out capability using typical pump-fed and pressure-fed reliability data. Because high reliability is desired, the basic conclusion can be drawn that a four engine arrangement is preferred over a six engine arrangement.

2) STS Compatibility: The quantity of LRB engines used affects the MLP/Flame trench, plume/base heating, aerodynamic drag, control of the mated vehicle, and ground/flight operations.

For our initial trade studies, free plume expansion in the MLP was assumed to be similar to the SSMEs, and the LRB nozzle diameter was constrained such that the plume from the LRB engines struck the flame defectors located over the flame trench in the same manner as the SRBs. This low risk approach allowed a maximum exit diameter of 90 inches. Optimum

pump-fed engine performance can be achieved within this limitation. However, the pressure-fed engine performance (for 4 engine LRBs) optimizes with nozzle diameters over 90 inches (see Figure 3.0); if 6 engines are used on the LRBs it is easier to optimize engine performance within the 90 inch nozzle limit. Because the 4 engine pressure-fed booster optimizes with nozzle diameters greater than 90 inches, we asked our subcontractors, PRC and Rocketdyne, to assess the possibility of using nozzle diameters greater than 90 inches. We feel that by shaping the MLP flamehole side walls and modifying the flame defectors it will still be possible to channel the exhaust into the flame trench. However, scale model testing will be required to verify/prevent overpressure wave impingement on the engines or interference with their operation. Hence, although 6 engines are better suited for the 90 inch diameter limit, currently no major impact is foreseen in increasing the exit diameter beyond 90 inches to get optimum size/performance using 4 engines.

An initial assessment made by Eagle Engineering suggests that the plume radiative heating to the orbiter body flap with engines aligned in a vertical row, rather than a clustered about the booster centerline is more severe (~10%). To fit within the geometry of the flame trench, the row layout is better suited for the 6 engine case (Examine Figure 1.0). However, for either engine layout (in a row or clustered around the centerline), the LRB base heating rate will be approximately ~30% less than the current SRBs.

The aerodynamic drag of a 3 or 6 engine LRB is expected to be greater than that of the same booster using 4 engines due to the larger aft skirt area (assuming the 6 engines are aligned in a row as presented in Figure 1.0). Presently vehicle control does not pose any problem for all three number of engine options. For comparison, engine out gimbals were calculated using the RP-1 pressure-fed booster with 3, 4, and 6 engines. The worst case was the three engine case, and the largest gimbal angle for engine out at maximum dynamic pressure was less than 5 degrees.

Ground/flight operational complexity will increase with increasing number of engines. In terms of ground operations, additional test and checkout will be required for additional engines, actuators, feedlines and avionics. In terms of flight operations, additional software development will be required as the number of engines increases. Additional costs due to increased operational complexity as the number of engines multiplies have not been evaluated.

3) Performance: In this section, impact on Emergency Power Levels (EPL), vehicle weight, engine weight, and throttling requirements required are discussed.

As shown in Figure 4.0, the booster lift-off weight minimizes at nominal  $T/W = 1.52$  for a 4 engine LOX/RP-1 pump-fed booster. To achieve an ATO (due to engine-out at liftoff) without changing the size of the LRB and using approximately balanced thrust during ascent, one needs a  $T/W=1.25$  at liftoff; the  $T/W$  required for ATO is sufficient to clear the pad in the event of wind drift as analyzed by LEMSCO (i.e.,  $T/W_{ATO} > 1.2$ ). The 1.25  $T/W$  requirement means an emergency power level (EPL) is needed for the 4 engine case as calculated by:

$$T/W_{EPL} = \frac{((T/W)_{ATO} \cdot \text{Vehicle Wt} - T_{SSME}) \cdot 8/6}{\text{Vehicle Weight}} + T_{SSME}$$

$$= 1.58$$

Thus a slight up-throttle capability (~6%) is needed. Extrapolating this data to 6 and 3 engine cases, it seems no extra EPL is needed for the 6 engine case, and the  $T/W_{EPL}$  for the 3 engine case is 1.7. If the nominal  $T/W$  is on the order of 1.5 then this increase in thrust level represents additional engine cost and weight. One can view the impact of ATO on the number of engines required in another fashion. If no EPL is provided, then the booster must be sized to a  $T/W$  which, with an engine out at liftoff, provides a  $T/W = 1.25$ . For the 4 engine booster this nominal  $T/W$  would be 1.58, for 3 engines it would be 1.7 and for 6 engines it would be 1.49. If one assumes that the relationship shown on Figure 3.0 is largely independent of the number of engines used, then for the six engine case the optimum  $T/W$  of 1.52 can be used at liftoff and still have ATO capability with engine-out. However, for the 4 engine case there is penalty in weight for sizing the booster at a  $T/W$  of 1.58 rather than 1.52 (<5000 LBs). The penalty in weight for the 3 engine case is much larger. The difference between sizing at a  $T/W$  of 1.7 rather than 1.52 is approximately 35,000 lbs. Thus there is no impact for 6 engines, a very slight impact for 4 engines, and a large impact for 3 engines. Similar trends hold for pressure-fed engines if optimum expansion ratios can be used (see the discussion on "STS Compatibility"), except that any EPL requirement imposes larger cost and weight penalties than for pump-fed engines due to the need for higher tank pressures.

The weight of the engines increases slightly with increasing number of engines (after 4). Yet even with inclusion of accessories, the difference in weight is quite small.

The approximate throttling range for various numbers of engines (with and without engine-out) are shown in Table I. An accepted rule of thumb in the industry is that 35-40% throttling is easily achievable. Any higher range imposes significant technological risk and cost. For the RP-1 pump-fed booster used in this comparison, throttle ranges for both the 4 and 6

engine configurations fall within this range, but the 3 engine case requires ~49% throttling.

4) Cost: The approximate change in engine DDT&E cost and manufacturing cost with change in number of engines are shown in Table I. As expected, DDT&E cost per engine decreases with an increase in the number of engines used per booster. There is not much of a change in engine manufacturing cost per LRB as the number of engines changes.

Conclusion Safety and reliability are improved if the minimum multiple number of engines is used per LRB (while still retaining engine-out capability). A 6 engine configuration is poorer than 4 engines in terms of safety/reliability, overall vehicle complexity, and STS compatibility. As safety, reliability, and STS compatibility are the premier criteria for judging options on this program, we conclude that 4 engines per LRB is the best number of engines to use.



Paul R. Brennan



Gopal Mehta




Figure 1.0 - Engine Layouts Considered




Figure 2.0 - Number of Engines vs. Propulsion System Reliability for a typical pump-fed engine system



FIGURE 2.0 - PERFORMANCE VS. EXPANSION RATIO




Figure 3.0 - Vehicle Length And Weight Vs. Expansion Ratio For  
A 4-engine Pressured-fed LO2/IRP-1 Booster

\* For A 15 ft. Equivalent Diameter Booster

ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY




Figure 4.0 - Nominal Liftoff T/W vs. L/D GLOW For a 4 Engine LOX/NP-1  
Pump-Fed Configuration

**TABLE I**  
**NUMBER OF ENGINES OF COMPARISON**

CRITERIA	3 ENGINES PER LNB		4 ENGINES PER LNB		6 ENGINES PER LNB	
	Pump Fed	Pressure Fed	Pump Fed	Pressure Fed	Pump Fed	Pressure Fed
<b>SAFETY/RELIABILITY:</b> • Propulsion system (Nominal Mission) (ATO - One Engine-Out)	.9414 .9957	.9650 .9900	.9227 .9935	.9530 .9970	8864 9884	9300 9940
<b>SIS COMPATIBILITY:</b> • Complexity (Ground/Flight Operations) • Base Heating (Heat Load To Orbiter Body Flap)	LOWEST		MEDIUM		HIGHEST	
	About 10% Increase In Heat Load Compared To 4 Engine Case, But Still Less Than SIBs				About 10% Increase In Heat Load Compared To 4 Engine Case, But Still Less Than SIBs	
<b>PERFORMANCE:</b> • Throttling (Nominal Mission) (ATO)	-33% +16% (49% Range Req'd)		-29% -35% (35% Range Req'd)		-19% -22% (22% Range Req'd)	
• Total Engine Weight Per LNB	21,900 LBS		21,300 LBS		23,300 LBS	
<b>COST</b> • LNB Engine DDTR&E Cost • Engines Recurring Cost Per LNB	\$1101 M \$22.3 M		\$834 M \$19.8 M		\$645 M \$19.3 M	

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
JANUARY 27, 1988

TRADE STUDY 1.3  
FINAL ERB

## ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION

STUDY LEADER: JEFF PATTON  
SYSTEMS ENGINEER: GREG FARMER

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division

## 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 2

### REQUIREMENTS:

- 70 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION  
WITH ORBITER SSME's LIMITED TO 100% THRUST
- 59 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION  
WITH ORBITER SSME's LIMITED TO 104% THRUST
- DESIGN GOAL TO MAKE MISSION (ABORT-TO-ORBIT) WITH ONE LRB  
ENGINE OUT

### CONSTRAINTS:

- USE APPLICABLE SECTIONS FROM THE SHUTTLE OPERATIONAL DATA BOOK  
(JSC 18934, VOL 1, REV D)
- ONLY STANDARD NOMINAL MECO TARGETS WILL BE CONSIDERED
- NO ORBITER SYSTEM WILL BE IMPACTED BEYOND THE CURRENT, NOMINAL  
OPERATING LIMITS (ORBITER SSME, OMS LOADING)

## 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 3

### Assumed Requirements

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>REQUIREMENT STATEMENT</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
1.	LRB ENGINES ARE THROTTLED	PROPULSION	GDSS
2.	MECO UNDERSPEED FOR TAL ABORT CAN BE NO GREATER THAN 290 fps	FLIGHT OPS	NASA/JSC
3.	MECO UNDERSPEED FOR AOA OR ATO CAN BE NO GREATER THAN 490 fps	FLIGHT OPS	NASA/JSC
4.	LOWER MECO TARGETS RESULT IN ABORTS IN ALL CASES	FLIGHT OPS	NASA/JSC
5.	TRAJECTORIES VIOLATING CURRENT STS WING LOADING CONSTRAINTS ARE UNACCEPTABLE	ORBITER	NASA/JSC
6.	LRB'S WILL UTILIZE SOME METHOD OF THRUST VECTOR CONTROL	LRB	GDSS
7.	FAST SEPARATION CAPABILITY OF THE ORBITER FROM THE ET/LRB STACK WILL EXIST	ORBITER	GDSS

# 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 3 (cont)


## Assumed Requirements

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>REQUIREMENT STATEMENT</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
8.	ORBITER MANUEVERING LIMIT CONTINGENCY ABORTS IS 3.5 G's (Z AXIS)	ORBITER	NASA/JSC
9.	LRB's MAY BE SHUT DOWN AND SAFELY SEPARATED AT 80 SECONDS INTO THE FLIGHT	LRB	GDSS

U1  
U1

# 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 4

## Analysis Plan






## **1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION**

### **Abort shaping background**

- **INTACT ABORTS: RETURN TO LAUNCH SITE (RTLS), TRANSATLANTIC ABORT LANDING (TAL), ABORT TO ORBIT (ATO), ABORT ONCE AROUND (AOA)**
- **CALLED "INTACT" BECAUSE RECOVERY OF CREW/VEHICLE IS HIGHLY LIKELY AND REPRESENTS RELATIVELY GOOD (?) ABORT MODES**
- **TRAJECTORY SHAPING DONE TO OPTIMIZE THESE ABORTS**
- **CONTINGENCY ABORTS: ABORT ON PAD, SPLIT-S, LOFT-RETURN, OCEAN DITCH (MULTIPLE FAILURES, ie SSMes+LRBs)**
- **CALLED "CONTINGENCY" BECAUSE RECOVERY OF CREW/VEHICLE IS UNLIKELY AND CONDITIONS OCCURRING TO WARRANT SUCH AN ABORT ARE DRASTIC (AND UNLIKELY)**
- **TRAJECTORY IS NEVER MODIFIED TO IMPROVE THESE ABORTS**

# RTLS ABORT SYNOPSIS



## DISADVANTAGES OF RTLS


1. RTLS TIME UNTIL LANDING IS LONGER THAN TAL
2. A SECOND FAILURE OF AN ORBITER SSME DURING RTLS RESULTS IN A DITCH, A SECOND ORBITER SSME FAILURE DURING TAL IS TOLERABLE.
3. ORBITER MANEUVERING IS SEVERE (INCLUDING FLYING BACKWARDS INTO ITS OWN PLUME AND A POWERED PITCHDOWN MANEUVER).

## ADVANTAGES OF RTLS

1. RETURNS ORBITER TO LAUNCH SITE FOR FAILURES WHERE TAL IS IMPOSSIBLE. (SUCH AS EARLY ORBITER SSME FAILURES)

# FIRST STAGE CONTINGENCY ABORT ANALYSIS

## NEW ABORTS UTILIZING LRB CAPABILITY



## **1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Results (Trends)**

**VARIOUS METHODS OF TRAJECTORY SHAPING AND VEHICLE  
SIZING WERE INVESTIGATED TO IMPROVE STS/LRB ABORTS**


- **TRAJECTORY SHAPING (LOFTING, DEPRESSING)**
  - **MAXIMUM DYNAMIC PRESSURE (Q, psf)**
  - **ANGLE OF ATTACK (ALPHA, deg)**
- **VEHICLE SIZING**
  - **THROTTLING REQUIREMENT**
  - **NUMBER OF ENGINES NECESSARY**
  - **VARYING THRUST/WEIGHT AT LIFTOFF**
  - **SIZE TO NOMINAL MISSION OR TO ATO**

## 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Results (Trends)

### TRAJECTORY SHAPING


- ONLY 2 CONSTRAINTS ARE ABLE TO BE VARIED DURING ASCENT: Q and ALPHA
  - NASA SPECIFIED QALPHA DURING THE TRANSONIC REGION TO BE -3000 AND ALPHA BETWEEN -4 deg TO -5 deg ("QALPHA CORRIDOR")
  - Q, THEREFORE, CAN VARY BETWEEN 600 psf AND 750 psf
- THESE RESULT FROM CONSTRAINTS USED FOR STS-26, A HIGHLY CONSTRAINED MISSION (MAX Q = 750 psf)
- FUTURE FLIGHTS ARE EXPECTED TO FLY AT LARGER MAX Q's
- THIS ANALYSIS VARIED Q BETWEEN 500 psf AND 800 psf, AND HELD ALPHA TO THE NASA DEFINED LIMITS OF -4 deg TO -5 deg (-2000 < QALPHA < -4000)
  - FLEW THROUGH THE "QALPHA CORRIDOR"

# MAXIMUM DYNAMIC PRESSURE



# Q-ALPHA CORRIDOR



Q NOMINAL = 690



## 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Results (Trends)

### Q AND GRAVITY LOSSES AS TRAJECTORY/LAUNCH VEHICLE SIZING INDICATORS


- DECREASING Q REPRESENTS A MORE "LOFTED" TRAJECTORY
- INCREASING GRAVITY LOSSES RESULTS AS THE LAUNCH VEHICLE "FIGHTS" TO OVERCOME GRAVITY
- BOTH ARE CRITICAL TO LAUNCH VEHICLE SIZING/PERFORMANCE DETERMINATIONS





# DYNAMIC PRESSURE vs GRAVITY LOSSES

- AS Q DECREASES (LOFTING), GRAVITY LOSSES INCREASE DRAMATICALLY
- RESULTS IN LARGER LRB




MAXIMUM DYNAMIC PRESSURE (Q)

5D (RP-1)  
4 ENGINES/LRB


# DYNAMIC PRESSURE VS STAGING TIME

- INCREASED Q (DECREASED GRAVITY LOSSES) RESULT IN SMALLER LRB'S AND EARLIER STAGING TIMES



5D (RP-1)  
4 ENGINES/LRB

# DYNAMIC PRESSURE vs LRB PROPELLANT



5D (RP-1)  
4 ENGINES/LRB

## 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Results (Trends)

### • INCREASING Q (DEPRESSED TRAJECTORY) IMPROVES

#### DOWNRANGE ABORTS


- GAIN VELOCITY QUICKLY
- ATTAIN INCREASED ENERGY STATE
- LATER ABORTS REQUIRE MORE ENERGY

### • DECREASING Q (LOFTED TRAJECTORY) IMPROVES

#### RTLS ONLY

- GAIN VELOCITY SLOWER
- INSUFFICIENT ENERGY FOR DOWNRANGE ABORTS
- FIRST STAGE CONTINGENCY ABORTS ARE IMPROVED

# Q AFFECTS ON INTACT ABORT BOUNDARIES



## **1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION**


### **Results (Trends)**

#### **RESIZING VEHICLE FOR ABORTS**

- **THROTTLING REQUIREMENT**
- **NUMBER OF ENGINES**
- **VARYING THRUST/WEIGHT AT LIFTOFF**
- **SIZE VEHICLE FOR NOMINAL MISSION OR ATO?**

## 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Results (Trends)

### ARE THE LRB'S REQUIRED TO THROTTLE?



- WITHOUT LRB THROTTLING, THE ORBITER SSME'S ARE REQUIRED TO THROTTLE UP 50% AND THE VEHICLE STILL VIOLATES 3G LIMIT

## **1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Results (Trends)**

### **NUMBER OF ENGINES**

- CURRENT VEHICLES SIZED FOR 4 ENGINES
- ENGINE-OUT REQUIREMENT FOR ATO WILL DETERMINE THROTTLING RANGE REQUIREMENTS
- PROPULSION GROUP INDICATES THAT THE MAXIMUM THROTTLING RANGE FOR THE LRB's IS 100% TO 65%
- TRAJECTORY RUNS INDICATE THAT MAXIMUM RANGE IS REQUIRED (65%) FOR THE 7 (OF 8) ENGINES RUNNING CASE
- RESULTS IN THRUST IMBALANCE DURING FLIGHT, BUT BY CONTROLLED THROTTLING, BOTH LRB's BURN OUT AT THE SAME TIME
- DECREASING TOTAL NUMBER OF ENGINES (5 OF 6) WOULD REQUIRE LARGER THROTTLE RANGE TO MAINTAIN PROPELLANT MANAGEMENT




## **1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Results (Trends)**

### **VARYING THRUST/WEIGHT AT LIFTOFF**

- DETERMINE OPTIMUM T/W AT LIFTOFF
- INVESTIGATE HIGHER/LOWER T/W


## T/W vs GRAVITY LOSSES

- AS T/W INCREASES, GRAVITY LOSSES DECREASE TO OPTIMUM T/W
- QALPHA = -3500 HAS LOWER LOSSES = LIGHTER VEHICLE



# NOMINAL T/W AT LIFTOFF vs STAGING TIME


- LARGER BOOSTER (GREATER WEIGHT) BURNS LONGER



5D (RP-1)  
4 ENGINES/LRB

# NOMINAL MINIMUM T/W AT LIFTOFF

- LIGHTEST VEHICLE IS AT  $T/W = 1.42$ ,  $QALPHA = -3500$



THRUST/WEIGHT AT LIFTOFF


5D (RP-1)  
4 ENGINES/LRB

### **1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Results (Trends)**

- **FOR EITHER QALPHA = -3500 OR -3000,  
T/W = 1.42 PROVIDES BEST ABORT  
WINDOWS (RP-1 CONFIGURATION)**


# T/W AFFECTS ON INTACT ABORT BOUNDARIES

QALPHA = -3000



# T/W AFFECTS ON INTACT ABORT BOUNDARIES

QALPHA = -3500



# 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Results (Trends)

## VEHICLE SIZING TO POSSIBLE ORBITS

	150 X 150 NMI NOMINAL MISSION 8 ENGINES OPERATING	105 X 105 NMI ABORT-TO-ORBIT 7 ENGINES OPERATING	150 X 150 NMI NOMINAL MISSION 7 ENGINES OPERATING
LRB PROPRLLANT PER BOOSTER (LBS)	940,000	910,000	1,187,000

8  
0

- NOMINAL MISSION WITH 8 ENGINES OPERATING SIZES VEHICLE  
OVER ATO MISSION
- VEHICLE SIZE PENALTY OF 33% FOR LRB ENGINE-OUT NOMINAL  
MISSION



## 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION Derived Requirements List

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>REQUIREMENT STATEMENT</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>
1.	RP-1 LRB's WILL NOMINALLY LIFT OFF AT T/W $\approx$ 1.42	LRB
2.	LRB SEPARATION SYSTEM MUST BE ABLE TO PROVIDE SAFE SEPARATION WITH PARTIAL LRB PROPELLANT LOAD	LRB
3.	LRB ENGINES MUST BE ABLE TO BE SHUTDOWN PREMATURELY	LRB
4.	ALL LRB CONFIGURATIONS WILL ALLOW FOR SAFE SEPARATION AND FIRST STAGE CONTINGENCY ABORTS	LRB
5.	FOR LRB CONFIGURATIONS WITH LESS THAN 4 ENGINES PER BOOSTER, THROTTLE RANGE MUST EXCEED CURRENT LIMITS (100% - 65%)	LRB
6.	GIMBALLING FOR ENGINE-OUT (LRB OR SSME)	LRB

## 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION

### Summary of Results

#### CONCLUSIONS:

- DECREASING DESIGN QALPHA TO -3500 psf IMPROVES DOWNRANGE ABORTS
- LRB ENGINE-OUT IS AN ATTAINABLE GOAL FOR ALL CONFIGURATIONS (F-1 CONFIGURATION IS TO BE DETERMINED)
- LRB'S IMPROVE ALL ABORT MODES INCLUDING NEW FIRST STAGE CONTINGENCY ABORTS
  - ABORT-ON-PAD
  - SPLIT-S
  - DOWNRANGE ABORT
  - LOFT RETURN
- TRAJECTORY SHAPING DOES NOT HELP LOFTING FOR FIRST STAGE CONTINGENCY ABORTS

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- WITH NASA APPROVAL, DECREASE QALPHA TO -3500 psf
- CONTINUE ASSESSMENT OF ABORTS INCLUDING:
  - PROPELLANT MANAGEMENT OF LRB'S WITH ONE ENGINE-OUT
  - INVESTIGATE IMPROVEMENTS TO SSME FAILURE ABORT WINDOWS UTILIZING LRB THROTTLING

## UPDATE ON T.S. 1.3 ABORT

The number one objective of the LRB program is to improve Shuttle safety including better abort capabilities. Obviously this is closely integrated with Orbiter capabilities, so we had many discussions in Houston (such as those on 2/16 - 2/18 1987 per attached itinerary).

Two initial desires were not reasonable:

- a) To eliminate the TAL bases by having RTLS and ATO overlap. (Sites still needed for emergencies.)
- b) Major trajectory reshaping (lofted or depressed) to improve TAL and ATO. (Orbiter constraints limit trajectory shaping to a large degree.)

Instead we found that improvements in various abort scenarios were all that is reasonable in view of the tight Q-alpha corridor constraints. Engine out and engine throttling abilities are major improvements. Another benefit would result from LRB capability to shut off and separate at about 80 seconds if a splashdown is the last resort.

Continuing trajectory optimizations have shown that each concept has an optimum launch T/W. This trade study shows optimum  $T/W = 1.42$  for LOX/RP-1. Later analyses to optimize gross weight showed 1.5 nominal (which allows ATO with 1 engine out).

Other later ideas include throttling up ~ 10% on the side with engine out and down ~80% on the other side.

This work must continue with ever increasing detailed trajectory work by JSC and its contractors.

(Attachment A)

## NASA/JSC TRIP ITINERARY (2-16-87 to 2-18-87)

Wednesday, February 17, 1988

Session 1

8:30 am - 11:00 am

EAGLE ENGINEERING

Subject	EAGLE	GDSS
Abort Mode Design	J. Wood	J. Patton
Premature LRB SEP vs FASTSEP	T. Zack	S. Seus
Abort Mode Propellant Margins		W. Thompson
Ignition Sequence/Structural Dynamics	W. Hoyer	G. Buchanan

Session 2

12:30 pm - 4:00 pm

LOCKHEED

Subject	LOCKHEED	GDSS
Intact Abort Design	P. Fardelos	J. Patton
Contingency Abort Design	D. Blumentrit	S. Seus
Premature LRB SEP vs FASTSEP		W. Thompson
Performance Requirements		
Ignition Sequence/Structural Dynamics	TBD	G. Buchanan

Thursday, February 18, 1987

Session 3

8:00 am - 11:30 am

NASA/JSC

Subject	NASA/JSC	GDSS
RTLS and TAL Abort Design	1st Lt J. Turner	J. Patton
Abort Propellant Margins	C. Sparks	S. Seus
Abort Controllability Requirements	C. Frayley	W. Thompson
Ignition Sequence/Structural Dynamics	TBD	G. Buchanan

(Attachment B)

## MEETING ATTENDEES

General Dynamics  
Space Systems Division

Steve Seus  
Jeff Patton  
Walter Thompson  
Guy Buchanan  
Celeste Salvaggio

Rockwell Shuttle Operations  
Company

Andy Flottorp  
Elmer Johnson  
Carson Sparks

Eagle Engineering

Jim Wood  
Tom Howe  
Carol Blaknoll  
Tom Zackrewski  
Wil Hoyer

NASA/JSC

1st Lt. John Turner  
Jim Akkerman

Lockheed Engineering  
Maintenance Support Company

Jim McCurry  
Pete Fardelos  
David Blumentrit  
Chris Christofferson  
Nancy Carter  
Wes Kelly

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
DECEMBER 4, 1987

TRADE STUDY 1.5  
FINAL ERB

## PUMP FED - PROPELLANT SELECTION

STUDY LEADER: TINA NGUYEN  
SYSTEMS ENGINEER: MIKE VACCARO

**GENERAL DYNAMICS**  
*Space Systems Division*

# 1.5 PUMP FED - PROPELLANT SELECTION Planning Sheet 1

## OBJECTIVE:

SELECT THE BEST PROPELLANT COMBINATIONS FOR THREE LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER CONCEPTS:

- EXPENDABLE WITH NEW ENGINES
- REUSABLE WITH NEW ENGINES
- EXPENDABLE WITH EXISTING ENGINES
- REUSABLE WITH EXISTING ENGINES

## GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS:

CONFIGURATION = CONVENTIONAL CYLINDRICAL (CURRENT SRB)

VEHICLE L/D RATIO = 12.3

NUMBER OF ENGINES = 4

TANK MATERIAL = AL-LI (WEIGHT OF TANK BASED ON  
LOAD CONSIDERATION)

## FOR NEW ENGINES:

EXIT DIAMETER = 50" (NO MODIFICATIONS IN MLP OR FLAME TRENCH)

= OPTIMIZED NOZZLE FOR 6 PSIA BACK PRESSURE  
(NO MODIFICATIONS TO FLAME TRENCH)

CHAMBER PRESSURE = BASED ON STBE NORMAL POWER LEVEL

MIXTURE RATIO = BASED ON STBE STUDY

ENGINE CYCLE = GAS GENERATOR

## 1.5 PUMP FED - PROPELLANT SELECTION Planning Sheet 2

### REQUIREMENTS:

1. 70 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION, WITH ORBITER SSME'S LIMITED TO 100% PL
2. 59 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION, WITH ORBITER SSME'S LIMITED TO 104% PL
3. SATISFY STS TRAJECTORY CONSTRAINTS (MAX Q, LIFTOFF TW, MAX G, ETC.)


∞  
∞

### CONSTRAINTS:

- IMPROVE SAFETY, RELIABILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACCEPTABILITY
- MINIMIZE IMPACT/CHANGES ON ET, ORBITER, LAUNCH SITE AND GSE
- MINIMIZE IMPACTS TO FLAMETRENCH - MAXIMUM D<sub>8</sub> IS LIMITED TO 90in
- MINIMIZE IMPACTS TO MLP - MAXIMUM D<sub>8</sub> IS LIMITED TO 50in



# 1.5 PUMP FED - PROPELLANT SELECTION



(1) MAY BE ELIMINATED EARLY IN TRADE DUE TO SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT  
(2) NOT VIABLE FOR EXPENDABLE CONCEPT DUE TO HIGH COST  
(3) NOT VIABLE FOR REUSABLE CONCEPT DUE TO HIGH COKING PROBLEM

# EXISTING ENGINE EVALUATION


- **ENGINES ANALYZED**

- SSME - 35
- F - 1
- AJ - 23

- **EVALUATION CRITERIA**

- ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY
- COST
- STS COMPATIBILITY (AIRBORNE & GROUND EQUIPMENT)
- SAFETY
- AVAILABILITY

# SSME - 35 (LO2/LH2; 4 ENGINES/BOOSTER)



## ADVANTAGES

- ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY - POSSIBLE
- STS COMPATIBILITY (GROUND) - NO FLAME TRENCH IMPACT
- SAFETY - HIGHLY RELIABLE; NOT AS HAZARDOUS AS HYPERGOLS
- AVAILABILITY - CURRENTLY IN PRODUCTION

## DISADVANTAGES

- STS COMPATIBILITY (AIRBORNE) - LARGEST BOOSTER (L = 190'; D = 15.4')
- COST - EXPENSIVE ENGINES; HIGHEST MAINTENANCE COST; LONGEST TURN-AROUND TIME


# F - 1 (LO2/RP-1; 2 ENGINES/BOOSTER)

## ADVANTAGES

- STS COMPATIBILITY (GROUND) - NO FLAME TRENCH IMPACT
- STS COMPATIBILITY (AIRBORNE) - MUCH SMALLER BOOSTER THAN SSME - 35
- SAFETY - HIGHLY RELIABLE; NOT AS HAZARDOUS AS HYPERGOLS

## DISADVANTAGES

- AVAILABILITY - PRODUCTION LINE DEACTIVATED
- ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY - *IN CONSIDERATION*




# AJ - 23 (NTO/MMH; 5 SETS OF ENGINES/BOOSTER)

## ADVANTAGES

- ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY - POSSIBLE
- STS COMPATIBILITY (GROUND) - NO FLAME TRENCH IMPACT
- STS COMPATIBILITY (AIRBORNE) - SMALLEST BOOSTER SIZE
- AVAILABILITY - CURRENTLY IN PRODUCTION
- COST - LESS EXPENSIVE THAN SSME - 35

## DISADVANTAGES

- SAFETY - HIGHLY TOXIC PROPELLANT



## **EXISTING ENGINE TRADE Summary**

- AJ -23 ENGINES APPEAR TO BE THE LEAST DESIREABLE OPTION  
DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL & SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
- SSME - 35 ENGINES APPEAR TO BE THE MOST DESIREABLE OPTION  
IF THE LARGE BOOSTER SIZE DOES NOT PROHIBIT INTEGRATION TO  
THE STS
- F - 1 ENGINES APPEAR TO BE THE PREFERRED OPTION IF THE  
SSME - 35 CANNOT BE INTEGRATED WITH THE STS

# PROPELLANT EVALUATION

## • PROPELLANT TYPES ANALYZED

- LO2/HC
- LO2/HC/LH2
- LO2/LH2
- NTO/MMH


## • EVALUATION CRITERIA

- |                            |                            |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| • SAFETY                   | • TECHNICAL RISK           |
| • STS COMPATIBILITY (SIZE) | • OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY |
| • PERFORMANCE              | • OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY   |
| • COST                     | • ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS    |
| • SCHEDULE RISK            | • GROWTH POTENTIAL         |

# LENGTH / DIAMETER: PUMP-FED LRB

PC = OPTIMIZED, NOZZLE DIAMETER = 50 IN

NOTE: ALL TANKS ARE  
CONVENTIONAL CYLINDERS





# LO2/HC PROPELLANT EVALUATION

## ADVANTAGES

- PERFORMANCE - BETTER Isp DENSITY THAN LO2/LH2
- RISK - LOWEST FOR LO2/NP1 (ADEQUATE FLIGHT EXPERIENCE)
- OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY - EXISTING FACILITIES FOR LO2 & NP1
- OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY - BETTER THAN HYPERGOLS OR LO2/MC/LH2
- SAFETY - NON-TOXIC; LOWEST EXPLOSIVE HAZARD

## DISADVANTAGES

- COST - ADDITIONAL HC TANKING SYSTEM; NOT AS EXPENSIVE AS LO2/MC/LH2
- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS - CO & CO2 EXHAUST DETRIMENTAL TO OZONE LAYER
- REUSEABILITY - CARBON DEPOSITION PROBLEMS AT HIGH CHAMBER PRESSURE WITH LO2/NP1 & LO2/C3H8 INTRODUCE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
- SAFETY - EXPLOSIVE HAZARD OF C3H8 IS HIGHER THAN CH4 & NP1 DUE TO ITS HEAVY VAPOR

# LO2/HC/LH2 PROPELLANT EVALUATION

## ADVANTAGES

- PERFORMANCE - BETTER ISP DENSITY THAN LO2/LH2
- REUSEABILITY - LIMITS OR ELIMINATES COKING & CARBON DEPOSITION PROBLEMS OF LO2/LH2
- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS (PRE-COMBUSTION) - BETTER THAN HYPERGOLS
- OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY - EXISTING FACILITIES FOR LO2, LH2 & RP1
- LO2/CH4/LH2 IS IN CURRENT STBE STUDIES

## DISADVANTAGES

- COMPLEX CYCLE WITH THREE PROPELLANT TURBOPUMP ARRANGEMENT
- COST - HIGHEST PRODUCTION & DEVELOPMENT COST
- SAFETY - EXPLOSIVE HAZARD IS HIGHER THAN DIPROPELLANTS
- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS - CO & CO2 EXHAUST DETRIMENTAL TO OZONE LAYER
- OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY - HIGHEST COMPLEXITY IN OPERATIONS & SUPPORT
- RISK - NEW CONCEPT; NO FLIGHT HISTORY  
HIGHEST TECHNOLOGICAL RISK WITH LO2/CH4/LH2 & LO2/RP1/LH2

# LO2/LH2 PROPELLANT EVALUATION

## ADVANTAGES

- COST - USES EXISTING SYSTEMS
- RISK - FLIGHT PROVEN CONCEPT; LOWEST DEVELOPMENT RISK
- REUSEABILITY - BEST CLEAN BURNING
- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS - MINIMAL
- OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY - COMPATIBLE WITH EXISTING SYSTEM
- OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY - BETTER THAN HYPERGOLS AND LO2/LH2
- SAFETY - NON TOXIC

## DISADVANTAGES

- BOOSTER SIZE - LARGEST OF ALL PROPELLANTS
- SAFETY - HIGHLY EXPLOSIVE

# NTO/HYDRAZINES PROPELLANT EVALUATION

## ADVANTAGES

- STS COMPATIBILITY - SMALL BOOSTER SIZE
- REUSEABILITY - CLEAN BURNING
- RELIABILITY - EXCELLENT COMBUSTION CHARACTERISTICS, EASY TO SEAL
- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT (POST-COMBUSTION) - RELATIVELY INERT EXHAUST PRODUCTS
- STORABLES - NO INSULATION SYSTEMS REQUIRED, SOME FLEXIBILITY IN LOADING TIME

## DISADVANTAGES

- SAFETY - HIGH TOXICITY, MM1/A-50 SUSPECTED CARCINOGENS; HIGH EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS (2-5% IN AIR) EXPOSURE LIMIT: 3 ppm FOR NTO; 0.2 ppm FOR MM1; 0.5 ppm FOR UDMH
- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS - SPILLS CLEANUP POSES HAZARDOUS WASTE ISSUE IN CASE OF EXPLOSION (ABORT OR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS), ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION OF TOXIC PLUME NTO - FORMS ACID WITH WATER, PHOTOCHEMICAL SMOG HYDRAZINES - SOLUBLE IN WATER, FORM TOXIC BY-PRODUCTS
- PROPELLANT AVAILABILITY - ONLY ONE EXISTING MANUFACTURER FOR EACH PROPELLANT. FOR LNB QUANTITIES REQUIRED, NEW PLANTS MAY BE NEEDED. ~3-5 YRS TO QUALIFY NEW VENDOR
- COST - MOST EXPENSIVE LIQUID PROPELLANT (2.75\$/LB NTO & 10\$/LB MM1, ~12M\$/LAUNCH!) HIGH FACILITY ACTIVATION COST
- OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY - COMPLEX LAUNCH PROCESSING PROCEDURES DUE TO SAFETY CONCERNS
- LAUNCH SCHEDULE IMPACT - DOWNWIND HAZARD CONCERNS
- RECOVERY/REFURNISHMENT - COMPLEX PROCEDURES DUE TO TOXICITY OF RESIDUES

# PROPELLANT EVALUATION Comparison Matrix

QUALITATIVE EVALUATION RANKING GRADE A - BEST B C D F - WORST	NEW/EXPENDABLE					NEW/REUSABLE					
	LO2/LH2	LO2/CH4	LO2/C3H8	LO2/RP-1	NTO/MMH	LO2/LH2	LO2/CH4	LO2/CH4/LH2	LO2/C3H8/LH2	LO2/RP-1/LH2	NTO/MMH
SAFETY	C	B	B	A	F	C	B	C	C	C	F
RELIABILITY	B	C	D	D	A	B	C	C	D	D	A
STS COMPATIBILITY (SIZE)	F	B	B	B	A	F	C	D	B	B	A
PERFORMANCE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
COST (?) NON-RECURRING RECURRING	B	C	C	B	C	C	D	D	F	F	D
	C	C	C	C	D	B	B	C	C	C	C
SCHEDULE RISK	B	C	C	B	D	B	C	D	F	F	D
TECHNICAL RISK	B	C	C	B	B	C	D	D	F	F	C
OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY						A	B	C	C	C	C
OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY	C	B	C	A	F	C	D	F	F	F	F
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS	A	B	C	C	F	A	B	C	C	C	F
GROWTH POTENTIAL (?)	A	B	B	B	C	A	B	B	B	B	C

## PUMP-FED PROPELLANT EVALUATION SUMMARY

- ALTHOUGH NTO/HYDRAZINES, INCLUDING AJ23, CANDIDATES HAVE LOWEST PROPELLANT VOLUME THEIR SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT DISADVANTAGES ARE SEVERE.
- FOR THE EXISTING ENGINES, SSME-35 (LO2/LH2) IS PREFERABLE IF ITS LARGE SIZE DISADVANTAGE DOES NOT PROHIBIT INTEGRATION TO THE STS. THE LARGE THRUST SIZE OF THE F-1 RESTRICTS ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY
- FOR REUSABLE CONCEPT, PERFORMANCE ADVANTAGES OF LO2/HIC/LH2 DO NOT APPEAR TO OFFSET DISADVANTAGES OF INCREASED COMPLEXITY AND COST OVER BIPROPELLANTS. LO2/RP1 IS ALSO BEING RECONSIDERED FOR REUSABLE CONCEPT BECAUSE OF ITS LOW TANK VOLUME.
- FOR EXPENDABLE CONCEPT, LO2/HIC OPTIONS HAVE VERY SIMILAR PROPELLANT VOLUME, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT. MORE DETAILED EXAMINATION OF THESE OPTIONS ARE BEING DONE.

## UPDATE ON T.S. 1.5 PUMP-FED PROPELLANT SELECTION

The data in this trade study was a major element in concept selection. After the midterm review, we stopped considering reusability, but cost and risk considerations became more important.

On 5/16/88 our selected concepts all use LOX/HC propellants:

LOX/RP-1 AND LOX/CH<sub>4</sub>

Higher cost estimates eliminated SSME before the midterm and new LOX/LH<sub>2</sub> pump-fed engines just recently. Reduced costs, perhaps by sharing with the ALS program, would make LOX/LH<sub>2</sub> a very viable candidate for LRB.

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
DECEMBER 4, 1987

TRADE STUDY 1.6  
FINAL ERB

# **PRESSURE FED - PROPELLANT SELECTION**

STUDY LEADER: TINA NGUYEN  
SYSTEMS ENGINEER: MIKE VACCARO

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division



## 1.6 PRESSURE FED - PROPELLANT SELECTION Planning Sheet 2

### REQUIREMENTS:

1. 70 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION, WITH ORBITER SSME'S LIMITED TO 100% PL
2. 59 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION, WITH ORBITER SSME'S LIMITED TO 104% PL
3. SATISFY STS TRAJECTORY CONSTRAINTS (MAX Q, LIFTOFF TW, MAX G, ETC.)

### CONSTRAINTS:

- IMPROVE SAFETY, RELIABILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACCEPTABILITY
- MINIMIZE IMPACT/CHANGES ON ET, ORBITER, LAUNCH SITE AND GSE
- MINIMIZE IMPACTS TO FLAMETRENCH - MAXIMUM D<sub>0</sub> IS LIMITED TO 90in

## 1.6 PRESSURE FED - PROPELLANT SELECTION Planning Sheet 1

### OBJECTIVE:

SELECT THE BEST PROPELLANT COMBINATION(S) FOR A PRESSURE FED LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER


### GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS

- CONFIGURATION = CONVENTIONAL CYLINDRICAL (CURRENT SRB)
- VEHICLE L/D RATIO = 12.3
- NUMBER OF ENGINES = 4
- TANK MATERIAL = GRAPHITE-EPOXY
- PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM = GAS GENERATOR HEATED HELIUM SYSTEM
- EXIT DIAMETER = 90 IN (NO MODIFICATION TO FLAME TRENCH)
- CHAMBER PRESSURE = 400 PSIA
- MIXTURE RATIO = FIXED (ISP OPTIMIZED)
  - SENSITIVITY RUNS SHOWED ONLY HIGHER ORDER EFFECT ON PROPELLANT VOLUME

# 1.6 PRESSURE FED - PROPELLANT SELECTION

## Planning Sheet 4

### Trade Tree



- (1) NOT CONSIDERED BECAUSE OF LARGE BOOSTER SIZE
- (2) NO ADVANTAGES FOR PRESSURE-FED APPLICATION
- (3) MAY BE ELIMINATED EARLY IN TRADE DUE TO SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONCERNS
- (4) CONSIDERED AS CANDIDATE FOR FUTURE APPLICATION ONLY DUE TO TECHNOLOGY RISK

# PROPELLANT EVALUATION

## • PROPELLANT OPTIONS ANALYZED


- LO2/CH4
- LO2/C3H8
- LO2/RP1
- NTO/MMH

## • EVALUATION CRITERIA

- |                            |                            |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| • SAFETY                   | • TECHNICAL RISK           |
| • STS COMPATIBILITY (SIZE) | • OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY |
| • PERFORMANCE              | • OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY   |
| • COST                     | • ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS    |
| • SCHEDULE RISK            | • GROWTH POTENTIAL         |

# LENGTH / DIAMETER: PRESSURE-FED LRB

PC = 400 PSI, NOZZLE EXIT DIAMETER = 90 IN



# NTO/MMH PROPELLANT EVALUATION

## ADVANTAGES

- STS COMPATIBILITY - SMALLEST BOOSTER
- REUSEABILITY - CLEAN BURNING
- RELIABILITY - EXCELLENT COMBUSTION CHARACTERISTICS
- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT (POST-COMBUSTION) - RELATIVELY INERT EXHAUST PRODUCTS
- STORABLES - NO VENT OR INSULATION SYSTEMS REQUIRED

## DISADVANTAGES

- SAFETY - HIGH TOXICITY, MMH IS SUSPECTED CARCINOGEN; HIGH EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS (~4.7% IN AIR)  
EXPOSURE LIMIT: 3 ppm FOR NTO; 0.2 ppm FOR MMH
- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS - SPILLS CLEANUP MAY POSE HAZARDOUS WASTE ISSUE  
IN CASE OF EXPLOSION (ABORT OR ACCIDENT SCENARIOS), ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION OF TOXIC PLUME  
NTO - FORMS ACID WITH WATER, PHOTOCHEMICAL SMOG  
MMH - SOLUBLE IN WATER, FORM TOXIC BY-PRODUCTS
- PROPELLANT AVAILABILITY - ONLY ONE EXISTING MANUFACTURER FOR EACH PROPELLANT.  
FOR LRB QUANTITIES REQUIRED, NEW PLANTS MAY BE NEEDED. ~3-5 YRS TO QUALIFY NEW VENDOR
- COST - MOST EXPENSIVE PROPELLANT (2.75\$/LB NTO & 10\$/LB MMH, ~12M\$/LAUNCH)  
HIGH FACILITY ACTIVATION COST
- OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY - COMPLEX LAUNCH PROCESSING PROCEDURES DUE TO SAFETY CONCERNS

# METALLIZED/GEL PROPELLANT EVALUATION

## ADVANTAGES

- |  | LIQUIDS | HANDLING & STORAGE |
|--|---------|--------------------|
| • SAFETY - EXPLOSIVE HAZARD IS LESS THAN                   |         |                    |
| • HIGHEST ISP DENSITY COMPARED TO ALL CONVENTIONAL LIQUIDS |         |                    |
| • STORABLE - FLEXIBILITY IN LOADING TIME                   |         |                    |

## DISADVANTAGES

- TRANSFER - HIGH VISCOSITY AS GEL, RHEOLOGY IS NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD, EVACUATED TANKS MAY BE REQUIRED TO AVOID BUBBLE ENTRAPMENT
- UNLOADING OF PROPELLANT IN CASE OF ABORT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE
- CORING IN TANK - POSITIVE EXPULSION DEVICE (EG. PISTON) MAY BE REQUIRED
- AVAILABILITY - ONLY PRODUCED IN SMALL QUANTITIES SO FAR. FOR LARGE QUANTITIES, NEW PRODUCTION PLANTS MAY BE REQUIRED
- COST - PROPELLANT COST WOULD PROBABLY BE HIGHEST. TRANSFER WILL BE EXPENSIVE.
- ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS - SOLID PARTICULATES ( $\text{Al}_2\text{O}_3$ ) IN EXHAUST PRODUCTS
- TECHNICAL AND SCHEDULE RISK - NEW DEVELOPMENT WHERE MANY PROBLEMS ARE IDENTIFIED AND NOT YET RESOLVED
- OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY - NEW FACILITY, TRANSFER, ETC
- OPTIONS INCLUDE ALUMINUM POLYMER GELS &  $\text{Al}_2\text{O}_3/\text{RP}_1$

# PRESSURE FED - PROPELLANT EVALUATION Comparison Matrix

RANKING GRADE A - BEST B C D F - WORST	QUALITATIVE EVALUATION			
	LO2/CH4	LO2/C3H8	LO2/RP1	NTO/MMH
SAFETY	B	B	A	F
RELIABILITY	B	B	B	A
STS COMPATIBILITY	D	C	B	A
PERFORMANCE	YES	YES	YES	YES
COST	B	B	B	C
SCHEDULE RISK	B	B	B	C
TECHNICAL RISK	B	B	A	A
OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY	B	B	B	F
OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY	B	B	A	C
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS	B	B	B	F
GROWTH POTENTIAL	B	B	B	C



# PRESSURE FED - PROPELLANT SELECTION

## Summary of Results

### CONCLUSIONS:

- LO2/RP1 APPEARS TO BE THE BEST LO2/HC PROPELLANT BASED ON STS COMPATIBILITY (SIZE)
- NTO/MMH SHOWS THE BEST STS SOMPATIBILITY (SIZE), BUT ITS OPERATIONS, SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS DISADVANTAGES MAY ELIMINATE THIS CONCEPT
- METALLIZED PROPELLANT WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE RATHER THAN IMMEDIATE APPLICATION DUE TO PRESENT TECHNOLOGY RISKS

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
JANUARY 12, 1988

TRADE STUDY 1.7  
FINAL ERB

# PRESSURE FED CHAMBER PRESSURE SELECTION

STUDY LEADER: BILL PIERCE  
SYSTEMS ENGINEER: MIKE VACCARO

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division

# 1.7 PRESSURE FED - CHAMBER PRESSURE SELECTION Planning Sheet 2

## REQUIREMENTS:

1. 70 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION,  
WITH ORBITER SSME'S LIMITED TO 100% PL
2. 59 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION,  
WITH ORBITER SSME'S LIMITED TO 104% PL

## CONSTRAINTS:

- AERODYNAMIC LOAD ON ORBITER WING AT MAX Q
- NEED TO MINIMIZE PROPELLANT TANK VOLUME
- FLAME TRENCH WIDTH
- NEED TO MINIMIZE ENGINE NOZZLE

# 1.7 PRESSURE FED CHAMBER PRESSURE SELECTION

## Planning Sheet 4

### Trade Tree

SEPARATE TRADES FOR THE FOLLOWING PROPELLANT COMBINATIONS

<del>NTOMMH</del>	LO2/RP1	LO2/CH4	LO2/C3H8
-------------------	---------	---------	----------

De = 90




\*  $P_c = 250$      $P_c = 400$      $P_c = 700$      $P_c = 1000$

NOTE: NTOMMH ELIMINATED BY DOWNSELECTION BEFORE CHAMBER PRESSURE SELECTION  
DATA WAS OBTAINED AND LO2/C3H8 PERFORMANCE WAS ASSUMED TO BE BETWEEN  
RP1 AND CH4 PERFORMANCE.

\* FOR LO2 /RP1 ONLY

# CHAMBER PRESSURE OPTIMIZATION FOR MINIMUM VEHICLE VOLUME

117  
LRB



- PROPELLANT TANKS
  - PROPELLANT TANKS AND HELIUM STORAGE BOTTLE
- ASSUMPTIONS:  
4 NOZZLES WITH EXIT DIAMETER 90 INCHES  
CHAMBER HELIUM PROPELLANT TANKS  
GAS DETACHMENT HEAT REJECTION PRESSURIZATION

## T.S. 1.7 PRESSURE FED CHAMBER PRESSURE SELECTION

### Summary of Results

#### CONCLUSIONS:

- THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN TANK VOLUME FOR CHAMBER PRESSURE OF 400 TO 700 PSIA
- THE NOMINAL CHAMBER PRESSURE SHOULD BE 400 PSIA, AS LOWER PRESSURE IS BETTER FROM THE SAFETY STANDPOINT.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- THIS OPTIMUM CHAMBER PRESSURE STUDY SHOULD BE REPEATED FOR L02/RP-1 WHEN THE CONFIGURATION, TRAJECTORY AND THRUST PROFILE ARE BETTER DEFINED.

## UPDATE ON T.S. 1.7 OPTIMUM CHAMBER PRESSURE

This trade was performed assuming advanced technology graphite-epoxy propellant tanks (see Trade 1.12). The answer is also strongly dependent on pressurization system weights (see Trade 1.14). Pressure fed engine features such as gimbaling and cooling also had to be assumed before Propulsion Subcontractor trades were complete. Based on these assumptions, we recommended a Chamber Pressure of 400 psi.

Subsequently there have been major changes. As of 5/13/88, we feel the optimum Chamber Pressure is approximately 330 psi. This is based on 2219 aluminum tanks, because of the high risk associated with graphite epoxy liquid propellant tanks (particularly for LOX). Work is continuing to consider nozzle exit diameter limits due to the KSC facilities, gimbaling high pressure inlet lines, feed line arrangements, and the risk of combustion instability throttling at this chamber pressure.

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
FEBRUARY 3, 1988

TRADE STUDY 1.12  
FINAL REPORT

## TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION

STUDY LEADER: TODD SACZALSKI

SYSTEMS ENGINEER: GREG FARMER/L. PENA

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division



# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION

## Planning Sheet 1

### OBJECTIVE:

DEVELOP A TYPICAL TANK DESIGN FOR BOTH PUMP AND PRESSURE FED SYSTEMS AND PROVIDE A RECOMMENDED CONFIGURATION FOR EACH TYPE OF PROPELLANT SYSTEM. THE DESIGN WILL INCLUDE STRUCTURE, INSULATION AND THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM DEFINITION.

### GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES:

BOOSTER L/D = 12.3  
FULLY REUSEABLE LRB  
TANK FACTOR OF SAFETY 1.4  
GRAPHITE/EPOXY STRESS ALLOWABLES = 100 (ksi)

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 2

## REQUIREMENTS:

PRELAUNCH SUPPORT - THE LRBs MUST SUPPORT THE ENTIRE STS VEHICLE ON THE MLP  
DURING GROUND OPERATIONS


LAUNCH LOADS - THE LRBs SHALL BE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING INDUCED LOADS  
DURING THE LAUNCH PERIOD.

## CONSTRAINTS:

INDIVIDUAL TANK L/D RATIO  
MATERIAL PROPERTIES  
MATERIAL COMPATABILITY  
MATERIAL STRESS ALLOWABLES  
MAXIMUM TANK DIAMETER = 15 FT.  
MAXIMUM VEHICLE LENGTH = 200 FT.


# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 4

## Trade Tree



# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 4

## Trade Tree



# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION

## Planning Sheet 5

### INPUTS:

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WILL NEED TO BE PROVIDED:

PROPELLANT QUANTITY  
NUMBER, TYPE AND SIZE OF ENGINES  
THERMAL HEATING PROFILE  
AERO AND STRUCTURAL LOADS PROFILE  
TANK OPERATING PRESSURE

### OUTPUTS:

DESIGN TANK DRAWINGS FOR EACH TYPE OF PROPELLANT SYSTEM

INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS


DEVELOP BACK-UP MATERIAL

### OTHER TRADES AFFECTED:


1.13 RECOVERY SYSTEMS SELECTION  
1.14 PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SELECTION  
2.4 DEGREE OF AUTOMATION  
2.5 ROBUSTNESS VS. MAINTAINABILITY  
2.6 PRODUCTION SITE OPTIONS

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 7


## RP1/LOX PRESSURE FED BOOSTER BASELINE



VEHICLE CONFIGURATION



TANK CONFIGURATIONS



FORWARD

REARWARD

ALL




ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY

6A

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 7

## RP1/LOX PUMP FED BOOSTER BASELINE


ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY



# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 7

## LH2/LOX PUMP FED BOOSTER BASELINE

ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY






TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION  
SELECTION  
Planning Sheet 7

# POLAR BOSS DESIGN #1

ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY



**ADVANTAGES**


- **START IN 1985**
- **LOW RISK**
- **FIN AN INST. OFFERED FINANCED**

## DISADVANTAGES

1. FIVE SEVEN  
 2. FIVE SEVEN  
 3. FIVE SEVEN  
 4. FIVE SEVEN  
 5. FIVE SEVEN  
 6. FIVE SEVEN  
 7. FIVE SEVEN  
 8. FIVE SEVEN  
 9. FIVE SEVEN  
 10. FIVE SEVEN  
 11. FIVE SEVEN  
 12. FIVE SEVEN  
 13. FIVE SEVEN  
 14. FIVE SEVEN  
 15. FIVE SEVEN  
 16. FIVE SEVEN  
 17. FIVE SEVEN  
 18. FIVE SEVEN  
 19. FIVE SEVEN  
 20. FIVE SEVEN  
 21. FIVE SEVEN  
 22. FIVE SEVEN  
 23. FIVE SEVEN  
 24. FIVE SEVEN  
 25. FIVE SEVEN  
 26. FIVE SEVEN  
 27. FIVE SEVEN  
 28. FIVE SEVEN  
 29. FIVE SEVEN  
 30. FIVE SEVEN  
 31. FIVE SEVEN  
 32. FIVE SEVEN  
 33. FIVE SEVEN  
 34. FIVE SEVEN  
 35. FIVE SEVEN  
 36. FIVE SEVEN  
 37. FIVE SEVEN  
 38. FIVE SEVEN  
 39. FIVE SEVEN  
 40. FIVE SEVEN  
 41. FIVE SEVEN  
 42. FIVE SEVEN  
 43. FIVE SEVEN  
 44. FIVE SEVEN  
 45. FIVE SEVEN  
 46. FIVE SEVEN  
 47. FIVE SEVEN  
 48. FIVE SEVEN  
 49. FIVE SEVEN  
 50. FIVE SEVEN  
 51. FIVE SEVEN  
 52. FIVE SEVEN  
 53. FIVE SEVEN  
 54. FIVE SEVEN  
 55. FIVE SEVEN  
 56. FIVE SEVEN  
 57. FIVE SEVEN  
 58. FIVE SEVEN  
 59. FIVE SEVEN  
 60. FIVE SEVEN  
 61. FIVE SEVEN  
 62. FIVE SEVEN  
 63. FIVE SEVEN  
 64. FIVE SEVEN  
 65. FIVE SEVEN  
 66. FIVE SEVEN  
 67. FIVE SEVEN  
 68. FIVE SEVEN  
 69. FIVE SEVEN  
 70. FIVE SEVEN  
 71. FIVE SEVEN  
 72. FIVE SEVEN  
 73. FIVE SEVEN  
 74. FIVE SEVEN  
 75. FIVE SEVEN  
 76. FIVE SEVEN  
 77. FIVE SEVEN  
 78. FIVE SEVEN  
 79. FIVE SEVEN  
 80. FIVE SEVEN  
 81. FIVE SEVEN  
 82. FIVE SEVEN  
 83. FIVE SEVEN  
 84. FIVE SEVEN  
 85. FIVE SEVEN  
 86. FIVE SEVEN  
 87. FIVE SEVEN  
 88. FIVE SEVEN  
 89. FIVE SEVEN  
 90. FIVE SEVEN  
 91. FIVE SEVEN  
 92. FIVE SEVEN  
 93. FIVE SEVEN  
 94. FIVE SEVEN  
 95. FIVE SEVEN  
 96. FIVE SEVEN  
 97. FIVE SEVEN  
 98. FIVE SEVEN  
 99. FIVE SEVEN  
 100. FIVE SEVEN

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 7

# POLAR BOSS DESIGN #2




- [illegible]

ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 7

# POLAR BOSS DESIGN #3

ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY



- | ADVANTAGES  | DISADVANTAGES  |
|---|--|
| • LIGHT WEIGHT, AIR COMPRESSIBLE IN SPINE   | • TEND TO BURN WITH OIL, MAYBE ENGINE 1 TO INFLAMMATE WITH THIS IN SPINE |
| • NO INFLAM "CIC" PROBLEMS  | • SEALING SURFACTS NEEDED SPECIAL TREATMENT                              |
| • CAN BE USED SUCCESSFULLY AND IN "COLD" TEMPS. 10-15°F WELL TO THE LOWEST -100°F, AND "HOT" TEMPERATURES | • TEND TO BE "WET" IN PARTS, MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS AT CRITICAL TEMPERATURES |
| • EASY TO USE AND EASY TO COMPRESSIBLE IN SPINE   |  |
| • SURETY IS AND THAT CAN BE MAINTAINED  |  |



# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 7

## SKIRT AREA DESIGN #1




FIGURE 1. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA WITH ELASTOMER/RESIN INSERTED INTO THE KNEAD REGION NOT TO SCALE.

ADVANTAGES: COMPOSITE STRUCTURE IS USED TO PROVIDE AN INTERNAL PART OF THE TANK FOR HIGH AXIAL LOADS

DISADVANTAGES: COMPOSITE FABRICATING PROBLEMS DUE TO EXCESSIVE MATERIAL WASTE

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 7

## SKIRT AREA DESIGN #2




FIGURE 2. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA WITH AN ADHESIVE FILM DOUBLER INSERTED.  
NOT TO SCALE.

ADVANTAGES SYSTEM COMBINATION EXISTS FOR SOME DOUBT AND SOME CASES  
EASY INSTALLATION IN DOUBT  
KEVAFIBER OVERWHELMINGLY HELP IN DOUBT. COMBINATION  
WITH WITH AIRMAN SHEAR

DISADVANTAGES DOUBT OVER 10 TO 10 STAGE COMBINATION

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 7

## SKIRT AREA DESIGN #3




FIGURE 3. COMPOSITE HONEYCOMB SKIRT AREA FOR A PUMP-FED SYSTEM. NOT TO SCALE.

ADVANTAGES: 1. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA RELATIVE TO A TANK LAMINATE STRUCTURE  
2. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA RELATIVE TO A SMALLER SKIRT AREA  
3. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA RELATIVE TO A SMALLER SKIRT AREA  
4. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA RELATIVE TO A SMALLER SKIRT AREA  
5. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA RELATIVE TO A SMALLER SKIRT AREA

DISADVANTAGES: 1. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA RELATIVE TO A TANK LAMINATE  
2. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA RELATIVE TO A SMALLER SKIRT AREA  
3. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA RELATIVE TO A SMALLER SKIRT AREA  
4. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA RELATIVE TO A SMALLER SKIRT AREA  
5. COMPOSITE SKIRT AREA RELATIVE TO A SMALLER SKIRT AREA

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Planning Sheet 7

## SKIRT AREA DESIGN #4




FIGURE 1. COMPOSITE PUMP-LED TANK DESIGN - AFT SKIRT REGION

### ADVANTAGES

- COMPOSITE STRUCTURE TO "GRIP" TANK
- TANK WALLS SAVED FROM CORROSION
- IT'S EASIER TO FABRICATE THAN A SKIRTING
- NO NEED TO JOIN CORROSION
- SKIRTING SEPARATION LESS LIKELY TO OCCUR


### DISADVANTAGES

- TANK-SKIRT TO TANK LAYER REQUIRES SPECIAL TANK HING
- CORROSION MATERIAL WEIGHT WOULD BE GREATER THAN A TANK HING MATERIAL
- AFT AROUND TANK HING WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SEAL LINE
- A TANK TANK DESIGN

ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY





# TANK WEIGHT vs. TANK PRESSURE



TANK VOLUME = 6597 (cu.ft.)


TKS 1/26/88

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION HI-PRESSURE RP1 THERMAL HEATING PROFILE



ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION HI-PRESSURE LOX THERMAL HEATING PROFILE



(14)

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Lox Incompatibility Problem

## I. AL-LI & GRAPHITE/EPOXY HYBRID TANK (PRESSURE-FED)

THE AL-LI LINER WILL BE 25% LOAD SHARING TO HELP ENSURE THAT THE TANK WILL NOT LEAK DURING FLIGHT ONLY IF THE TANK PASSES THE INITIAL PRESSURE TEST BEFORE THE GRAPHITE/EPOXY IS OVERWRAPPED.

### ADVANTAGES

1. SAFEST LIGHT WEIGHT ALTERNATIVE.

### DISADVANTAGES

1. IF LOX WERE TO COME IN CONTACT WITH GR/EPOXY A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE WOULD OCCUR.

## II. AL-LI TANK (PRESSURE-FED & PUMP-FED)

### ADVANTAGES

1. LOX IS COMPATIBLE WITH ALUMINUM-LITHIUM.
2. FEASIBLE FOR PUMP-FED LOX TANK.

### DISADVANTAGES

1. TWICE AS HEAVY AS GR/E W/AL-LI PRESSURE-FED TANK.

## III. AL-LI, GR/E & HONEYCOMB SANDWICH (PUMP-FED)

### ADVANTAGES

1. SLIGHT WEIGHT SAVINGS.

### DISADVANTAGES

1. NOT FEASIBLE WITH LOX DUE TO RISK AND MANUFACTURING DIFFICULTIES.

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Comparison Matrix

CONFIGURATION PROPELLANT		MATERIAL TANK CONSTRUCTION										TANK LINER MATERIAL			TANK LINER CONSTR		INSULATION				
		AL-LI	GREPOXY	STRETCH FORMED	FILAMENT WOUND	SANDWICH	WAFFLE	ISOGRID	SKIN STRINGER	RING FRAMES	AL/LI	NON METALLIC	INVAR	KEL F	NONE	RIGID INNER SHELL	THIN LAMINATE	LOAD SHARING	PVC FOAM	POLYURETHANE	NONE
PRESSURE FED	LOX	X	X	X	X						X			X		X		X	X		
	RP1	X	X	X	X																
	LOX	X		X					X	X				X					X		
	RP1	X		X																	X

METALLIC COMPOSITE

NOTE: ALL PRESSURE FED TANKS WILL BE A MONOCOQUE STRUCTURE.

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION Comparison Matrix

CONFIGUR- ATION PRO- PELLANT		MATERIAL TANK CONSTRUCTION										TANK LINER MATERIAL		TANK LINER CONST.		INSULATION			
		AL-LI	GREPOXY	STRETCH FORMED	FILAMENT WOUND	SANDWICH	WAFFLE	ISOGRID	SKIN STRINGER	RING FRAMES	MONOCOQUE	AL/LI	NON METALLIC	INVAR	THIN LAMINATE	LOAD SHARING	PVC FOAM	POLYURETHANE	NONE
LOX		X	X	X	X	X						X			X	X	X		
RP1			X	X	X	X							X					X	
LH 2			X	X	X	X			X			X or X		X			X		
LOX (-297°F)		X		X				X	X	X			X				X		
RP1 (70°F)		X		X			X		X	X			X						
LH 2 (-423°F)		X		X					X	X			X					X	

PUMP FED

METALLIC COMPOSITE

PUMP FED  
METALLIC  
COMPOSITE

# TRADE STUDY 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION

## 3.0 Summary of Results

### CONCLUSIONS:

FOR A PUMP-FED LOX TANK, AN ALL METALLIC TANK DESIGN WOULD HAVE THE LOWEST RISK VERSES AN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY COMPOSITE TANK DESIGN. A COMPOSITE DESIGN WOULD OFFER ONLY A SLIGHT WEIGHT ADVANTAGE OVER THE METALLIC DESIGN DUE TO REDUCED ALLOWABLES CAUSED BY THE MANUFACTURE OF LARGE TANK STRUCTURES USING THIN LAMINATES AND A METALLIC LINER. HOWEVER, A COMPOSITE DESIGN WOULD BE PREFERRED FOR THE RP-1 TANK, DUE TO A METALLIC LINER NOT BEING REQUIRED.

IF A PRESSURE-FED LRB IS PROPOSED, THAN THE HIGHEST PERFORMANCE MAY BE SEEN BY A TANK DESIGN INCORPORATING AN ADVANCED COMPOSITE, SUCH AS GRAPILITE/EPOXY FILAMENT WOUND TOW. USING FILAMENT WINDING TECHNOLOGY FROM SOLID ROCKET MOTOR CASES, AN ALL COMPOSITE TANK FOR THE RP-1 PROPELLANT WOULD BE POSSIBLE. FIBER-OVERWRAPPED METALLIC PRESSURE VESSEL TECHNOLOGY COULD ALSO BE APPLIED TO THE DESIGN OF THE LOX TANK, PROVIDING LOW RISK LOX COMPATIBILITY.

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

-CONTINUE RESEARCH, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF FILAMENT WOUND TANK STRUCTURES FOR THE LRB (BOTH PUMP AND PRESSURE-FED).

- Reference 1    1987 JANNAF COMPOSITE MOTOR CASE SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING  
J.D. Erickson & J.A. Yorgason, Morlon Thiokol, Inc., Wasatch Operations, Brigham City, UT., "GRAPILITE EPOXY PRESSURE VESSEL DOME REINFORCEMENT STUDY", February 17-19, 1987, pp.11-23.

## COMPOSITE TANK RISKS

LRB

### I. LINER REQUIRED

- LOX COMPATIBILITY, I.E. GR/EPOXY IN CONTACT WITH LOX EXPLOSIVE
- LINER THICKNESS GREATER THAN NORMAL TO RESIST BUCKING DUE TO HIGH FIBER OVERWRAP TENSILE STRESSES PRESENT IN AN EMPTY, UNPRESSURIZED TANK.

### II. HIGH TEMPERATURE CAPABILITY

- HIGH He GAS PRESSURIZATION TEMPERATURES (~800R) DICTATE USING SLIGHTLY REDUCED COMPOSITE STRENGTH ALLOWABLES ON TOP OF HOT/WET CONDITION ALLOWABLES.
- RESIN SYSTEMS EXIST THAT HANDLE HIGH TEMPERATURES AND OTHER SYSTEMS HANDLE CRYOGENIC TEMPERATURES. HOWEVER, RESEARCH IS CONTINUING IN SEARCHING FOR AN OPTIMUM RESIN SYSTEM TO HANDLE THE WIDE TEMPERATURE RANGE ON TOP OF BEING COMPATIBLE WITH SALT WATER FOR REUSABILITY PURPOSES.

### III. EXISTING TECHNOLOGY

- SMALL COMPOSITE-METAL LINED STORAGE BOTTLES ARE MADE BY STRUCTURAL COMPOSITE INDUSTRIES TODAY, BUT THE RISK WILL BE IN SCALING THESE DESIGNS INTO MUCH LARGER TANKS FOR 'LRB'.

### IV. FURTHER STUDY AND ANALYSIS REQUIRED

- SEVERAL 1988 GDSS IRADS ARE PRESENTLY IN WORK



## UPDATE ON T.S. 1.12 TANK CONFIGURATION SELECTION

At the midterm program review we recommended composite tanks to minimize weight on the pressure fed LRB concept. We acknowledged the risk in this new technology area particularly an aluminum liner in the LOX tank. In his memo 3/14/88, "Results of LRB Configuration Review", MSFC/Larry Wear advised us that "...the selection of composite tanks for cryogenic propellants is inconsistent with design goals of maximum flight safety."

Therefore we have adapted as a low risk baseline lithium-aluminum for pump fed tanks and 2219 aluminum for pressure fed. The difference is due to the approximately 1 inch thick walls for pressure fed. Most Al-Li work to date has been on 1/4 inch thickness or less, with good results in LOX compatibility, VPPA weldability, etc. On thicker sections there is less information. Problems have occurred with weak transverse properties in thicker sections.

Using GDSS IRAD funds, we are continuing to explore graphite epoxy propellant tanks for LOX, RP-1, and LH2.

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
FEBRUARY 11, 1988

TRADE STUDY 1.14  
FINAL ERB

**PRESSURE FED**  
**PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SELECTION**

STUDY LEADER: BILL PIERCE

SYSTEMS ENGINEER: MIKE VACCARO

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division

# TRADE STUDY 1.14

## PRESSURE FED - PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SELECTION PLANNING SHEET 1

### OBJECTIVE:

SELECT THE OPTIMUM PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM FOR A PRESSURE FED LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER

### GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES:

- PRESSURANT COMPATIBLE WITH PROPELLANT
- HELIUM STORAGE BOTTLE PRESSURE 4000 PSIA
- COLD HELIUM STORAGE BOTTLE TEMPERATURE 150 DEGREES R
- TANK PRESSURE 700 PSIA
- MAXIMUM ULLAGE TEMPERATURE 800 DEGREES R
- HELIUM STORAGE SAFETY FACTOR 1.5
- MAIN PROPELLANT LO2/RP-1

## 1.14 PRESSURE FED - PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SELECTION Planning Sheet 2

### REQUIREMENTS:


- PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SHALL BE SAFE AND RELIABLE (MAN RATED)
- PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SHALL SUPPLY THE REQUIRED VOLUME OF PRESSURANT AT THE REQUIRED TANK PRESSURE FOR EACH PROPELLANT.
- PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SHALL MAINTAIN LAUNCH READINESS DURING A 24 HOUR HOLD

### CONSTRAINTS:

- NO PUMP

# 1.14 PRESSURE FED - PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SELECTION Planning Sheet 4 Trade Tree

## PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM OPTIONS



## 1.14 PRESSURE FED - PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SELECTION

### SUMMARY OF PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM OPTIONS

	(A) Ambient Helium (He)	(B) Cold He Heated With LO2/RP-1 Gas Generator	(C) Cold He Heated With LO2/RP-1 Gas Generator and Hot He Coil passing through He storage bottle	(D) Cold He heated with LO2/RP-1 Gas Generator and Three Storage Bottle Cascade
Pressurant Storage Bottle	18,529 He 60,690 (Five 14.9 Dia. He)	11,725 He 14,600 (14.9 Dia. He)	6,846 He 8,707 (12.4 Dia. He)	6,069 He 7,558 (11.7 Dia. He) 667 (4.6 Dia. He) 168 (2.6 Dia. He)
Components Main Propellant		5,000 5,954	8,525 5,874	5,398 6,431
Total Weight	79,219 Lbs.	37,279 Lbs.	29,952 Lbs.	26,291 Lbs.
Advantages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proven technology</li> <li>• Simple</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proven technology</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same as (B), but less residual He makes it lighter</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Same as (B), but less residual He makes it lighter.</li> </ul>
Disadvantages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Very Heavy</li> <li>• Very large volume</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Heavy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Approximately 600 ft of 3 inch tubing in storage bottle.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complex with three different storage bottles.</li> </ul>
Safety and Reliability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Very High</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Medium</li> </ul>

## 1.14 PRESSURE FED - PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SELECTION

### SUMMARY OF PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM OPTIONS

	(E) Cold He heated with Heat Exchanger which is part of Engine Cooling System	(F) LN2 heated with LO2/RP-1 Gas Generator	(G) LN2 to pressurize fuel tank and Cold He to pressurize Oxidizer Tank; Both heated with LO2/ RP-1 Gas Generator	(H) LH2 to pressurize fuel tank and Cold He to pressurize Oxidizer Tank; Both heated with LO2/RP-1 Gas Generator
Pressurant Storage Bottle.	11,725 He 14,600 (14.9 Dia. He)	44,978 He & LN2 5,750 (10.7 Dia. He) 738 (11.5 Dia. LN2)	23,679 He & LN2 11,218 (13.6 Dia. He) 337 (8.2 Dia. LN2)	9,832 He & LH2 10,885 (13.5 Dia. He) 290 (7.7 Dia. LH2)
Components Main Propellant	*397 2,142	10,601 11,967	6,857 8,116	6,166 7,346
Total Weight	28,864 Lbs.	74,034 Lbs.	50,207 Lbs.	34,519 Lbs.
Advantages	• Light weight	• Proven Technology	• Proven Technology	• Proven Technology
Disadvantages	• Makes engine more complex and possibly less reliable	• Very heavy	• Very heavy	• More complex than (B) • LH2 on board
Safety and Reliability	• Medium	• High	• High	• Medium

\*Net increase from weight of ablative thrust chamber

# 1.14 PRESSURE FED - PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## SUMMARY OF PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM OPTIONS

	(J) High Press LO <sub>2</sub> /LH <sub>2</sub> Gas Generator Combustion Products to Pressurize Fuel Tank and to Heat LO <sub>2</sub> to Pressurize Oxidizer Tank	(K) High Press LO <sub>2</sub> /LH <sub>2</sub> Gas Generator Combustion Products to Pressurize Fuel Tank and to Heat Cold He to Pressurize Oxidizer Tank	(L) N <sub>2</sub> H <sub>4</sub> Decomposition Products to pressurize Fuel Tank and to Heat Cold He to Pressurize Oxidizer Tank	(M) Cold He Mixed with Small Amounts of H <sub>2</sub> and O <sub>2</sub> Heated by Catalytic Reaction
Pressurant Storage Bottle	44,130 He, LO <sub>2</sub> & LH <sub>2</sub> 8,060 (11.9 Dia. He) 1,771 (11.4 Dia. LH <sub>2</sub> ) 1,111 (10.0 Dia. LO <sub>2</sub> )	13,299 He, LO <sub>2</sub> & LH <sub>2</sub> 13,261 (14.3 Dia. He) 746 (8.3 Dia. LH <sub>2</sub> ) 70 (3.3 Dia. LO <sub>2</sub> )	17,125 He & N <sub>2</sub> H <sub>4</sub> 9,570 (12.9 Dia. He) 309 (6.6 DIA N <sub>2</sub> H <sub>4</sub> )	8,216 He/H <sub>2</sub> /O <sub>2</sub> Mix 11,740 (13.9 Dia. Mix) 4,701 (9.9 Dia. Mix)
Components Main Propellant	2,792	1,082	5,289 - 1,256	400
Total Weight	84,573 Lbs.	38,913 Lbs.	31,037 Lbs.	25,057 Lbs.
Advantages		• Lighter than (B)	• Proven Technology • Light weight	• Lightest system • Simple
Disadvantages	• Very heavy • Complex with three different storage bottles • LH <sub>2</sub> on board	• Complex with three different storage bottles • LH <sub>2</sub> on board	• Requires 10,000 pounds of N <sub>2</sub> H <sub>4</sub> which is toxic	• Needs development for LRB operating conditions
Safety and Reliability	• Low	• Low	• Medium	• High




## TRIDYNE

- A GASEOUS MIXTURE ( $O_2/H_2 + N_2$  OR He DILUENT) PROVIDING A CATALYTICALLY HEATED GAS FOR THRUSTERS AND PRESSURIZATION
- MIXTURES ARE SAFELY STORABLE IN CONVENTIONAL PRESSURE VESSEL
- USES SIMPLE BASIC STRUCTURE OF A COLD GAS SYSTEM
- CATALYST CHARACTERISTICS PROVIDE PREDICTABLE REACTION FOR A GIVEN GAS MIXTURE
- TECHNOLOGY BASE IS WELL ESTABLISHED
- CURRENTLY BASELINED FOR MX STAGE IV PRESSURIZATION SUBSYSTEM

153

235-535



# ROCKETDYNE TRIDYNE EXPERIENCE AND APPLICATIONS INVESTIGATIONS


TYPE EFFORT	YEAR	SPONSORING AGENCY
GASEOUS-BLOWDOWN PROPULSION	1964	IR&D
TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS	1966	AFRPL, AF04(611)-11383
ATTITUDE CONTROL THRUSTERS	1970	NASA, NAS7-719
GUN BREECH SCAVENGER SYSTEMS	1973	ARMY, DAAA22-74-C-0107
GUN BREECH SCAVENGER SYSTEMS	1975	ARMY, DAAA22-75-C-0158
MINUTEMAN II TRIDYNE VCS DESIGN	1977	ROCKETDYNE
IGNITABILITY AND ADIABATIC COMPRESSION TESTS	1977	IR&D
LIGHT-WEIGHT ADVANCED POST-BOOST VEHICLE PROPULSION FEED SYSTEM	1977	AFRPL, F04611-77-C-0068

151 A


285-5258




# CONCENTRATION TEMPERATURE STABILITY FOR HELIUM TRIDYNE AT 2000 PSIA




285-235



# He-TRIDYNE CONCENTRATION-PRESSURE IGNITABILITY LIMITS AT AMBIENT TEMPERATURE



# TRIDYNE COMPOSITION




254-580



Rocketdyne Division  
Rockwell International

# SELECTED PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM PRESSURANT HEATED BY CATALYTIC REACTION



## 1.14 PRESSURE FED - PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM SELECTION

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

- The H<sub>2</sub>/O<sub>2</sub> catalytic reaction system (option (M)) was selected as potentially the best pressurization system for the Pressure Fed Engine.
  - Lightest System
  - Less impact on other systems
  - Fewer Pressurization lines than other systems
  - No overboard dump.
- Development Requirements for the H<sub>2</sub>/O<sub>2</sub> catalytic reaction system
  - Show that the system will operate properly for the pressure, temperature and flow range expected for LRB.
  - Determine the nonignitable region (volume percent of H<sub>2</sub> and O<sub>2</sub> in the mixture) for LRB operating conditions.
  - Prove that ice crystals, which may form in the LO<sub>2</sub> tank, will not cause a problem.

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
FEBRUARY 1, 1988

TRADE STUDY 1.8  
FINAL ERB

## PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

STUDY LEADER: TINA NGUYEN/GOPAL MEHTA

SYSTEMS ENGINEER: MIKE VACCARO

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
*Space Systems Division*



## **1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION**

### **OBJECTIVES:**

- PROVIDE PERFORMANCE DATA FOR ALL ENGINE CANDIDATES
  - VALIDATE DATA USED IN INITIAL TRADES AND ANALYSES
  - PROVIDE UPDATED DATA WHERE NECESSARY, ESPECIALLY FOR SELECTED ENGINES
- PROVIDE QUALITATIVE EVALUATION FOR ALL ENGINE CONCEPTS

## 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES:

- CHAMBER PRESSURES, MIXTURE RATIOS & EFFICIENCIES PROPOSED IN STME & STBE WILL BE USED.
- UPDATED ENGINE DATA ARE TO BE VERIFIED AGAINST STME & STBE POINT DESIGNS FROM PRATT & WHITNEY, ROCKETDYNE AND AERJET.
- ONE-DIMENSIONAL EQUILIBRIUM CODE WITH TYPICAL CHAMBER PRESSURE AND ENGINE EFFICIENCIES WILL BE USED TO GENERATE ENGINE PERFORMANCE WHERE NO DATA ARE AVAILABLE.
- PRATT & WHITNEY'S PARAMETRIC EQUATIONS FROM HYDROCARBON ENGINE STUDY WERE USED FOR INITIAL TRADES. (ONLY AVAILABLE DATA)
- DATA WILL EMPHASIZE ON DOWNSELECTED CONCEPTS AS OF 1/15/88, WHICH INCLUDE SSME-35, F-1, NEW LO2/LH2 AND NEW LO2/RP1 ENGINES. ALSO, BOTH REUSABLE AND EXPENDABLE MODES WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR THESE SELECTED ENGINES.

## 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### Cost Assumptions

- GD COST MODEL FOR DDT&E AND PRODUCTION COST, USED IN ALS AND STAS, ASSUMING LOW COST EXPENDABLE PROPULSION STUDY RESULTS
- 93% LEARNING CURVE; 91.5% RATE CURVE
- 25 MISSION LIFE FOR ALL WATER RECOVERABLE ENGINES
- OVERHAUL COST BETWEEN FLIGHTS FOR WATER RECOVERY IN TERMS OF FIRST UNIT COST ASSUMING 1 ENGINE OVERHAUL/YR IS
  - 30% FOR SSME-35 AND F-1; 25% FOR NEW GG ENGINES


## 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### REQUIREMENTS:

1. 70 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION, WITH ORBITER SSME'S LIMITED TO 100% PL
2. 59 KLB PAYLOAD TO 150 NM ORBIT, 28.5 DEG INCLINATION, WITH ORBITER SSME'S LIMITED TO 104% PL
3. SATISFY STS TRAJECTORY REQUIREMENTS (IE. LIFTOFF TW, MAX G, MAX Q, ETC.)
4. ENGINE/VEHICLE INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS - TBD

### CONSTRAINTS:

- EXISTING ENGINE CONCEPT WILL ONLY CONSIDER ENGINES WITH THRUST SIZE LARGER THAN 300KLB.  
ALSO, ONLY PROVEN CAPABILITIES OF THESE ENGINES WILL BE CONSIDERED.
- EFFECT OF CONTROL AUTHORITY WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED
- ENGINE NOZZLE SIZE IS LIMITED BY DIMENSIONS OF FLAME TRENCH  
(EG. MAXIMUM NOZZLE EXIT DIAMETER IS 90IN FOR 4 ENGINES/LRB CONFIGURATION)
- DATA BASE FOR NEW ENGINES WILL BE RESTRICTED TO:
  - STME & STBE STUDIES (POINT DESIGN)
  - LOW COST EXPENDABLE ENGINE STUDIES
  - HYDROCARBON ENGINE STUDIES (PARAMETRIC EQUATIONS BY PRATT & WHITNEY)
  - NEW IMPROVED ENGINE PARAMETRIC EQUATIONS FOR ALS FROM PRATT & WHITNEY
  - ONE-DIMENSIONAL EQUILIBRIUM (ODE) CODE WITH TYPICAL EFFICIENCIES FOR NTO/MMH



- (1) ELIMINATED ON BASIS OF SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
- (2) STAGED-COMBUSTION CYCLE WAS RANKED LOWER THAN GAS-GENERATOR CYCLE IN PREVIOUS STUDIES
- (3) ELIMINATED ON BASIS OF HIGH COST, COMPLEXITY & TECHNICAL RISK ASSOCIATED WITH TRIPROPELLANTS
- (4) ELIMINATED ON BASIS OF HIGH TECHNICAL RISK AS COMPARED TO LO2/RP1 AND LO2/LH2
- (5) OFFERS NO MAJOR ADVANTAGES AS COMPARED TO LO2/CH4 AND LO2/RP1
- (6) RECENTLY ELIMINATED ON BASIS OF HIGH RISK IN CONTROL AUTHORITY, REQUALIFICATION COST & SCHEDULE

# 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

## Existing Engine Evaluation

CRITERIA	SSME-35	F-1	LR87-11
PROPELLANT	LO2/LH2	LO2/RP1	NTO/A-50
NO. OF ENGINE PER BOOSTER	4	2	5 PAIRS
IGNITION COMPLEXITY	MEDIUM	HIGH	LOW
ENGINE OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY	VERY HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW
THROTTLEABILITY	65% TO 109% RPL	1.25 TO 1.8MLB	PRESET THRUST ONLY
FLT PROVEN REUSABILITY	MAXIMUM OF 10 MISSIONS	NONE	NONE
LEAD TIME	48 MONTHS	48 MONTHS	30 MONTHS
COST	HIGH RECURRING COST	MEDIUM RECURRING COST \$85M NON-RECURRING COST	LOW RECURRING COST
TECHNOLOGY RISK	LOW	MEDIUM	LOW
SCHEDULE RISK	LOW	HIGH	LOW
LRB CONTROL AUTHORITY	GOOD	MARGINAL	GOOD

## 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

Existing Engine: SSME-35

• RPL	65%	100%	109%
• SL THRUST, LB	253.3K	412.8K	453.9K
• VAC THRUST, LB	296.3K	455.8K	496.8K
• SL Isp, SEC		398.6	403.4
• VAC Isp, SEC		440.1	441.5
• Pc, PSIA	1947	2995	3265
• MR		6.0	
• AREA RATIO		35	
• D ext, IN		61	
• LENGTH, IN		146	
• WEIGHT, LB	(DRY) 6550	(WET) 7090	
• GIMBALLING		±11°, 10°/SEC	

- LO2/LH2
- STAGED COMBUSTION CYCLE
- REGEN. FUEL COOLED
- CONTINUOUS THROTTLING 65 - 109% RPL
- LIFE: 7.5 HRS, 55 STARTS
- LEAD TIME - 48 MONTHS
- PRODUCTION COST (ROCKETDYNE)
  - \$45-50M/BASIC ENGINE (QNTY 2-8/YR, 4 TOTAL)
  - \$35-40M/EXPENDABLE ENGINE (QNTY 8-12/YR, 30 TOTAL)
- OPERATIONS COST (ROCKETDYNE)
  - \$1.3M/LAUNCH (3 ENGINES), AVGD OVER 25 FLTS
- INCLUDED MAJOR OVERHAULS AFTER EVERY 10 FLTS

## 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

Existing Engine: F-1 (uprated)

	MPL	NPL	EPL
• SL THRUST, LB	1.25M	1.522M	1.80M
• SL Isp, SEC		265.4	271.9
• VAC Isp, SEC		304.1	306
• Pc, PSIA	806	982	1135
• MR		2.27	
• AREA RATIO		16	
• D exit, IN		143.5	
• LENGTH, IN		220.4	
• WEIGHT, LB		(DRY) 19,647; (WET) 21,649	
• GIMBALLING		±6°, 10°/SEC, 1RAD/SEC2	

- LO2/RP1
- GAS GENERATOR CYCLE
- REGEN. FUEL COOLED
- CONTINUOUS THROTTLING 1.25 - 1.8MLBF
- LIFE: 5,000 SEC, 30 STARTS, 25 FLTS CAPABILITY,  
50 FLTS ACHIEVED WITH OVERHAUL
- LEAD TIME - 48 MONTHS
- NON-RECURRING COST (ROCKETDYNE)  
\$85M FOR TOOLING & SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
- PRODUCTION COST (ROCKETDYNE)  
\$14-16M/ENGINE (QNTY 12-16/YR, 45 TOTAL)
- OPERATIONS COST (ROCKETDYNE)  
MAJOR OVERHAUL AFTER 25 FLTS  
60% FIRST UNIT COST FOR MAJOR OVERHAUL



## **1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION**

### **New Gas Generator Cycle Engine**

- PROVIDE QUALITATIVE EVALUATION FOR ALL OPTIONS
- VALIDATE ALL PERFORMANCE ENGINE DATA USED IN LRB  
AGAINST STME AND STBE POINT DESIGNS
- PROVIDE UPDATED DATA AS AVAILABLE
- COMPARE SELECTED CONCEPTS IN STBE VS. LRB

# 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

## New Gas Generator Cycle Engine Evaluation (Sheet 1 of 2)

CRITERIA	LO2/LH2	LO2/CH4	LO2/C3H8	LO2/RP1
COOLANT	LH2	CH4	C3H8	RP1
TYPE OF COOLING	REGENERATIVE	REGENERATIVE	REGENERATIVE	REGENERATIVE
PERFORMANCE Pc (psia)/sp.v (sec)	HIGHEST ~3000/~440	GOOD ~2800/~340	MEDIUM ~2800/~330	POOR ~1500/~315
IGNITION CHARACTERISTICS	GOOD	MEDIUM	POOR	POOR
COMBUSTION STABILITY	VERY GOOD	GOOD	MEDIUM	POOR
ENGINE OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY	HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW
THROTTLEABILITY	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
REUSABILITY	HIGH	HIGH	LOW	LOW
CONTROL AUTHORITY	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
COST - DDT&E FIRST UNIT	HIGH HIGH	MEDIUM MEDIUM	MEDIUM MEDIUM	LOW LOW
TECHNOLOGY RISK	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW
SCHEDULE RISK	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW

## 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### New Gas Generator Cycle Engine Evaluation (Sheet 2 of 2)

CRITERIA	LO2/CH4/LH2	LO2/C3H8/LH2	LO2/RP1/LH2	NTO/MMH
COOLANT	LH2	LH2	LH2	MMH
TYPE OF COOLING	REGENERATIVE	REGENERATIVE	REGENERATIVE	REGENERATIVE
PERFORMANCE Pc (psia)/tsp,v (sec)	VERY GOOD ~3600/~365	VERY GOOD ~3600/~360	VERY GOOD ~3600/~355	POOR ~1500/~290
IGNITION CHARACTERISTICS	VERY GOOD	GOOD	GOOD	VERY GOOD
COMBUSTION STABILITY	VERY GOOD	GOOD	GOOD	VERY GOOD
ENGINE OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	LOW
THROTTLEABILITY	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
REUSABILITY (CLEAN BURN)	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
CONTROL AUTHORITY	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
COST - DDT&E FIRST UNIT	HIGH HIGH	HIGH HIGH	HIGH HIGH	LOW LOW
TECHNOLOGY RISK	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	LOW
SCHEDULE RISK	MEDIUM	HIGH	HIGH	LOW

# 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

## New GG Engine Performance Data Used in Previous Trades/Analyses

• ENGINE DATA USED WERE ADEQUATE FOR PRELIMINARY TRADES/ANALYSES PURPOSES

ENGINE (1)	PC (2) (PSIA)	MR	DATA SOURCE	% MEAN DISPERSION (3)		
				Dexil	Isp.v	WEIGHT
LO2/LH2 (5)	3000	6.0	P&W/LCEE (GG)	-2.4	1.1	-6.0
LO2/CH4	2333	3.0	P&W/HC ENGINE	-4.1	-0.6	-10.8
LO2/C3H8	2333	2.7	P&W/HC ENGINE	-2.5	-3.5	-8.1
LO2/RP1	1275	2.7	P&W/HC ENGINE	-5.0	-1.5	-14.9
LO2/CH4/LH2 (5)	3067	3.5	P&W/HC ENGINE	-3.2	0.8	-10.2
LO2/C3H8/LH2	3067	3.2	P&W/HC ENGINE	-1.9	1.6	-2.7
LO2/RP1/LH2	3067	3.0	P&W/HC ENGINE	-2.2	2.6	-5.4
NTOMMH(4)	1000	2.2	ODE w/ $nc^*=0.95$ , $nn=0.95$	N/A	N/A	N/A

- (1) ASSUMED SINGLE THRUST LEVEL FOR SIZING OF ENGINE; EXPENDABLE ENGINE WEIGHT.  
 (2) CHAMBER PRESSURE FROM P&W'S STBE AT NPL AND LO2/LH2 LOW COST EXPENDABLE ENGINE OF ALS.  
 (3) STBE & STIME POINT DESIGNS FROM P&W, RD AND AJ WERE USED AS REFERENCE. THEIR PC, MR & AR WERE USED IN P&W PARAMETRIC EQUATIONS TO GENERATE NEW DATA. ARITHMETIC ERROR OF THE EQUATIONS FROM THE REFERENCE WERE AVERAGED OVER THE 3 COMPANIES' DATA; NEGATIVE VALUE INDICATES EQUATION ESTIMATE IS LESS THAN REFERENCE.  
 (4) DUE TO LACK OF DATA, LO2/RP1 ENGINE LENGTH & WEIGHT EQUATIONS WERE USED FOR CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES.  
 (5) RECENT STIME/STBE DATA, 1/88, WERE USED AS REFERENCE.

# 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

## New GG Engine - Improved Performance Data

• NEW IMPROVED ENGINE EQUATIONS FROM P&W GIVE BETTER ACCURACY

ENGINE	PC (1) (PSIA)	MR	DATA SOURCE	% MEAN DISPERSION (2)		
				Dexit	Isp,v	WEIGHT
LO2/LH2 (4)	3000	6.0	P&W NEW EQNS(5)	-1.1	0.8	-4.8
LO2/CH4	2800	3.0	P&W NEW EQNS(5)	1.5	-0.9	-2.3
LO2/C3H8	2800	2.7	NOT AVAILABLE	N/A	N/A	N/A
LO2/RP1	1500	2.7	P&W NEW EQNS(5)	-0.1	-1.1	-10.9
LO2/CH4/LH2 (4)	3600	3.5	P&W NEW EQNS(5)	-1.6	0.1	2.1
LO2/C3H8/LH2	3600	3.2	NOT AVAILABLE	N/A	N/A	N/A
LO2/RP1/LH2	3600	3.0	P&W NEW EQNS(5)	0.4	1.1	4.0
NTOMMH(3)	1500	2.2	NOT AVAILABLE	N/A	N/A	N/A

- (1) CHAMBER PRESSURE AT EMERGENCY POWER LEVEL FROM STME/STBE.  
(2) STBE & STME POINT DESIGNS FROM P&W, RD AND AJ WERE USED AS REFERENCE. THEIR PC, MR & AR WERE USED IN P&W PARAMETRIC EQUATIONS TO GENERATE NEW DATA. ARITHMETIC ERROR OF THE EQUATIONS FROM THE REFERENCE WERE AVERAGED OVER THE 3 COMPANIES' DATA; NEGATIVE VALUE INDICATES EQUATION ESTIMATE IS LESS THAN REFERENCE.  
(3) DUE TO LACK OF DATA, LO2/RP1 ENGINE LENGTH & WEIGHT EQUATIONS WERE USED FOR CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES.  
(4) RECENT STBE & STME DATA USED AS REFERENCE (1/88)  
(5) P&W NEW GAS GENERATOR ENGINE PARAMETRIC EQUATIONS PREPARED FOR ALS (12/87)

# 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

## New GG Engine Concept - STBE Evaluation

ENGINE	OVERALL ENGINE RANKING			TECHNOLOGY RISK RANKING		
	P&W	RD	AJ	P&W (1)	RD (2)	AJ (3)
LO2/CH4	2	1	2	4	1	1
LO2/C3H8	5	4	4	5	6	2
LO2/RP1	6 (4)	2 (5)	5	6 (6)	5	1
LO2/CH4/LH2	1	3	1	1	2	1
LO2/C3H8/LH2	4	6	3	3	4	2
LO2/RP1/LH2	3	5	3	2	3	2
						SELECTED

• BASIS FOR EVALUATION:

- 100 MISSION LIFE WITH 25 MISSIONS BETWEEN OVERHAUL
- ALL GAS GENERATOR CYCLE ENGINES
- 160 SEC BURN TIME

- (1) TECHNICAL RISK WAS NOT EVALUATED INDEPENDENTLY, BUT INCORPORATED IN TOTAL DDT&E COST RANKING REFLECTS DDT&E COST
- (2) RANKING OF SUM OF DDT&E AND OPERATIONS COST RISKS
- (3) QUALITATIVE RATING IN TERMS OF "DEVELOPMENT RISK" AND "ENABLING TECHNOLOGY"
- (4) P&W ASSUMED HIGH OPERATIONS & SUPPORT COST FOR LO2/RP1
- (5) RD ASSUMED LOW DDT&E AND RELIABILITY COST FOR LO2/RP1
- (6) P&W ASSESSED LO2/RP1 AS HAVING LOWEST RISK FOR EXPENDABLE CONCEPT

## **1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION**

### **New GG Engine Concept - STBE vs. LRB Selection**

#### **STBE**

- LO2/CH4/LH2 WAS SELECTED AS THE BEST PROPELLANT CONCEPT
- 100 MISSION LIFE WITH 25 MISSIONS BETWEEN OVERHAULS
- 160 SECOND BURN TIME
- LO2/CH4 MAY REPLACE PRESENT DESIGN CONCEPT

#### **LRB**

- LO2/JP1 (& IL02/LH2) SELECTED AS THE BETTER PROPELLANT CONCEPT
- 25 MISSION LIFE (WATER RECOVERY)
- 110-130 SECOND BURN TIME
- MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH CURRENT SYSTEM
- MUST HAVE VERY LOW TECHNICAL AND SCHEDULE RISK

- LRB RESULTS DIFFER FROM STBE RESULTS BECAUSE OF GROUND RULES

## 1.8 PUMPED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### Summary of Results

- ENGINE DATA USED IN PREVIOUS TRADES/ANALYSES WERE ADEQUATE FOR ESTIMATING BOOSTER SIZE OF VARIOUS PROPELLANT OPTIONS FOR COMPARISON.
- P&W'S NEW GAS GENERATOR CYCLE ENGINE PARAMETRIC EQUATIONS FOR ALS ARE FAIRLY ACCURATE IN THEIR PREDICTION AS COMPARED TO STBE/STME
- ENGINE COST ANALYSIS IS IN PROGRESS
- P&W'S NEW LOW COST ENGINE USING LO2/LH2 OR LO2/CH4 SEEM PROMISING FOR EXPENDABLE CONCEPT. THESE TWO CONCEPTS WILL BE STUDIED IN DETAILS UPON CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT WITH P&W.



## UPDATE ON T.S. 1.8 PUMP FED ENGINE SELECTION

When the contract started, we used existing STBE and STME data plus parametric data available from engine contractors. We had to consider both expendable and reusable modes since T.S. 1.13 hadn't even started. This trade study summarizes our first cut choices up to February 1988.

After the midterm program review, we included in Rocketdyne's subcontract work on gas generator LOX/RP and LOX/LH2 engines sized for LRB. We also started working with Pratt and Whitney on split expander cycle engines using LOX/LH2 and LOX/CH4. Therefore all the data including costs have changed.

Also at the midterm program review we selected expendable concepts, because the LRB mission model did not justify the substantial investment in reusability. This meant that engine costs, particularly recurring costs, became very important.

Our final pump fed engine selections as of 5/16/88 are a LOX/RP gas generator concept and a LOX/CH4 expander cycle.

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
DECEMBER 8, 1987

TRADE STUDY 1.9  
FINAL ERB

**PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE  
SELECTION**

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division

# 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION Planning Sheet 1

## OBJECTIVE:

- PROVIDE PERFORMANCE/WEIGHT RELATIONSHIPS FOR PROPELLANTS CONSIDERED IN PROPELLANT SELECTION TRADE STUDY
- SELECT THE BEST ENGINE CHARACTERISTICS AND PROVIDE PERFORMANCE/WEIGHT/COST RELATIONSHIPS FOR SELECTED PROPELLANTS (FROM INITIAL SCREENING)
- PROVIDE ENGINE EVALUATION FOR THESE SELECTED PROPELLANTS

## GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES:

- INITIAL SCREENING WILL BE DONE BY ENGINE SUBCONTRACTORS WITH GD CONSENSUS
- FINAL EVALUATION WILL BE DONE BY GD WITH THE HELP OF SUBCONTRACTORS
- METALLIZED PROPELLANT ENGINES WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR GROWTH OPTION ONLY
- INITIALLY 30% THROTTLING AND 5 DEG. GIMBALLING WILL BE ASSUMED UNTIL THESE RANGES ARE ESTABLISHED BY CONTROL AUTHORITY AND ABORT OPTIMIZATION TRADE
- NEAR TERM ENGINE EFFICIENCIES (PROVEN BY AVAILABLE TEST DATA) WILL BE ASSUMED BY ENGINE SUBCONTRACTORS

## 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

RESULTS: PERFORMANCE AND LENGTH DATA

SOURCES: TRW AND ROCKETDYNE

DATA FROM TRW: • EFFICIENCIES

- ODE PLOTS FOR LOX/RP-1, LOX/CM4, LOX/C3M8, NTO/MMH

DATA FROM ROCKETDYNE: • EFFICIENCIES

- PRINTOUT, PLOTS, AND CURVE-FITTED RELATIONSHIPS FOR  
LOX/RP-1, LOX/CM4 AND LOX/C3M8
- ENGINE LENGTH DATA

RECOMMENDATION:

- USE ROCKETDYNE RELATIONSHIPS FOR HYDROCARBONS DATA  
USED IN INITIAL TRADES OFF BY ABOUT 1%.
- USE TRW DATA FOR NTO/MMH WITH C\* EFFICIENCY = 0.95 AND  
NOZZLE EFFICIENCY = 0.97

# 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

RESULTS: WEIGHT DATA AND RELATIONSHIPS

SOURCES: TRW AND ROCKETDYNE

DATA FROM TRW: • COMPREHENSIVE WEIGHT MODEL AND PLOTS FOR ABLATIVE SYSTEM  
(NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROPELLANTS)

- POINT DATA (AND WEIGHT BREAKDOWN) FOR REGENERATIVE AND ABLATIVE SYSTEMS

DATA FROM ROCKETDYNE: • TABULAR DATA FOR HYDROCARBON REGENERATIVE AND ABLATIVE SYSTEMS

DESIGN POINT	ROCKETDYNE		TRW	
	REGENERATIVE (LBS)	ABLATIVE (LBS)	REGENERATIVE (LBS)	ABLATIVE (LBS)
pc = 500 psia T = 750 K G = 10	5652	6664		6000
pc = 400 psia T = 619 K E = 6	4198	4827	3956 (Dry) 5106 (Wet)	4753 (Dry) 5453 (Wet)

RECOMMENDATION: USE ROCKETDYNE DATA AS DATA FOR BOTH ABLATIVE AND REGENERATIVE SYSTEMS IS AVAILABLE. DATA USED IN INITIAL TRADES OFF BY ABOUT 10%.

# 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

RESULTS: COST DATA

SOURCES: TRW & ROCKETDYNE

DATA FROM TRW: • CER FOR ABLATIVE SYSTEM (LITVC, REFURBISHMENT)

• TABULAR DATA FOR OTHER SYSTEMS (POINT DATA)

DATA FROM ROCKETDYNE: • PARAMETRIC DATA ON ABLATIVE AND REGENERATIVE SYSTEMS

ITEM	REGENERATIVE	ABLATIVE	REGENERATIVE	ABLATIVE	COMMENTS
FIRST UNIT COST (400 PSIA, 750 K)	6.36 M	4.75M	00.995M	0.716M	• TRW MAY NOT BE FOR FIRST UNIT COST
DDTE COST	377M	296M	209M	168M	• ASKED FOR COST BREAKDOWN
LEARNING CURVE	93%	93%	90%	90%	• ASKED DAN EIMER TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE
RATE CURVE	VARIABLE	VARIABLE	90%	90%	

RECOMMENDATION: USE ROCKETDYNE DATA AND USE 20% AS REFURBISHMENT  
COST FOR SEA RECOVERY.

# 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION


## PRESSURE FED ENGINE EVALUATION

CRITERIA	LOX/RP-1	LOX/C3M8	LOX/CM4	NTO/MMH
PERFORMANCE (ISP)	285 SEC	294 SEC	308 SEC	268 SEC
COMBUSTION INSTABILITY**	POTENTIAL EXISTS, BUT HAVE EXPERIENCE DEALING WITH IT	POTENTIAL EXISTS, BUT NO EXPERIENCE	LOW, BUT NO EXPERIENCE	LOW
COOLING PASSAGE LOSSES (REGEN)	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	MEDIUM
IGNITION COMPLEXITY	HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW
INJECTOR DESIGN	MAY REQUIRE INSULA- TION BETWEEN LOX AND RP-1	MINIMAL REQUIREMENT	MAY REQUIRE GASIFICATION	NO REQUIREMENT
REUSABILITY - ABLATIVE - REGENERATIVE	SAME LOW	SAME MEDIUM	SAME HIGH	SAME HIGH
COST	SAME (10)	SAME (10)	SAME (10)	APPROX. SAME (099)
TECHNOLOGY RISK	LOW BECAUSE OF PAST EXPERIENCE	MEDIUM	HIGH	LOWEST* (UNRESOLVED SAFETY, ENVIRONMENTAL & AVAILABILITY ISSUES)
IOC DATE	LATER	LATER	LATEST	EARLY

RECOMMENDATION: LOX/RP-1 SLIGHTLY PREFERRED OVER OTHER HYDROCARBONS AS A PRESSURE FED  
ENGINE BECAUSE OF LOWER TECHNOLOGY RISK

# 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

## INJECTOR TRADE TREE



1. DROPPED AFTER INITIAL SCREENING BY ROCKETDYNE



## 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

# INJECTOR RANKING BY ROCKETDYNE

CRITERIA	FLAT FACE	MODULAR	SECI
EFFICIENCY ( C*)	REFERENCE	1% LESS	2 TO 3% LESS
STABILITY	HIGH AFTER DEVELOPMENT	HIGH AFTER DEVELOPMENT	HIGH
FABRICABILITY	HIGHEST	LOW	MODERATE
DEVELOPMENT COST	HIGHEST	LOW	LOW
PRODUCTION COST	HIGH	HIGH	LOW
REUSE AND REFURBISHMENT COST	LOW	LOW	HIGH
THROTTLING			

ROCKETDYNE RECOMMENDED : FLAT FACE OR MODULAR FOR REUSABLE  
- MODULAR FOR EXPENDABLE

# 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

## INJECTOR RANKING BY TRW

CANDIDATE	STABILITY	THROTTLING CAPABILITY	FACE SHUTOFF	MANUFACTURING COST	DEVELOPMENT COST	COMBUSTION PERFORMANCE	CHAMBER SIZE	ENGINE WEIGHT	RELIABILITY	RECOVERY	COMPATIBILITY WITH
COAXIAL (SEC)	1	1	YES	1	1	2	3	1	1	1	1
SHOWER HEAT (FLAT FACE)	3	2	NO	3	3	1	1	3	3	3	3
RADIAL	2	2	NO	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2


NOTE:: 1 IS THE MOST FAVORABLE RANKING, 3 IS WORST

TRW RECOMMENDED SECI WITH THROTTLING AND FACE SHUT-OFF

RECOMMENDATION: SECI AND MODULAR BECAUSE LOWER RISK DURING DEVELOPMENT

## 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

THRUST CHAMBER/NOZZLE COOLING TRADE TREE



# 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

## ROCKETDYNE THRUST CHAMBER/NOZZLE COOLING SELECTION

CRITERIA	TUBE WALL CHAMBER NOZZLE REGENERATIVELY COOLED BY SINGLE PASS CIRCUIT	ABLATIVE, SILICA PHENOLIC COMBUSTION CHAMBER WITH CARBON/CARBON NOZZLE	CORRUGATIVE WALL TYPE CHAMBER
RELIABILITY	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
SAFETY	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
COST REUSABLE EXPENDABLE	LOW HIGH	HIGH LOW	N/A MEDIUM
ENGINE WEIGHT EFFECT	0	5236 LB	0
COOLANT LOSSES EFFECT	11426 LB.	0	11426 LB.
TECHNICAL RISK	LOW	LOW	HIGH

ROCKETDYNE RECOMMENDED TUBE WALL REGENERATIVELY COOLED SYSTEM FOR REUSABLE CONCEPT  
AND ABLATIVE COMBUSTION CHAMBER FOR EXPENDABLE CONCEPT

## 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### TRW THRUST CHAMBER/NOZZLE COOLING SELECTION

CANDIDATES	RELIABILITY	COST	WEIGHT	EFFECTIVENESS	GEOMETRICAL STABILITY	COMPABILITY WITH RECOVERY
ABLATIVE	1	1	1	1	2	1
REGENERATIVE	2	3	3	1	1	3
FILM	2	2	2	1	1	2

### TRW RECOMMENDED ABLATIVE COOLING SYSTEM

**RECOMMENDATION:** CARRY BOTH TUBE WALL REGENERATIVELY COOLED AND ABLATIVE  
SYSTEMS BECAUSE OF SOME SAFETY CONCERNS FOR ABLATIVE  
SYSTEM

# 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION


## NOZZLE SELECTION

CRITERIA	NOZZLE TYPE	
	80% BELL	15° SEMI-ANGLE CONE
WEIGHT	1186 LB	1432 LB
MANUFACTURING COST	HIGH	LOW
PERFORMANCE	BASELINE	0.5% LESS

RECOMMENDATION: 80% BELL NOZZLE

# 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION


## IGNITION SYSTEM TRADE TREE/SELECTION



RECOMMENDATION: HYPERGOLIC SLUG BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE AND RELIABILITY

## 1.9 PRESSURE-FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### Valve Selection Trade Tree






## 1.9 PRESSURE-FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### Valve Selection

CRITERIA	BLADE VALVE	BUTTERFLY VALVE	BALL VALVE	PLUG VALVE	BURST DISC
RELIABILITY & SAFETY	HIGH	HIGH, stays in set position	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
THROTTLING • ACCURACY • LINEARITY	HIGH MEDIUM	HIGH GOOD	MED-HIGH GOOD	NONE	NONE
RESPONSE TIME	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	RAPID	RAPID
PRESSURE DROP POWER REQ'D	~0 MEDIUM	~10 PSI HIGH	~0 LOW	NONE	NONE
WEIGHT	LOW	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW	LOW
COST	LOW-MED	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW	LOW
TECHNICAL RISK	LOW (some concern on acoustic vibration)	LOW	LOW (large experience)	LOW	LOW

RECOMMENDATION: BALL VALVE, ASSUMING VALVE THROTTLING REQUIRED

# 1.9 PRESSURE-FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION TVC Trade Tree



(1) ELIMINATED AFTER INITIAL EVALUATION WITH ROCKETDYNE

## 1.9 PRESSURE-FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### Rocketdyne TVC Rating

CRITERIA	LITVC	HEAD END GIMBAL	DIFFERENTIAL THROTTLING
RELIABILITY/ SIMPLICITY	Multiple valve operation with auxiliary equipment	Belows in line; Gimbal Actuators with auxiliary equipment	Complex Control/ Guidance Software
WEIGHT	Heavy due to weight & volume of propellants	MEDIUM	LIGHT
COST	MEDIUM	HIGH	LOW
ENVELOPE	SMALL	LARGE	SMALL
EXPERIENCE/RISK	LOW RISK	LOW RISK	NO EXPERIENCE

ROCKETDYNE PREFERS HEAD-END GIMBAL

# 1.9 PRESSURE-FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

## TRW TVC Rating

CANDIDATES	WEIGHT	COST	EFFECTIVENESS	RESPONSE	COMPATIBILITY WITH RECOVERY	COMMENTS
DIFFERENTIAL THROTTLING	1	1	1	2	2	Requires no extra hardware; just software
LITVC	3	2	1	1	1	Requires significant weight increase
GIMBALED ENGINE	2	3	1	3	3	Requires hydraulics & recovery loads impact design

NOTE: 1 is the most favorable ranking, 3 is the worst

TRW PREFERRED DIFFERENTIAL THROTTLING

RECOMMENDATION: HEAD-END GIMBAL & DIFFERENTIAL THROTTLING.  
DIFFERENTIAL THROTTLING NEEDS FURTHER EVALUATION TO SEE  
IF IT MEETS CONTROL REQUIREMENTS.

## 1.9 PRESSURE-FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### Summary

• ENGINE CONFIGURATION SELECTION FOR LO2/RP1 (SELECTED PROPELLANT)

TRADES	TRW	ROCKETDYNE	RECOMMEDATION
CHAMBER PRESSURE OPTIMIZATION	L* = 96in MR = 2.5 CR = 2.2 L = 153 in	L* = 67in MR = 2.5 CR = 2.2 L = 156 in	Dependent on Injector Initially 30% (TBD)
THROTTLING RANGE			
THROTTLING TYPE	Valve & Injector	Valve	TBD
INJECTOR	SECI	Reusable: Flat Face or Modular Expendable: Modular	SECI or Modular
NOZZLE	80% Bell	80% Bell	80% Bell
COOLING	Ablative	Reusable: Regenerative Expendable: Ablative	Regenerative & Ablative
IGNITION	Hypergolic	Hypergolic	Hypergolic
VALVES	Ball	Ball	Ball
TVC	Differential Throttling	Head End Gimbal	Head End Gimbal & Differential Throttling

## 1.9 PRESSURE-FED ENGINE TYPE/PERFORMANCE SELECTION

### Summary

- ENGINE PERFORMANCE AND WEIGHT DATA ARE AVAILABLE IN USABLE FORM FOR ALL PROPELLANTS CONSIDERED IN THE TRADE STUDY. COST DATA IS AVAILABLE FOR LO2/RP1 (SELECTED CONCEPT)
- LOX/RP1 IS THE PREFERRED ENGINE OUT OF ALL HYDROCARBON ENGINES BECAUSE OF ITS LOWER TECHNOLOGY RISK
- THROTTLING RANGE, THROTTLING TYPE, COOLING SYSTEM, INJECTOR TYPE AND TVC HAVE TO BE FURTHER DOWNSELECTED

## UPDATE ON T.S. 1.9 PRESSURE FED ENGINE TYPE

This trade study was completed in January 1988 based on preliminary data for LRB generated under subcontract by Rocketdyne and TRW. Many engine subsystem trades remained to be run or rerun: injector type, regenerative cooling vs. ablative coatings, head end gimbal vs. nozzle only. The data had to cover both expendable and reusable concepts.

After the midterm review, when expendable concepts were recommended, Rocketdyne has continued under contract. We continue to recommend LOX/RP as the propellant combination. The choice of subsystems was made difficult by lack of experience with LOX/RP ablative materials. Clearly there are a number of technology gaps which need to be demonstrated on the MSFC pressure-fed LRB test bed program.

Our current baseline features regenerative cooling, head-end gimbaling, and modular injectors.

REPORT NO. GDSS-LRB-88-024

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY NO. 1.10  
IGNITION SEQUENCE AND HOLD DOWN  
FINAL REPORT

22 FEBRUARY, 1988

PREPARED UNDER  
CONTRACT No.  
NAS8-37137

Prepared by

GENERAL DYNAMICS SPACE SYSTEMS DIVISION  
P.O. BOX 85990  
San Diego, California 92138-5357



## SUMMARY

Trade Study 1.10 provides a preliminary analysis of the LRB configured STS ignition and launch sequence, and the resulting transient response induced by the SSME thrust build-up. Five preliminary down select candidates were examined with the following guidelines and constraints used to complete this analysis:

- 1) Current SSME ignition sequence can be modified if necessary
- 2) Gross Thrust/Weight ratio at STS release  $\leq 1.0$
- 3) Minimum SSME power level at release  $\geq 90\%$ .
- 4) F-1 engine rise time and Saturn V ignition timing were used for LRB ignition analysis.

Two release techniques that have shown potential for improvement of the adverse transient characteristics are the release of the stack prior to the peak of transient loading, and employing a modified SSME ignition timing sequence that manipulates the STS transient to reduce maximum bending moment and twang at release. The early release technique indicates a possible reduction of hold down post loads by approximately 70% at the maximum and 10% at release. A potential savings of 7500 lbs of SSME propellants is also indicated. The modified SSME ignition sequence may reduce post loads by 50% at the maximum and 3% at release with a savings of 3900 lbs of SSME propellants.

These findings indicate that compliant boosters and modified ignition timing can be used to reduce the problems of hold down bolt load and twang associated with the ignition and release sequence, while providing some improvement in SSME propellant margins.

Potential problems with these techniques center around the balance of thrust between the SSMEs and LRBs at release. To hold to the constraints of  $T/W \leq 1$  and the 90% SSME power level requires that the stack be released with LRB engine thrust levels between 55% and 75%. Additionally, the low booster thrust level at release and the "slow" LRB engine rise time (as compared to the SRB) may summarily preclude the use of an explosive release system because of control authority problems near the pad and the health verification capability with 55% to 75% LRB power levels at release.

If these problems cannot be resolved, or if the final LRB configuration is stiffer than these techniques will allow, a damped launch release system designed to alleviate both base bending moment and transient launch loads appears to be a potential solution to the problems discussed here.

**Trade Study 1.10  
Ignition Sequence and Hold Down**

**Table of Contents**

<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Objective	1
1.2 Ground Rules and Assumptions	1
2 Analysis	3
2.1 Requirements and Constraints	3
2.2 Evaluation Criteria	3
2.3 Description of the Current STS Ignition Sequence	3
2.4 comparison of Engine Rise Times	9
2.5 Description of Alternative Approaches	9
2.6 Results	12
2.7 Alternative Evaluation	20
3 Conclusions	26
4 Recommendations	26

## **SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION**

A dynamic transient occurs when the Orbiter SSMEs are ignited and the STS deflects in response to the offset thrust. When the stack springs back to a minimum deflection, the SRBs are ignited, holddown bolts are released, and the stack lifts off the launch pad. High bolt loads and bending moments are produced by the transient, and severe vibration or "twang" occurs when the vehicle is released from the launch pad.

### **1.1 OBJECTIVE**

The objective of this trade study was to investigate engine ignition and release sequence characteristics for an STS configuration with Liquid Rocket Boosters, and identify methods and techniques that would:

1. Minimize twang at STS release
2. Verify engine health prior to STS release
3. Minimize LRB pre-release loads

### **1.2 GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS**

Ground rules and assumptions are listed in Planning Sheet 1, Figure 1.1. Arrows indicate revisions made during the course of the study as STS data were acquired. Ground rules 1 & 2 are carried over from the overall scope of the LRB study. F-1 engine data and the Saturn V ignition sequence were used for analysis since they are existing, proven systems and considered representative of candidate booster engine characteristics.

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

## TRADE STUDY #1.10 IGNITION SEQUENCE AND HOLD DOWN

### Planning Sheet 1

#### OBJECTIVE:

TO DETERMINE THE OPTIMUM ENGINE IGNITION AND RELEASE SEQUENCE TO:

- (1) MINIMIZE TWANG AT LAUNCH
  - (2) VERIFY ENGINE HEALTH PRIOR TO RELEASE
  - (3) MINIMIZE LRB PRE-RELEASE LOADS
- 

#### GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES:

1. REMAIN IN THE CONTEXT OF STS FLIGHT AND LAUNCH SYSTEMS BY MINIMIZING IMPACT TO EXISTING STS SYSTEM ELEMENTS, FACILITIES, AND PROCEDURES.
2. CONSIDER IMPACT OF BOTH PUMP-FED AND PRESSURE-FED FORMS OF LIQUID ROCKET PROPULSION.
- 3. F-1 ENGINE RISE TIME AND SATURN V IGNITION SEQUENCE TIMING USED FOR LRB ANALYSIS.

## **SECTION 2 ANALYSIS**

The trade study comprised the following key activities:

1. Establishing applicable requirements and guidelines
2. Analyzing the current STS ignition sequence
3. Defining alternate ignition and release methods
4. Determining preliminary properties of candidate LRB configurations
5. Sensitivity analysis
6. Analysis of candidate configurations
7. Evaluating alternate methods
8. Presenting conclusions and recommendations

### **2.1 REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS**

For this study, two requirements were identified based on STS safety guidelines as shown in Figure 2.1. Requirement 1 states that the STS will not be launched until all engine systems are verified healthy in an operating state. A verifiable, healthy operating state is currently defined for SSMEs, but is not available for conceptual booster engine designs. It will be shown later in this report that definition of such a state may be crucial to the final selection of a launch method. Requirement 2 provides that no backup system intended to sustain powered or controlled flight will be used for launch, and launch must occur with prime systems in operational control.

Constraints were significantly revised between the initiation and completion of the study as STS data were obtained. Explanations for each revision are provided below the applicable constraint in Planning Sheet 2, figure 2.1.

### **2.2 EVALUATION CRITERIA**

Evaluation criteria are listed in the Criteria Applicability Matrix, Figure 2.2. Criteria were selected to be consistent with the overall study, and where the ignition sequence could have a significant impact to the final selection of an LRB configuration. Quantitative evaluations of safety, reliability, and performance were significant in the result of this study.

### **2.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT STS IGNITION SEQUENCE**

The current STS ignition and launch sequence is illustrated in Figure 2.3, Nominal STS Ignition Sequence. The SSMEs are started at 0.12 second intervals (T1 & T2), with each engine rising to full thrust in 1.905 seconds. Total rise time to full SSME

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

## TRADE STUDY #1.10 IGNITION SEQUENCE AND HOLD DOWN

### Planning Sheet 2

#### REQUIREMENTS:

1. ALL ENGINES WILL BE VERIFIED FUNCTIONAL PRIOR TO RELEASE.
2. USE OF A BACKUP SYSTEM FOR FAIL OPS/FAIL SAFE PROTECTION PRIOR TO LAUNCH WILL RESULT IN A LAUNCH ABORT AND ORDERLY SHUT DOWN OF ALL ENGINES.

#### CONSTRAINTS:

→ ~~1. THE CURRENT ORBITER SSME START SEQUENCE WILL BE USED WITHOUT MODIFICATION.~~

ENGINE IGNITION TIMING IS A SOFTWARE DRIVEN FUNCTION THAT CAN BE EASILY MODIFIED IF NECESSARY. CURRENT STAGGER TIME OF 0.12 SEC IS A HOLDOVER FROM EARLY TESTING DAYS AND IS NOT CONSIDERED A CONSTRAINT.

→ 2. MAXIMUM T/W AT RELEASE = 1.0

FOR T/W > 1.0, LONGITUDINAL VIBRATION PROBLEMS MAY RESULT.

→ 3. MINIMUM SSME %RPL AT RELEASE = 90%

SSME ENGINE HEALTH MONITORING LIMIT IS CURRENTLY SET TO 90%.

Figure 2.1

Criteria Applicability Matrix worksheet (Rev-A)			Trade Study No. 1.10	Page 1 of 2	Applicability
SELECTION CRITERION	SELECTION CRITERION DEFINITION	SELECTION CRITERION ELEMENTS			
SAFETY	EXTENT TO WHICH LRB CONCEPT MINIMIZES HAZARDS TO STS, LAUNCH FACILITIES, RANGE, AND PERSONNEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• PROPELLANT TOXICITY/EXPLOSIVE HAZARD</li><li>• ABORT FEASIBILITY &amp; OPERATIONAL CONTINGENCY MODES</li><li>• FAILURE DETECTION</li></ul>			X
RELIABILITY FEATURES	DEGREE TO WHICH LRB CONCEPTS INCORPORATE RELIABILITY ENHANCEMENTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• DESIGN MARGINS</li><li>• ENGINE OUT CAPABILITY</li><li>• EXCESS PERFORMANCE</li><li>• DEGREE OF SYSTEM REDUNDANCY</li><li>• STS INTERFACE MODIFICATIONS</li></ul>			X
STS COMPATIBILITY	DEGREE TO WHICH CANDIDATE LRB MINIMIZES IMPACTS TO EXISTING STS, INCLUDING ORBITER, EXTERNAL TANK, AND GROUND/LAUNCH FACILITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MAINTENANCE OF STS/SRB LAUNCH CAPABILITY</li><li>• PROCESSING/LAUNCH FACILITY MODIFICATION RECMTS</li><li>• LRB PROGRAM PHASE IN FEASIBILITY DURING ON-GOING STS OPERATIONS</li></ul>			X
PERFORMANCE	ABILITY OF LRB CONCEPT TO MEET OR EXCEED REQUIRED PERFORMANCE CAPABILITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• ENGINE/PROPULSION SYSTEM EFFICIENCY</li><li>• LRB LIFT OFF WEIGHT</li><li>• MARGINS</li></ul>			X
NONRECURRING COST	INCLUDES ALL COSTS INCURRED DURING THE DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION (DDT&E) PHASE. EXCLUDES PRODUCTION OF ALL FLIGHT HARDWARE.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• RESEARCH, DVL PMT, TEST &amp; EVALUATION</li><li>• DEVELOPMENT COSTS TO FLIGHT VEHICLE IOC</li><li>• GROUND FACILITY ACTIVATION COSTS</li><li>• LRB TEST FLIGHTS</li></ul>			X
RECURRING COST	COST (UNDISCOUNTED) STARTING WITH COMPLETION OF FIRST LRB TEST FLIGHTS AND PROCEEDS THROUGH ITS DEFINED LIFE CYCLE. INCLUDES PRODUCTION COSTS OF REUSABLE HARDWARE, RECURRING OPERATIONS COSTS, AND COSTS FOR UNRELIABILITY.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• PRODUCTION OF FLIGHT HARDWARE</li><li>• RECOVERY, REFURB, AND RESUPPLY OF REUSABLE LRB HW</li><li>• ALL OPS &amp; MAINT COSTS FOR LRB FLT AND GRD SYSTEMS</li><li>• COSTS FOR LOSSES BASED ON UNRELIABILITY</li></ul>			X
COST RISK	AREAS OF GREATEST COST RISK WILL BE IDENTIFIED BY ANALYZING THE SENSITIVITY OF COST TO KEY DESIGN AND PROGRAM PARAMETERS.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• RISKS IN SUCCESSFULLY INTEGRATING LRB INTO STS</li><li>• RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH FACILITY MODIFICATIONS</li></ul>			

Figure 2.2

Criteria Applicability Matrix worksheet (Rev-A)			Trade Study No. 1.10	Page 2 of 2	Applicability
SELECTION CRITERION	SELECTION CRITERION DEFINITION	SELECTION CRITERION ELEMENTS			
SCHEDULE RISK	THE LIKELIHOOD THAT REQUIRED LRB SYSTEMS CAN BE DEVELOPED AND ACQUIRED ON SCHEDULE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• RISK FOR TECH DVL/PMT AND INTEG INTO LRB ON NEED DATE</li><li>• LONG LEAD PROCUREMENT</li></ul>			
TECHNICAL RISK	THE LIKELIHOOD THAT TECHNICAL ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT</li><li>• RISK IN MEETING PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS</li></ul>			
OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY	DEGREE TO WHICH LRB CONCEPTS WILL BE OPERATIONALLY READY TO SUPPORT STS MISSIONS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• INSENSITIVITY TO FAILURES, ENVIRONMENTS, ETC</li><li>• SUPPORTABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY</li><li>• PROCESSABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY</li><li>• REUSABLE COMPONENT TURNAROUND TIME</li></ul>			
OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY	DEGREE TO WHICH LRB CONCEPT REDUCES OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY, REQUIREMENTS, OR PROCEDURES IN AN EFFORT TO STREAMLINE LRB PROCESSING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• BUILT IN TEST &amp; CHECKOUT</li><li>• AI/EXPERT SYSTEMS FOR LAUNCH PROCESSING</li><li>• MISSION CONTROL SYSTEM</li><li>• MINIMIZES HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS</li><li>• ACCESSIBLE COMPONENTS</li></ul>			X
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCEPTABILITY	EXTENT TO WHICH LRB CONCEPTS AVOID INTRODUCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANTS OR OTHER DETRIMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS. EXTENT TO WHICH LAUNCH DEBRIS IS MINIMIZED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• NON-CORROSIVE, NON-TOXIC PROPELLANTS</li><li>• MINIMIZES RE-ENTRY DEBRIS</li><li>• MINIMIZES AIR, WATER, AND NOISE POLLUTION</li></ul>			X
GROWTH POTENTIAL	ABILITY OF THE CANDIDATE LRB CONCEPT TO ACCOMMODATE INCREASES IN STS LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS ABILITY OF LRB CONCEPT TO EVOLVE TO SATISFY BOOSTER REQUIREMENTS OF FUTURE LAUNCH VEHICLE SYSTEMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• PERFORMS INCREASED STS PAYLOAD/FLT RATE RECOMTS</li><li>• GROWTH COMPATIBILITY FOR SDV, ALS, OR SHUTTLE #</li><li>• LEVEL OF LRB GROWTH POTENTIAL</li></ul>			X
Additional Criteria	Additional Criteria Definition				

Figure 2.2 (contin.)



power is  $1.905 + .12 + .12 = 2.145$  seconds. The current STS configuration (with SRBs) has a bending frequency of .30 Hz, with a half wave length of 1.667 seconds. The major elements of the ignition sequence are discussed in the following sections.

### 2.3.1 SSME IGNITION

Ignition and thrust buildup of the SSMEs bends the stack forward in the X-Z plane. During the delay until release at 4.382 sec., the SSMEs burn at full power for a total of 7.07 engine seconds as follows:

Engine #1	$4.382 - 1.905$	$= 2.477$
Engine #2	$4.382 - 1.905 - .12$	$= 2.357$
Engine #3	$4.382 - 1.905 - .24$	$= 2.237$
		7.071 total engine sec

SSME ignition, rise time to 100% of rated power level (RPL), and the stagger time constants T1 and T2 are detailed as item 1 in figure 2.3.

### 2.3.2 MAXIMUM RESPONSE TO OFFSET SSME THRUST

Coupled to SSME ignition, the STS stack flexes through one cycle of response, with the maximum deflection of the stack (item 2, Fig. 2.3) occurring 2.75 sec. after SSME ignition. At this point, the boosters experience the maximum base bending moment of approximately 570 million in-lbs. SRB mass is thrown in front of the bending axis, aiding the transient, but the Orbiter/ET mass opposes the transient at all times with its mass offset 43 inches behind the bending axis.

### 2.3.3 HOLD DOWN BOLT RELEASE POINT

At 6.6 seconds after first SSME ignition, the stack has sprung back to a minimum deflection point where the base bending moment is approximately 145 million in-lbs (item 3, Fig. 2.3). At this minimum moment point the SRBs are simultaneously ignited, and the 8 hold down bolts are released. This rapid booster release in the presence of a significant bending moment provides the "twang" as strain energy in the boosters rapidly dissipates as free-free vibration. A reduction in the base bending moment experienced at release will result in a reduction of the resultant twang.

### 2.3.4 SRB IGNITION

At the instant of release, the SRBs are simultaneously ignited (Item 4, Fig. 2.3) and thrust build up occurs rapidly, reaching full power 0.35 seconds later. Approximately 0.2 sec after ignition, SRB thrust levels are sufficient to produce a total thrust to weight

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

# NOMINAL STS IGNITION SEQUENCE




Figure 2.3

ratio (T/W) of one. The stack begins to fly off the pad with the SRBs still gaining thrust for another 0.15 sec.

## 2.4 COMPARISON OF ENGINE RISE TIMES

Rise times from 0 to 100% of RPL for the SSME, SRB, and F-1 engines are illustrated in Figure 2.4. As shown, the SRB rise time of 0.35 sec is an order of magnitude less than either the SSME (at 1.905 sec) or the F-1 (at 2.6 sec). This rapid rise time allows the current practice of releasing the stack with a T/W significantly less than one. In the 0.35 sec between STS release and achieving full SRB thrust, the stack does not rotate or translate significantly, and the vehicle flies off the pad before the dynamic state of the free stack exceeds control recovery boundaries.

With liquid propellant engines, the rise time is slow enough that a similar release sequence could result in a collision between the vehicle and fixed launch pad structures. The time between release and  $T/W = 1$  is sufficient to allow the vehicle to move beyond recoverable control boundaries. Because of this and the requirement for health verification, LRBs must be ignited and restrained until sufficient thrust has built up. Whether or not the vehicle can safely clear the launch structure in the one to two seconds between release (at  $T/W = 1$ ) and full thrust is beyond the scope of this trade, and will be addressed in future analysis. For the purpose of this study, a T/W ratio of one is assumed to be adequate.

## 2.5 DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The alternate methods of ignition and release examined in this study are summarized in Planning Sheet 4, Figure 2.5. Simultaneous ignition of SSME and booster engines was ruled out because of the difference in engine rise times and thrust. At the point where  $T/W = 1$ , the LRB engines would be at approximately 79% of RPL and the SSMEs at 48% of RPL, which violates constraint #3 for minimum SSME power at launch.

Ignition of LRB engines before SSME engines was also ruled out. Since the dynamic transient is produced by SSME thrust input, the LRB engines would be burning fuel unnecessarily while waiting for the minimum moment point in the transient response. In this situation, the consumption of LRB propellants on the launch pad reduces payload lift performance by almost 1100 lbs/sec of delay.

Thus, the current practice of igniting the SSMEs first appears to be the most efficient method. However, it will be shown that the current stagger time of 0.12 sec may not be optimal. Analysis indicates a modified SSME ignition sequence would be advantageous for controlling the dynamic transient.


For LRB engine ignition, a sequence similar to that used for the Saturn V was adopted. The five F-1 engines on the Saturn were ignited in the following order:

1. Center engine ignited
2. 0.20 second delay
3. #2 and #4 engines ignited

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

## COMPARISON OF ENGINE RISE TIMES



- SSME RISE TIME SHOWN FOR COMPARISON TO SRB & LRB
- LRB RISE TIME IS AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE GREATER THAN SRB
- HEALTH VERIFICATION AT LEVELS REQUIRED FOR RELEASE ARE SIGNIFICANTLY LOW (50%-70%)
- TRANSITION TIME FROM RELEASE TO CONTROLLED FLIGHT INCREASES WITH LRB

Figure 2.4


LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division

# IGNITION SEQUENCE & HOLD DOWN TRADE TREE

## ENGINE IGNITION SEQUENCE TRADE



(Saturn V Ignition Sequence continued)

4. 0.20 second delay
5. #3 and #5 engines ignited

All candidate LRB configurations possess four engines, and the assumed ignition sequence is identical to steps 3 through 5 for the Saturn.

Initially, ignition overpressure was perceived to be a problem for LRBs, similar to that experienced with SRBs. However, ignition overpressure is proportional to combustion chamber pressure rise rate, which for liquid engines is an order of magnitude less than for solids. Because of this, it was assumed that simultaneous ignition of engines on both boosters would not exceed current SRB overpressure limits. Thus the basic ignition sequence for the LRB configured STS became:

1. Simultaneously ignite 2 engines on the left booster and 2 engines on the right booster
2. 0.20 second delay
3. Simultaneously ignite remaining 2 engines on each booster

## 2.6 RESULTS

### 2.6.1 PRELIMINARY PROPERTIES OF LRB CANDIDATES

Preliminary design properties for the five downselected LRB configurations are listed in the first table of Figure 2.6. Booster wall thickness values were chosen to support launch loads only as opposed to thickness values to achieve stiffness comparable to SRB values.

Calculated values in the second and third tables of Figure 2.6 were used to determine bending frequencies of the STS model with each of the LRB configurations. The data represents a single degree of freedom analysis in the cantilever mode with a uniformly distributed mass cantilever beam for the boosters, and an end-loaded cantilever with a "mass-less" spring for the Orbiter/ET. A first mode frequency range of 0.15 Hz. to 0.22 Hz. was determined for the five booster configurations, and these boundary values were used for analysis.

### 2.6.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

The dynamic response sensitivity to frequency is illustrated in Figure 2.7. The SRB configuration (.30 Hz.) is to the left, followed by LRB configuration #1B (.22 Hz.), and configuration #5D (.15 Hz.) on the right. For the three transient plots, SSME stagger is held constant at 0.12 sec.

Comparison of the three plots shows that booster bending stiffness determines the frequency of the configuration. If stiffness is decreased, the maximum bending moment and the time delay to the minimum moment both increase. This relationship

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

# PRELIMINARY STIFFNESS PROPERTIES

CONFIG #	DIA-in.	t-in.	I-in <sup>4</sup>	El-lb-in <sup>2</sup>	W-lbs wet	L-in
1B LOX/RP-1	170.4	1.0	1.909 (10) <sup>6</sup>	2.157 (10) <sup>13</sup>	1,288,000	2100
5A LOX/LH2	183.6	0.405	9.778 (10) <sup>5</sup>	1.105 (10) <sup>13</sup>	661,000	2256
5D O2/RP-1	158.4	0.451	6.979 (10) <sup>5</sup>	7.886 (10) <sup>12</sup>	1,138,000	1956
5J LOX/LH2	183.6	0.405	9.778 (10) <sup>5</sup>	1.105 (10) <sup>13</sup>	657,000	2316
5K O2/RP-1	168.0	0.431	7.964 (10) <sup>5</sup>	8.999 (10) <sup>12</sup>	1,259,000	2064

\* SIZED TO SUPPORT LAUNCH LOADS ONLY, MATERIAL IS AL70

CONFIG #	K-lbs/in	Kf	El equiv	m-lbs <sup>2</sup> /in <sup>2</sup>	M-lbs <sup>2</sup> /in <sup>2</sup>
1B LOX/RP-1	40,300	.79	1.702 (10) <sup>13</sup>	3.2	6900
5A LOX/LH2	20,700	.88	9.724 (10) <sup>12</sup>	1.5	6200
5D O2/RP-1	14,700	.91	7.184 (10) <sup>12</sup>	3.0	6400
5J LOX/LH2	20,700	.88	9.724 (10) <sup>12</sup>	1.5	6200
5K O2/RP-1	16,800	.90	8.097 (10) <sup>12</sup>	3.2	6800

CONFIG #	$\omega_1$ rad/sec	$\omega_2$ rad/sec	f comb. (hz)
1B LOX/RP-1	3.75	1.5	.22
5A LOX/LH2	4.10	1.2	.18
5D O2/RP-1	2.50	1.0	.15
5J LOX/LH2	4.16	1.2	.18
5K O2/RP-1	2.59	1.1	.21

MAXIMUM


MINIMUM

Figure 2.6

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

# STS DYNAMIC RESPONSE SENSITIVITY TO $f$



## • AS $f$ DECREASES:

- MAXIMUM MOMENT (BOLT LOAD) INCREASES (DECREASED STIFFNESS)
- TIME TO MINIMUM MOMENT INCREASES (INCREASED DISTANCE TRAVEL)
- MINIMUM MOMENT (TWANG EFFECT) DECREASES (LESS OVERSHOOT)

Figure 2.7



is aggravated when the half wave-length of the system is in close proximity to the total SSME rise time, i. e. :

$$(1.905 + T1 + T2) = 1/(2f) \quad (1)$$

Fortunately, the two variables most responsible for the dynamic transient, i. e. booster stiffness, and total SSME rise time, can be varied to modify the dynamic flexure of the system.

### 2.6.3 ANALYSIS OF CANDIDATE CONFIGURATIONS

Transient response and release analyses for the .15 Hz. and .22 Hz. configurations were performed using both the nominal SSME stagger timing ( $T1 = T2 = 0.12$  sec), and also with a series of modified values for  $T1$ . For analyses with the nominal SSME stagger timing, release of the stack was performed at the same bending moment magnitude experienced by the nominal SRB configuration. Delaying release until the minimum moment point would impose a serious impact on ET propellant margins, because of the increased time delay associated with the more compliant boosters. Two points in the transient response meet this minimum moment criteria. One occurs prior to the maximum peak and one after, both of which were examined for feasibility.

For analysis with the modified values for  $T1$ , release of the stack was performed at the the earliest point where all SSME engines were above the minimum thrust level of 90%, and the base bending moment was less than or equal to that experienced by the SRB configuration.

For all cases, the start of the LRB ignition sequence was timed such that  $T/W = 1$  at the identified time of release.

**2.6.3.1 Configurations Using Nominal SSME Stagger Timing** Release analysis for configuration #1B (.22 Hz.) with nominal SSME stagger is summarized in Figure 2.8 and illustrated in Figure 2.9. Release prior to the maximum bending moment cannot be accomplished because all three SSMEs have not developed thrust levels greater than 90% at the time the moment begins to exceed the defined release value. The earliest possible release time after the transient peak occurs at 5.035 sec after SSME ignition. To achieve  $T/W = 1$  at release, 4 LRB engines (ignited at 3.987 sec ) are at 73% of RPL, and the remaining 4 (ignited 0.20 sec later) are at 58.6% of RPL.

Release analysis for configuration #5D (.15 Hz.) with nominal SSME stagger is summarized in Figure 2.10 and illustrated in Figure 2.11. For this more compliant booster, release prior to the maximum moment is feasible. Here, the response to SSME ignition is delayed enough that all SSMEs are above 90% of RPL at the time the moment increases beyond the defined release value. Release at the defined moment magnitude occurs prior to the peak at 2.039 sec with 4 LRBs at 73.1% and 4 at 58.7% of RPL. While not shown in Figure 2.11, by "backing down" the transient plot to the point where the last ignited SSME is at 90% of RPL (consistent with constraint

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

## RELEASE ANALYSIS: CONFIGURATION #1B

### GROUND RULES:

- TW = 1.0 AT RELEASE
- MINIMUM SSME RPL = 90% AT RELEASE
- BENDING MOMENT AT RELEASE = 144.9 M in-lbs (CURRENT PRACTICE)
- GLOW = 4,404,468 lb.
- $T_{LRB} = 619,482$  lb.
- $f = 0.223$  HZ.

### RELEASE ANALYSIS:

For Release At Time Of Minimum Bending Moment :  $T_1 = 0.867$  RTU (1.652 sec)

$T_2 = 2.643$  RTU (5.035 sec)

$T_{SSME}$  @  $T_1$  : 1 @ 86.7%  
1 @ 88.4%  
1 @ 74.1%

SSME RPL < 90%

$T_{SSME}$  @  $T_2$  : 3 @ 100%

$T_{SSME} = 3(381,000) = 1,143,000$  lb

$T_{LRB} ((4(\%RPL) + 4(\%RPL-.144)) = GLOW - T_{SSME}$

### LRB THRUST LEVELS:

@  $T_1$  : VIOLATES GROUND RULE      @  $T_2$  : 4 LRBE @ 73.0% RPL  
FOR MINIMUM % RPL                      4 LRBE @ 58.6% RPL


Figure 2.8

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

# RELEASE ANALYSIS: CONFIGURATION #1B

Moment  $\times 10^6$  in-lbs  
FREQ. (Hz) = .223  
 $T_1 = T_2 = 0.12$  sec



LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

## RELEASE ANALYSIS: CONFIGURATION #5D

### GROUND RULES:

- $TW = 1.0$  AT RELEASE
- MINIMUM SSME RPL = 90% AT RELEASE
- BENDING MOMENT AT RELEASE = 144.9 M in-lbs (CURRENT PRACTICE)
- $GLOW = 4,128,707$  lb.
- $T_{LRB} = 568,926$  lb.
- $f = 0.151$  HZ.

### RELEASE ANALYSIS:

For Release At Time Of Minimum Bending Moment:  $T_1 = 1.070$  RTU (2.039 sec)

$T_2 = 3.60$  RTU (6.858 sec)

$T_{SSME}$  @  $T_1$ : 1 @ 100%  
1 @ 100%  
1 @ 96.8%

$T_{SSME} = 2.968(381,000) = 1,130,808$  lb

$T_{SSME}$  @  $T_2$ : 3 @ 100%

$T_{SSME} = 3(381,000) = 1,143,000$  lb

$T_{LRB} ((4(\%RPL) + 4(\%RPL-.144))) = GLOW - T_{SSME}$

### LRB THRUST LEVELS:

@  $T_1$  : 4 LRBE @ 73.1% RPL      @  $T_2$  : 4 LRBE @ 72.8% RPL  
4 LRBE @ 58.7% RPL      4 LRBE @ 54.4% RPL

Figure 2.10

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

# RELEASE ANALYSIS: CONFIGURATION #5D




Fig 2.11

#3) additional improvements in ET propellant margins, bending moment at release, and the time delay to release can be realized. The earliest possible release time after the transient peak occurs at 6.858 sec after SSME ignition. To achieve  $T/W = 1$  at release, 4 LRB engines (ignited at 5.814 sec) are at 72.8% of RPL, and the remaining 4 (ignited 0.20 sec later) are at 54.4% of RPL.

The increase in maximum moment, deflections, and time delay encountered with LRBs using "nominal" SSME ignition stagger timing indicates these configurations should not proceed through a full cycle of response prior to release. Consequently, analyses were performed on the two LRB configurations to determine the potential benefit of modifying the total SSME rise time.

**2.6.3.2 Modified SSME Rise Time** Modification consisted of varying the stagger time between the first and second engine starts ( $T_1$ ), to negate the relationship between total rise time and the half wave-length of the system (Section 2.6.2). Stagger time between second and third engine starts ( $T_2$ ) was held at 0.12 sec. Discussion of the following figures is in comparison to Figure 2.3, Nominal STS ignition Sequence.

A series of transient response plots for configuration #1B (.22 Hz.) with  $T_1$  values of 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, 4.5, and 5.0 seconds is illustrated in Figure 2.12. For all cases plotted, a significant decrease in the maximum bending moment is shown, and for cases with  $3.5 \leq T_1 \leq 4.0$  sec., release can be accomplished to satisfy the constraints for bending moment release limit and the minimum SSME power level constraint of 90%.

At first glance, the time delay until possible release appears to be significantly greater than for the current SRB configuration. However, the dashed line labeled "EQUIVALENT NOMINAL SSME ENGINE SECONDS" denotes the boundary where the same amount of ET propellants (as the SRB configuration) would be consumed. Comparison of this boundary with the boundary for release points labeled "SSME POWER LEVELS @ 100, 96.3, & 90 %" demonstrates that a substantial increase in ET propellant margins is possible.

Similar plots for configuration #5D are shown in Figure 2.13, with values for  $T_1$  of 4.0, 4.5, 5.0, and 5.5 seconds. For all cases, a significant decrease in the maximum bending moment is demonstrated, and for the cases where  $T_1 \geq 5.0$ , a substantial decrease in the bending moment at release is realized. Additionally the ET propellant margins gained by release at minimum SSME thrust levels are even greater than that for the .22 Hz. case.

## 2.7 ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION

A summary of release data for the analyzed configurations is compared to appropriate selection criteria in Figure 2.14. Configurations #1B and #5D RELEASE #2 require additional consumption of ET propellants (2033 lbs and 7688 lbs respectively) prior to launch. Reduction of ET propellants from the nominal margins poses a significant impact to Orbiter intact abort and cross range capability. Because of the impact to safety, both of these release techniques are immediately eliminated from further evaluation.

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

# DYNAMIC RESPONSE W/MODIFIED T1: f = .223




Figure 2.12

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

# DYNAMIC RESPONSE W/MODIFIED T1: $f = .151$




Figure 2.13



LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

# CONFIGURATION RELEASE DATA COMPARISON

CRITERIA CONFIG. #	RELIABILITY		PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY		
	MOMENT x 10 <sup>6</sup> MAX.	@ REL.	Δ SSME ENG SEC	Δ SSME PROPELLANT	RELEASE TIME
NOMINAL SRB	569	145	NA	NA	4.382 sec
CONFIG #1B	666	145	1.960 sec	-2033 lb	5.035 sec
#5D REL #1	128	128	-7.280 sec	+7560 lb	1.955 sec
#5D-REL #2	045	144	7.405 sec	-7600 lb	6.706 sec
#1B MOD. T1 <sup>①</sup>	238	141	-3.831 sec	+3977 lb	5.335 sec
#5D MOD. T1 <sup>②</sup>	300	102	-2.401 sec	+2493 lb	6.835 sec

\* AMPLITUDE AT RELEASE CORRESPONDS TO SSME RPL OF 100, 96.3, AND 90 %

① T1 = 3.5 SEC, T2 = 0.12 SEC

② T1 = 5.0 SEC, T2 = 0.12 SEC

### 2.7.1 RELIABILITY

Bending moment magnitudes and  $\Delta$  SSME engine seconds were assigned to the criteria of reliability since a reduction in these parameters as compared to the nominal SRB configuration could immediately be interpreted as an increase in current STS design margins. A comparison of values for each category indicates that the more compliant configuration #5D is superior to #1B MOD T1 in reducing SSME burn time, and also maximum and minimum bending moments. Configuration #5D MOD T1 is superior only in reducing the minimum bending moment, and thus can be considered the best at reducing twang loads at release. Regardless of relative ranking, all three LRB candidates show a substantial improvement over the stiffer SRB configuration.

### 2.7.2 SAFETY

As noted in Figure 2.13, all remaining candidates meet the requirement for SSME health verification at 90% RPL. In fact, in order to realize the improvements in launch characteristics they require release at 90% of RPL. To delay launch until the last SSME was at 100% of RPL would negate these improvements since these parameters are time dependent and increasing in magnitude at the time of release. STS launch with the SSMEs at these power levels causes the last 10% of thrust to be applied while the vehicle is flying, as opposed to the current practice of restraining the stack until all engines are up to 100% of RPL. This would require a new engine qualification program to verify SSME safety and function in a new environment.

The question of LRB engine health verification is significant to all LRB configurations since thrust levels at launch are relatively low. This situation is driven by the constraint of  $T/W = 1$ , where the intent is to reduce the longitudinal lift-off transient. This longitudinal load fluctuation at the SRB/ET thrust fittings occurs when the stack is explosively released from the launch pad and the last two million pounds of thrust are applied (from two SRBs) after release. Instantaneously releasing the stack with  $T/W \geq 1$  would aggravate this condition by introducing a greater step input to the system, producing longitudinal vibration more severe than the current practice.

Because of this, the LRB engine health verification criteria may become the driving factor in choosing a launch release system and technique. Health verification criteria are constrained by the  $T/W$  limit at release, the SSME minimum RPL limit, and the effect of explosive release and the resultant longitudinal transient. If LRB engines require power levels greater than those listed in Figure 2.13 to verify them "Go for Launch", explosive release becomes impractical because of these constraints. The practice of running LRB engines up to greater thrust levels for health verification, and then throttling back for launch levels would overcome these constraints, but would require an inordinate amount of propellant consumption on the pad, resulting in much larger design capacity, thermal problems from exhaust plumes, and possible performance losses from additional inert tank and structure weight.

### 2.7.3 PERFORMANCE

ET propellant savings could be interpreted as safety criteria for increased capability to close the gaps between intact abort modes , or as additional ascent performance. Since the three remaining configurations do not penalize ET propellant margins of the current Orbiter/ET configuration, no impact to abort margins is realized. As in the case of reliability, all three of the remaining candidates demonstrate a significant improvement in ET propellant margins, with configuration #5D REL #1 providing a substantial savings in ET propellants at more than 7500lbs.

### 3.0 CONCLUSIONS

Trade study conclusions are listed in Figure 2.15. As shown in the transient moment plots for LRB configurations, the SSME ignition sequence can be used to manipulate the resulting transient, minimize the adverse characteristics of the STS launch sequence, and improve propellant margins. While the SSME engine rise time is considered constant at 1.905 sec., the time intervals between engine starts can be varied to produce desirable results without impacting current STS limitations.

Also demonstrated by comparison, when the half wave-length of the system increases beyond the SSME rise time, the response time increases, allowing greater SSME thrust to build up before bending moment limits are exceeded. Thus, the more compliant booster configuration is advantageous to controlling and reducing the transient loads and twang.

The constraints on T/W and the resulting low LRB thrust levels at release may present an insurmountable problem for explosive release techniques. Issues of control authority and collision avoidance near launch pad hardware, health verification at low thrust, and the risks of launching with propulsion systems operating below nominal levels will be difficult to resolve. Coupled with the difficulties of duplicating launch environments for LRB and new SSME engine qualification programs, these issues may preclude the use of explosive launch release altogether.

### 4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

Trade study recommendations are listed in Figure 2.16. If the issues associated with low LRB thrust levels can be resolved, it is recommended that investigation of transient manipulation and explosive release techniques continue for LRB configurations. Options other than ignition sequence timing and stiffness reduction remain to be explored. Investigation of SSME rise time variation and the impact to STS operations is recommended as a first alternative. The feasibility of tilting the stack (on the launch pad) back in the X-Z plane such that the CG moment arm for the Orbiter/ET mass contributes greater resistance to the off-set SSME thrust should also be investigated.

If the issues of LRB thrust levels at release cannot be resolved satisfactorily, it is recommended that a damped launch release system similar in function to those used for Saturn and Atlas launch vehicles be adopted. This type of system could be superior in reducing base bending moments and vibratory twang loads at release, while providing gradual vehicle release as thrust builds up to flight levels.

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

## TRADE STUDY 1.10 CONCLUSIONS

1. SSME IGNITION SEQUENCE CAN BE OPTIMIZED TO MINIMIZE BOLT LOAD AND TWANG, AND IMPROVE LIFT PERFORMANCE.
2. COMPLIANT BOOSTER IS ADVANTAGEOUS FOR CONTROLLING TRANSIENT EFFECTS ON BOLT LOADS AND TWANG WITH SSME SEQUENCE TIMING.
3. LOW BOOSTER RPL (58%-73%) AT RELEASE, AND "SLOW" RISE TIME MAY PRECLUDE EXPLOSIVE LAUNCH RELEASE TECHNIQUE WITH LRBS.
  - CONTROL AUTHORITY NEAR PAD
  - HEALTH VERIFICATION
  - EMOTIONAL ISSUES

LRB

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER STUDY

## TRADE STUDY 1.10 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. IF BOOSTER RPL AND RISE TIME ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED,  
PROCEED WITH EXPLOSIVE RELEASE OPTIMIZATION
  - IGNITION SEQUENCE
  - REDUCED STIFFNESS
  - ENGINE RISE TIME
  - TILTED STACK
2. IF ISSUES CANNOT BE RESOLVED, BASELINE DAMPED  
LAUNCH RELEASE SYSTEMS FOR LRB.

Figure 2.16

## UPDATE ON T.S. 1.10 IGNITION SEQUENCE

Since this initial trade study was performed, a dynamic loads model was developed and a first cut made of loads and deflections. Our basic philosophy continues to be:

- 1) A soft LRB is acceptable, even preferable when
- 2) SSME starts are staggered about 4 seconds and
- 3) The whole stack is held down until all engines (Orbiter and LRBs) exceed 90% of full thrust (allowing time to determine engine health and then
- 4) A controlled, "slow" release occurs. There is probably insufficient room for Saturn type release heads. Therefore we are considering explosive bolts + stretch bolts drawn out about 6" through a die.

This concept appears to have many advantages including lower deflections and less twang than the current STS system with SRM.

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division

# LRB RECOVERY DOWNSELECTION MEETING

5 FEB 1988

LRB

TRADE STUDY 1.13

## RECOVERY ANALYSES AND SELECTIONS

88034-1

1.13



## LRB DOWNSELECTION MEETING 2/5/88

 LRB

MEETING OBJECTIVE: Downselect Recovery/Reusability Concepts for LRB

LRB BACKGROUND: LRB for STS Systems Study, NAS 8-37137

- ATP 10/13/87
- Technical completion 6/13/88

MMC

- Baselineing storable propellants
- Have included LOX/RP-1

GDSS Downselected from 15 concepts to 5 in January

- Two existing engines (SSME, F-1)
- Two new pump-fed engines (LOX/RP-1, LOX/LH2)
- One pressure-fed engine (LOX/RP-1)

Subsequently dropped F-1 concept option

Downselection to be completed by next IPR

## LRB RECOVERY DOWNSELECTION MEETING

 LRB

### RECOVERY

### REFURBISHMENT

### REUSE

## ANALYSIS, IMPACTS, & SELECTIONS

### TOPICS:

- Objectives & Proposed Options
- Methodology
- Recovery Concepts & Methods
- Technological Downselections
- Selected Recovery Techniques
- Recovery Options Evaluations
- Weight Impacts
- Cost Comparisons
- Conclusions & Recommendations

## TRADE 1.4 DEGREE OF RECOVERY/REUSABILITY

LRB

### OBJECTIVE:





Determine the technical and cost feasibility for recovery, refurbishment, and reuse of a total LRB or the propulsion/avionics (P/A) portion.

### BASIC GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES:

- Booster design will use multiple engines per booster
- Recovery may be downrange with limited exposure of components to salt water
- Recovery may be by dry landing, either downrange or return to launch site
- Number of boosters required per year will be 9X2=18
- Number of engines required per year will be 18X4=72
- Performance of LEO maintained
- Maintain one engine-out abort capability

# GD/SS PROPOSED RECOVERY OPTIONS (PAGE 1 OF 2)

LRB

EXPENDABLE PRESSURE-FED BOOSTER	PROPULSION MODULE WITH FLEXIBLE SHROUD	CANNONBALL ENGINE MODULE	FULL RETURN WITH CLAM SHELL
 <p>Booster shroud Booster Launch Booster shroud Booster Launch</p> <p>ADVANTAGES: - NO TURBOCHARGER (WATER GAS PRESSURANT) - STRONG, THICK WALLED TANKS MAY ALLOW WATER RECOVERY AS AN OPTION - OCEAN-GOING REC. FORCE NOT REQD. - DOWIE - LOW</p> <p>DISADVANTAGES: - ADDED FACILITIES TO SUPPLY PRESSURIZATION - WEIGHT PENALTY IN TANK STRUCTURE - SIZE MAY IMPACT ATTACH. TO PAD &amp; VEHICLE DUE TO ENGINE CLUSTER - RELATIVELY LOW PERFORMANCE - HIGH COST RISK # UNIT COST PROJECTIONS ARE NOT ACHIEVED</p>	 <p>Booster shroud Booster Launch Booster shroud Booster Launch</p> <p>ADVANTAGES: - REUSE OF HIGHEST COST BOOSTER ELEMENT (ENGINES) - MINIMAL IMPACT TO PAD &amp; VEHICLE - NO SALT WATER ON ENGINES - USES EXISTING WATER RECOVERY EQUIPMENT - POTENTIALLY LIGHTWEIGHT SYSTEM - DOWIE COST - LOW</p> <p>DISADVANTAGES: - OCEAN-GOING RECOVERY FORCE REQD. - PROCESSING TIME TO REFURBISH - RECOVERY ATTENTION RATE - CONTAMINATION</p>	 <p>Booster shroud Booster Launch Booster shroud Booster Launch</p> <p>ADVANTAGES: - REUSE OF HIGHEST COST BOOSTER ELEMENT (ENGINES) - MINIMAL IMPACT TO PAD &amp; VEHICLE - NO SALT WATER ON ENGINES - USES EXISTING WATER REC. EQUIP. - DOWIE COST - LOW</p> <p>DISADVANTAGES: - WEIGHT HIGHER THAN SHEATH - LARGE DIA. DRAG INDUCING POD REQD TO ENCLOSE CLUSTERED ENGINES - OCEAN-GOING RECOVERY FORCE REQD - PROCESSING TIME TO REFURBISH - RECOVERY ATTENTION RATE</p>	 <p>Booster shroud Booster Launch Booster shroud Booster Launch</p> <p>ADVANTAGES: - RECOVERS ENTIRE BOOSTER - SIMILAR RECON. PROCEDURES TO SRB - MINIMAL IMPACT TO PAD &amp; VEHICLE (DEPENDENT ON ENGINE CLUSTER SIZE) - NO SALT WATER ON ENGINES</p> <p>DISADVANTAGES: - ENTIRE BOOSTER DESIGNED FOR WATER IMPACT (WEIGHT PENALTY) - LARGE DIA. DRAG INDUCING CLAM SHELL DOORS REQD FOR CLUSTERED ENGINES - OCEAN-GOING RECOVERY FORCE REQD - POTENTIALLY HIGHEST RECOVERY ATTENTION RATE - LARGE REFURBISHMENT COST - RESTARTING PRODUCTION LINE FOR BOOSTER REPLACEMENT</p>

# GD/SS PROPOSED RECOVERY OPTIONS (PAGE 2 OF 2)

LRB


ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY

* PARKFOIL RECOVERY TO LAND	* CATAMARAN BOOSTER	ROTATING/SWING WING BOOSTER	* FLYBACK BOOSTER
<p>Engine with lift off</p> <p>Compress on parkfoil</p> <p>Recovery time</p> <p>Launch</p> <p>Landing</p> <p>Recovery time</p>	<p>Launch</p> <p>Recovery time</p> <p>Landing</p>	<p>Launch</p> <p>Recovery time</p> <p>Landing</p>	<p>Launch</p> <p>Recovery time</p> <p>Landing</p>
<p><b>ADVANTAGES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NO OCEAN-GOING RECOVERY FORCE</li> <li>• REUSE OF HIGHEST COST BOOSTER ELEMENT (ENGINE)</li> <li>• MINIMAL IMPACT TO PAD &amp; VEHICLE</li> <li>• LESS LOSSES THAN WATER RECOVERY</li> <li>• NO RISK OF SALT WATER CONTAMINATION</li> </ul> <p><b>DISADVANTAGES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GUIDANCE &amp; ACTIVE CONTROL REQD</li> <li>• RANGE SAFETY ISSUES</li> <li>• LIKELY HEAVIER THAN WATER RECOVERED CONCEPTS</li> <li>• REQUIRES LAND RECOVERY SUPPORT &amp; INFRASTRUCTURE</li> <li>• REQUIRES TRAJECTORY MODIFICATIONS OR TOSSEBACK MANEUVER</li> </ul>	<p><b>ADVANTAGES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FULLY REUSABLE</li> <li>• NO OCEAN-GOING RECOVERY FORCE</li> <li>• MINIMAL IMPACT TO PAD &amp; VEHICLE</li> <li>• FEW RECOVERY LOSSES</li> <li>• LANDS ON EXISTING RUNWAYS</li> <li>• REQUIRING COST - POTENTIAL FOR LOWEST PER FLIGHT</li> </ul> <p><b>DISADVANTAGES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GUIDANCE &amp; ACTIVE CONTROL REQD</li> <li>• RANGE SAFETY ISSUES</li> <li>• LIKELY HEAVIER THAN WATER RECOVERED CONCEPTS</li> <li>• REQUIRES LAND RECOVERY SUPPORT &amp; INFRASTRUCTURE</li> <li>• REQUIRES TRAJECTORY MODIFICATIONS OR TOSSEBACK MANEUVER</li> </ul>	<p><b>ADVANTAGES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• FULLY REUSABLE</li> <li>• NO OCEAN-GOING RECOVERY FORCE</li> <li>• MINIMAL IMPACT TO PAD &amp; VEHICLE</li> <li>• FEW RECOVERY LOSSES</li> <li>• LANDS ON EXISTING RUNWAYS</li> <li>• REQUIRING COST - POTENTIAL FOR LOWEST PER FLIGHT</li> </ul> <p><b>DISADVANTAGES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GUIDANCE &amp; ACTIVE CONTROL REQD</li> <li>• RANGE SAFETY ISSUES</li> <li>• LIKELY HEAVIER THAN WATER RECOVERED CONCEPTS</li> <li>• REQUIRES LAND RECOVERY SUPPORT &amp; INFRASTRUCTURE</li> <li>• REQUIRES TRAJECTORY MODIFICATIONS OR TOSSEBACK MANEUVER</li> </ul>	<p><b>ADVANTAGES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EASILY EVOLVES TO ALS CONFIG. FMS</li> <li>• FULLY REUSABLE</li> <li>• NO OCEAN-GOING RECOVERY FORCE</li> <li>• FEW RECOVERY LOSSES</li> <li>• LANDS ON EXISTING RUNWAYS</li> <li>• REQUIRING COST - POTENTIAL FOR LOWEST PER FLIGHT</li> </ul> <p><b>DISADVANTAGES:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MAJOR CHANGES REQD TO PAD &amp; FMS</li> <li>• CHANGES TO ITS FLIGHT PROFILE</li> <li>• INCOMPATIBLE WITH SRB</li> <li>• GUIDANCE &amp; ACTIVE CONTROL REQD</li> <li>• RANGE SAFETY ISSUES</li> <li>• RESTARTING PRODUCTION LINE FOR VEHICLE REPLACEMENT</li> <li>• REQUIRES MULTIPLE RUNWAY FACILITY</li> <li>• COSTLY COST - HIGH</li> </ul>

0872-156





\*REQUIRES TURBOJET SYSTEMS-RELEGATED TO GROWTH OPTIONS

# LRB RECOVERY DOWNSELECT METHODOLOGY




# STOWABLE / DEPLOYABLE RECOVERY CONCEPTS

LRB

RECOVERY SYSTEM	LIFT / DRAG	CHARACTERISTICS
<p>PARACHUTE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SINGLE</li> <li>• CLUSTER</li> </ul> 	0	IN USE, WELL DEFINED, USED ON SRM, etc.
<p>RAM AIR</p> 	3	REQUIRES MANY SHROUD LINES. CURRENT TECHNOLOGY LIMITED DUE TO REEFING PROBLEMS WHEN RECOVERING WEIGHTS OVER 20,000 LBS.
<p>INFLATABLE WING</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ROGALLO</li> <li>• HANG GLIDER</li> <li>• PARAWING (SEMI RIGID)</li> </ul> 	3-7	ROGALLO AND HANG GLIDER TECHNOLOGY ESTABLISHED BUT HEAVY LIFT CAPABILITY UNKNOWN. SEMI-RIGID PARAWING ANALOGOUS TO RIGID WING, CAN WITHSTAND HIGH LOAD, WILL REQUIRE DEVELOPMENT.
<p>SWING OUT RIGID WING</p> 	10	BASIC AIRCRAFT WING DESIGN. SWING OUT REQUIRES DEVELOPMENT.

# RECOVERY METHODS TREE

*Handwritten signature*  
LRB




## CRITERIA

- Technological
- Risk
- Operations
- Cost




# TECHNOLOGICAL TRADE TREE

*8/2/80*  
**LRB**



## RECOVERY TECHNOLOGICAL DOWNSELECT PHILOSOPHY

 **LRB**

### CONSIDER RECOVERY OF.....


- LRB, for total re-use
- Partial LRB, for P/A module recovery
- P/A module only, not practical:
  - structural weight high for impact shielding
  - complicated separation
  - use planned discarded LRB tanks

### ENGINE & P/A ALLOWANCES

- Engine and P/A in water - O.K.
  - New engines can be designed for minimum refurbishment from water
  - Dry cover (clamshell, sock) is only cost effective for SSME
- Impact to 5g

# P/A MODULE CONCEPT

LRB



## NOTES:

- MUST DISCONNECT ALONG SHIELD
- WEIGHT INCREASE = 1.35 \* WEIGHT OF THRUST STRUCTURE

## RECOVERY TECHNOLOGICAL DOWNSELECT PHILOSOPHY (continued)

**LRB**


### RTLS OPTIONS

- Toss-back to RTLS
  - Restart BME (50% thrust)
  - SMR's too heavy
- Tow-back, via large fixed wing airplane
  - LRB with rigid wing
  - LRB with parawing (developed by UTC)
  - Partial LRB with parawing, for P/A
  - Runway landing, not practical because the landing gear would be too heavy and complicated, also there would be limited descent crossrange control
- Placid inland water landing - O.K.

### DOWNRANGE OPTIONS


- Platform (or ship's deck), not practical for same reasons stated in the runway landing option
- Parachutes, versus wings, provide lightest and lowest impact speeds
- LRB (total) pump-fed, not practical because the parachute/retrorocket weights would be too high for soft landing and rough seas overstress the tanks
- LRB (total) pressure-fed, is practical with parachutes
- Partial LRB to save P/A module, with parachutes

# TECHNOLOGICAL DOWNSELECTED RECOVERY CONCEPTS



\* MOST DESIRABLE CONCEPT; LEAST COMPLEXITY

## TRAJECTORY GUIDELINES

 LRB

### ASCENT

- Established trajectory profile, fixed MECO conditions
- 75,500 pounds payload to 150 NM orbit
- Engine-out at lift-off - 1.10 g

### POST-SEPARATION

- Ballistic to RTLS tow-back and to downrange
- RTLS by toss-back and glide-back
  - BME (50%) shortly after separation

## Trajectory Ground rules

### Ascent Constraints


- Maximum  $Q^*$  alpha:  $-3000 \text{ pounds-degree/foot}^{**2}$
- Maximum Dynamic pressure:  $750 \text{ pounds/foot}^{**2}$
- Angle of attack:
  - $1.05 \leq \text{mach} \leq 1.55$ ;  $-5 \leq \text{angle of attack} \leq -4$
- Engine out Abort on pad thrust/weight: 1.1

### MECO Conditions

- Velocity: 25,670 feet/second
- Flight Path Angle: 0.65 degrees
- Altitude: 57 nautical miles
- Orbital Inclination: 28.5 degrees
- Payload weight: 75,500 pounds

# TOSSBACK RTLS


*LRB*





# TOWBACK DEPLOYABLE WING CONCEPT PARAWING & RIGID WING LRB

LRB




# LRB WITH RIGID WING

**LRB**


WEIGHT 144 000 LB  
WING AREA 3037 FT<sup>2</sup>  
LANDING NO FLAPS 107 MPH  
LANDING FLAPS 94 MPH  
DIMENSIONS IN FEET

AIRFOIL (GA(W)-2) [13%]  
ASPECT RATIO 12.97




# TOWBACK DEPLOYABLE WING CONCEPT PARAWING 1/2 LRB (P/A)

LRB



GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division


# RTLS PLACID WATER LANDING SITE



# DOWNRANGE PARACHUTE RECOVERY



LRB




GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division

# DOWNRANGE PARACHUTE, 1/2 LRB RECOVERY WITH 1/2 LRB AND LRB COST BACK-UP (5)



LRB



# SELECTED STOWABLE RECOVERY SYSTEMS


BACK-UP (6)

## WEIGHT AND COST



LRB


PUMP FED  
RECOVERY SYSTEM  
WEIGHT.....7,370 LB  
COST.....4.5M



PARAWING

PUMP FED  
RECOVERY SYSTEM  
WEIGHT.....11,179 LB  
COST.....6.8M

PUMP FED (1/2 LRB)  
RECOVERY SYSTEM  
WEIGHT.....4,702 LB  
COST.....4M



SEMI-RIGID WING

PUMP FED  
RECOVERY SYSTEM  
WEIGHT.....15,874 LB  
COST.....

PRESSURE FED  
RECOVERY SYSTEM  
WEIGHT.....24,220 LB  
COST.....

## PARAWING REUSABLE HARDWARE

# OF USES

PARAWING CANOPY/SAIL  
AIR FRAME STRUCTURE  
DEPLOYMENT ACTUATORS  
DROGUE CHUTE AND RISERS

15

(SAME AS PAYLOAD)



10

6

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
*Space Systems Division*

# SSME WATER PROTECTION


 LRB



88034-9



# PARACHUTE RECOVERY EQUIPMENT STOWAGE LRB WITH LO2/LH2 ENGINE



## ROCKWELL SEA LANDING ASSESSMENT

*[Signature]*  
LRB

### \* PROPOSED 6 FPS - REQUIRES PARACHUTES AND RETROCKET

- \* LIMIT ENTRY IMPACT, STRUCTURAL LOADS AND PRESSURES
- \* CONSIDER ERRORS IN PARACHUTE  $\pm$  5 FPS
- \* DESCENT VARIATIONS DUE TO HUMIDITY.
- \* RETROCKET IGNITION TIME VARIATION  $\pm$  5 FT AT 100 FT/SEC

NOTE: SEAS GREATER THAN 8.5 FT WILL OVER STRESS THE PUMP  
FED LRD.

# SURVIVABILITY OF LRB TANKS

0.000 LRB

## PUMP FED LRB

- SUBMERGED WATER LANDING WILL COLLAPSE TANK. WATER DEPTH OF 7 FEET PRODUCES 3 PSI
- 8.5 FOOT WAVES WILL EXCEED STRENGTH OF TANK

## PRESSURE FED LRB

- TANK PRESSURE 100 PSI AFTER SEPARATION
- TANK GOOD FOR 10 G'S IN ROUGH SEA
- LANDING IMPACT AT SEA NOT A PROBLEM FOR TANK

# LRB RECOVERY CONCEPT SELECTION RIGID WING - TOTAL LRB ONLY

**LRB**

CRITERIA		EVALUATION
SAFETY	HYDROGEN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Will require safe handling from pad-pond/lagoon.</li> <li>• Purging of tank required at dock, prior to overland transport through KSC</li> </ul>
	RP - 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Remove RP-1 at dock before transporting through KSC</li> </ul>
RELIABILITY		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proposed fiberglass wings, and empennage proven contemporary private aircraft concept. Swing-out within current state-of-the-art.</li> </ul>
RECOVERY / REFURBISHMENT OPERATIONS COMPATIBILITY		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wings and empennage will have to be removed for refurbishing the LRB.</li> <li>• Alter reassembly may require functional test.</li> </ul>
LRB / STS COMPATIBILITY		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As wings will lay on outer LRB surface, will have STS stacking operations interfaces.</li> <li>• Will have aerodynamic influences during ascent.</li> </ul>
RISK		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High development and operational risk.</li> <li>• No simple way to flight-test; deployment through landing</li> <li>• Too risky, parawing better winged option</li> </ul>

# LRB RECOVERY CONCEPT SELECTION PARAWING - PARTIAL AND TOTAL LRB

LRB

CRITERIA		EVALUATION
SAFETY	INDOGEN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Will require safe handling from pad-pond/lagoon.</li> <li>Purging of tank required at dock, prior to overland transport through KSC</li> </ul>
	NP -1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Remove NP-1 at dock before transporting through KSC</li> </ul>
RELIABILITY		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analogous to contemporary air inflated parafoils.</li> <li>Deployment (mechanical with aero assistance) and operational reliability should be higher than parafoils and ram air stabilized wings.</li> </ul>
RECOVERY / REFURBISHMENT OPERATIONS COMPATIBILITY		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Packaged along length of LRB.</li> <li>Will have to be removed for LRB refurbishment.</li> <li>For P/A recovery, via 1/2 LRB, will be removed for refurbishment and assembly to new LRB.</li> </ul>
LRB / STS COMPATIBILITY		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No apparent STS stacking interference.</li> <li>Low x-axis profile offers little aerodynamic influence during ascent.</li> </ul>
RISK		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Low development and operational risk.</li> <li>Analogous to high glide parachutes.</li> </ul>

# LRB RECOVERY CONCEPT SELECTION PARACHUTE - PARTIAL AND TOTAL LRB

LRB



CRITERIA		EVALUATION
SAFETY	HYDROGEN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Will require safe handling from pad-pond / lagoon.</li> <li>Purging of tank required at dock, prior to overland transport through KSC</li> </ul>
	RP-1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Remove RP-1 at dock before transporting through KSC</li> </ul>
RELIABILITY		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proven concept for SRM recovery</li> </ul>
RECOVERY / REFURBISHMENT OPERATIONS COMPATIBILITY		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Similar to SRB, except for salting</li> </ul>
LRB/STS COMPATIBILITY		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Packing about boat-tail affords no interference with stacking</li> </ul>
RISK		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Same as for SRB</li> </ul>



**OPTIONS:**

EXPOSED - NO WATER PROTECTION FOR ENGINE  
CLAM - CLAM SHELL WATER PROTECTION FOR ENGINE  
SOCK - WATER PROTECTION FOR ENGINE  
STRAPON - SOLID ROCKET TO OBTAIN TOSS BACK VELOCITY  
FIRESTART - USE MAIN ENGINE FOR TOSS BACK VELOCITY

W<sub>M</sub> = INERT WEIGHT  
W<sub>P</sub> = PROPELLANT WEIGHT  
W<sub>A</sub>\* = WATER PROTECTION




# WEIGHT SUMMARY PRESSURE FED LRB

*0.000*  
LRB

RECOVERY MODE	BALLISTIC	RTLS-TOW BACK		RTLS-TOSS BACK	
RECOVERY TYPE	PARACHUTE	PARAWING	RIGID WING	PARAWING	RIGID WING
RECOVERABLE	LRB	LRB	LRB	LRB	LRB
OPTIONS	ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	STRAP ON SOLID MOTOR	RESTART
CONFIGURATION	1.02 X WI 1.04 X Wp	1.16X WI 1.03 X Wp	1.38 X WI 1.08 X Wp		
1B LOX / RP-1 PRESSURE FED				BEST RECOVERY MODE IS BALLISTIC PARACHUTE	

OPTIONS:  
EXPOSED - NO WATER PROTECTION FOR ENGINE  
STRAPON - SOLID ROCKET TO OBTAIN TOSS BACK VELOCITY  
RESTART - USE MAIN ENGINE FOR TOSS BACK VELOCITY


WI - INERT WEIGHT  
Wp - PROPELLANT WEIGHT



LRB



# COST ESTIMATING GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS



LRB

	LAND RECOVERY/DRY WATER RECOVERY(1)	WATER RECOVERY (SEA WATER)
	DESIGN LIFE	DESIGN LIFE
	% OF T1 COST FOR REFURB	% OF T1 COST FOR REFURB
ENGINES		
SSME	40	25
NEW PUMP-FED	N/A	25
NEW PRESSURE-FED	N/A	25
ACTUATORS		
ELECTROMECHANICAL ACTUATORS	25	25
STRUCTURES		
TANKS	N/A	100 (2)
ADAPTERS	N/A	100
THRUST STRUCTURE	N/A	100
MAIN PROPELLANT SYSTEM	N/A	100
WINGS (PARA/RIGID)	N/A	10/100
RECOVERY RELIABILITY 97%		15%
CONSTANT FY 87 DOLLARS		15%
NINE (9) LAUNCHES PER YEAR		15%
LRB OPERATIONS INCLUDE ASSEMBLY, PROCESSING AND CHECKOUT FOR LAUNCH		15%
EXCLUSIONS:		15%
PROPELLANT AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS		15%
ASCENT RELIABILITY		15%
AVONICS AND SOFTWARE		15%
CONTRACTOR FEE; RESERVE; GOVT SUPPORT		15%

- (1) DRY WATER RECOVERY USING THE SOCK OR CLAM-SHELL
- (2) EXCEPTION: LH2 TANK DESIGN LIFE LIMITED TO 15 FLIGHTS DUE TO CRYO DETERIORATION
- (3) IF NEW ENGINE HAS PROTECTED TURBOPUMP, THE REFURB WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED

# COST SUMMARY PUMP FED LRB

RECOVERY MODE	BALLISTIC-DOWNRANGE				RTLS-TOW BACK				RTLS-TOSS BACK			
	PARACHUTE				PARAWING				PARAWING			
	1/2 LRB (AFT TANK + P/A)				1/2 LRB (AFT TANK + P/A)				LRB			
RECOVERABLE	ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	CLAM	SOCK		ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	CLAM	SOCK		ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	CLAM	SOCK	
OPTIONS												
CONFIGURATION												
5A LOX / LH2 NEW PUMP FED	0.95E <sub>x</sub>	N/A*	N/A*		0.95E <sub>x</sub>	N/A*	N/A*		ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER		ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	
5D LOX / RP-1 NEW PUMP FED	1.09E <sub>x</sub> 1.03E <sub>x</sub>	N/A*	N/A*		1.09E <sub>x</sub> 1.03E <sub>x</sub>	N/A*	N/A*		ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER		ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	
5J LOX / LH2 SSME-35			0.74E <sub>x</sub>									


## OPTIONS:

- EXPOSED - NO WATER PROTECTION FOR ENGINE
- CLAM - CLAM SHELL WATER PROTECTION FOR ENGINE
- SOCK - WATER PROTECTION FOR ENGINE
- STRAPON - SOLID ROCKET TO OBTAIN TOSS BACK VELOCITY
- RESTART - USE MAIN ENGINE FOR TOSS BACK VELOCITY


- E<sub>x</sub> = EXPENDABLE
- N/A\* = WATER PROTECTION INCORPORATED INTO NEW ENGINE

9 FLIGHTS/YEAR

15 FLIGHTS/YEAR



1 LRB



1/2 LRB

# COST SUMMARY PRESSURE FED LRB

000000  
LRB

RECOVERY MODE	BALLISTIC	RTLS-TOW BACK		RILS-TOSS BACK	
RECOVERY TYPE	PARACHUTE	PARAWING	RIGID WING	PARAWING	RIGID WING
RECOVERABLE	LRB	LRB	LRB	LRB	LRB
OPTIONS	ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	STRAP ON SOLID MOTOR	RESTART
CONFIGURATION	ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	ENGINE EXPOSED TO WATER	STRAP ON SOLID MOTOR	RESTART
1B LOX / RP-1 PRESSURE FED	> 1.10Ex			BEST RECOVERY MODE IS BALLISTIC PARACHUTE	

## OPTIONS:

EXPOSED - NO WATER PROTECTION FOR ENGINE


STRAPON - SOLID ROCKET TO OBTAIN TOSS BACK VELOCITY

RESTART - USE MAIN ENGINE FOR TOSS BACK VELOCITY

Ex - EXPENDABLE

9 FLIGHTS/YEAR

15 FLIGHTS/YEAR



LRB

## LRB RECOVERY DOWNSELECT MEETING

 LRB

### CONCLUSIONS:

- RRR of pump-fed P/A and pressure-fed LRB marginally cost effective
  - Sensitive to cost assumptions and mission rates
- Downrange parachute best recovery option
  - Lowest risk, least KSC impact

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Continue RRR on downrange parachute options
  - Emphasis on (1) new engine LOX/LH2 & RP-1; (2) pressure-fed LRB
  - Evaluate
    - operations/facilities impact
    - LRB phase-in with SRB
    - refurb phase-in to LRB production/use
    - total costs with mission rate sensitivities
    - other

## UPDATE ON T.S. 1.13 RECOVERY SYSTEMS

At the midterm review we recommended that LRBs be expended based on cost estimates which at that time showed:

An additional development expenditure of over \$1B should just about pay for itself in 100 flights (LOX/RP vehicle).

Investigation of the cost effectiveness of recovery and reuse includes: a) upsized vehicle and engine to handle the added weight of recovery systems, b) an allowance of approximately 10% for LRBs lost in the recovery attempt, and c) estimates of 15% to 50% refurbishment costs.

Our data continues to show that reusability approximately breaks even for LRB flight rates up to 15/year. For other vehicles at higher flight rates, recovery and reuse may be cost effective.

TRADE STUDY 1.15  
FINAL ERB  
FEBRUARY 11, 1988

## 1.15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION

STUDY LEADER: JOHN WASHBURN

SYSTEMS ENGINEER: LOU PENA

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
*Space Systems Division*

## **1.15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 1**

### **OBJECTIVE:**

- DETERMINE BEST LAUNCH/MCS CONCEPTS, FACILITIES AND GSE TO PROCESS AND LAUNCH THE LRB, WHILE MINIMIZING INTERFACE IMPACTS WITH THE STS.

### **GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES:**

- ON-LINE PROCESSING WILL MINIMIZE CHANGES TO CURRENT STS PROCESSING
- ON-LINE PROCESSING WILL COMPLY WITH STS REQUIREMENTS EXCEPT AS IDENTIFIED AND JUSTIFIED
- PROCESSING WILL BE OPTIMIZED TO MINIMIZE RECURRING COSTS
- ASSUME NEW LAUNCH PROCESSING SYSTEM

## 1.15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 2

### REQUIREMENTS:

- MINIMIZE MODIFICATION TO EXISTING STS FACILITIES/GSE
  - FLAME TRENCH
  - MLP
  - PROPELLANTS
  - LPS/MCS
  - ICING
  - GROUND ACCESS
  - VAB
- SUPPORT 14 FLIGHTS PER YEAR
- MODIFICATIONS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH ON-GOING OPERATIONS
- SAFETY (NHB 5300.4, NSTS 07700)

### CONSTRAINTS:


- ON-LINE PROCESSING WILL BE SIMILAR TO EXISTING STS PROCESSING




# 1.15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 4

## Trade Tree

### KSC FACILITY/GSE OPTIMIZATION




### ASSEMBLY AND CHECKOUT FACILITY



# 1.15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 4

## Trade Tree


**MCS FACILITY/GSE OPTIMIZATION**




# 1.15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 4

## Trade Tree

### KSC FACILITY/GSE OPTIMIZATION



\* FACILITIES CAN BE MODIFIED FOR LRB USE.  
NEW FACILITIES NOT REQUIRED



\* \* EXISTING FACILITIES INADEQUATE FOR  
REFURB, ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT.  
NEW FACILITY REQUIRED.

## 1.15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION Planning Sheet 5

### INPUTS:

- 1.1 CONFIGURATION
- PROPELLANT SELECTION (1.5 & 1.6)
- FLAME TRENCH MODS (1.5 & 1.6)
- 1.4 DEGREE OF RECOVERY/REUSABILITY

### OUTPUTS:

- OPTIMIZED OFF-LINE GROUND OPERATIONS/FACILITIES
- MODIFICATION COST & SCHEDULES
- RECURRING COST ESTIMATES

### OTHER TRADES AFFECTED:

- 1.1 LENGTH/DIAMETER OPTIMIZATION
- 1.2 NUMBER OF ENGINES
- 1.3 ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION, 1.11 IGNITION SEQUENCE
- 1.5 & 1.6 PROPELLANT SELECTION
- 2.4 DEGREE OF AUTOMATION
- 2.6 PRODUCTION SITE OPTIONS
- 2.10 RECOVERY SITE/MODE
- 1.4 RECOVERY/REUSABILITY
- EVOLUTION/GROWTH

4

## **1.15 FACILITIES OPTIMIZATION**

### **Summary of Results - MCS**

#### **CONCLUSIONS:**

- MCS WILL BE DRIVEN BY JSC FLIGHT OPS REQUIREMENTS

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

## **1.15 FACILITIES OPTIMIZATION**

### **Summary of Results - Reuseable**

#### **CONCLUSIONS:**

- EXISTING ON-SITE FACILITIES NOT ADEQUATE FOR REFURB, ASSY & C/O  
NO GROWTH CAPABILITY
- OFF-SITE OFFERS GREATEST REFURB, ASSEMBLY & C/O EFFICIENCY, GROWTH POTENTIAL

078

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- FOR REUSEABLE CONCEPTS, EXPLORE KSC AREA FACILITY

## **1.15 FACILITIES OPTIMIZATION**

### **Summary of Results - Expendable**

#### **CONCLUSIONS:**

- EXISTING ON-SITE FACILITIES NOT ADEQUATE, NO GROWTH
- OFF-SITE OFFERS GREATEST ASSEMBLY & C/O EFFICIENCY

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- BASELINE OFF-SITE ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT (SHIP & SHOOT)
- SELECT OFF-SITE LOCATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH MANUFACTURING SITE SELECTION

## 1.15 FACILITIES OPTIMIZATION

### Summary of Results - LC-39

#### CONCLUSIONS:

- IDENTIFIED LC-39 (VAB,LCC,PAD) MODIFICATIONS FOR EACH LRB CONCEPT
- MODS ARE MANAGEABLE - MIN INTERFERENCE TO ON-GOING STS OPERATIONS
  - SUPPORT 14 STS FLIGHTS/YEAR
  - LSOC AGREES WITH ASSESSMENT

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- START VAB MODIFICATIONS EARLY - 1992



## FACILITY OPTIMIZATION

The top row indicates the on-line KSC facilities and launch support equipment that we examined to determine their adequacy for an LRB and the options, either to modify existing or build new. Because of the high utilization of the Mobile Launch Platforms (MLP) to support on-going SRB operations, it will be necessary to build at least one new MLP to support the initial LRB operations. The need to build additional new or modify the existing MLPs to the LRB configuration can be determined later. The existing VAB highbays 1 & 3 used to integrate the STS flight elements can be modified to accommodate the LRB. Because of the increased diameter of the LRBs versus the SRBs, the existing platforms must be modified to fit the LRBs and also to provide clearance for the STS with LRBs to clear the platforms as the STS leaves the VAB for the launch pad. It was also determined that the existing launch pads can be modified to handle the LRB, precluding having to build an entirely new one. The principal modification will be the addition of propellant storage and transfer systems for propellants other than LO2 and LH2. For these 2 cryogenic propellants, the LRBs can be serviced by teeing off the existing ET propellant systems on the MLP. The question of either adding a Launch Control Center or modifying the existing one depends to a great extent on the projected usage of the existing 4 LCCs. Current projections show almost full utilization of the LCCs; however, software modification and development may be possible to schedule into the LCCs during on-going operations.

For both the expendable and reusable versions of the LRB, we examined the possibility of using existing on-site facilities for LRB receipt, inspection, refurbishment for recovery, final assembly and checkout. The existing facilities were inadequate for this task, primarily because of the difficulty in integrating into on-going operations and also because of limited potential for increasing the LRB processing activity sufficiently to handle the STS plus any LRB growth options.

## ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT - KSC FACILITIES

This matrix summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of various options for LRB final assembly and checkout facilities at KSC. The selected option is to build a new facility that can be built to optimize the efficiency of LRB final assembly and checkout and refurbishment operations for the reusable versions.

# 1:15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION

## ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT - KSC FACILITIES

LOCATION	REQMTS	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
On Site Assembly & Checkout	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access to VAB</li> <li>• LPS C/O</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Min LRB xport</li> <li>• Rapid Response to sched changes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Generally not KSC work</li> </ul>
Existing Facilities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Min facility costs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrate mods &amp; LRB ops with ongoing ops</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ARF</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Horizontal - most efficient</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transition with SRB ops</li> <li>• Limited growth</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RPSF</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Horizontal - 4 LRBs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transition not compatible</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• VAB Low Bays</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Horizontal</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not large enough</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• VAB High Bays 2 &amp; 4</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vertical - least efficient</li> <li>• 75 days/year lost time due to SRB/ET stacking</li> <li>• Limited growth</li> </ul>
New Facility		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Optimize efficiency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Const of Fac cost/sched</li> <li>• ARF RPSF utilization</li> </ul>

# 1.15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION

## KSC LC - 39 FACILITY MODIFICATIONS

	LO2/LH2 SSME-35 5J	LO2/RP-1 F-1 5K	LO2/LH2 New Pump 5A	LO2/RP-1 New Pump 5D	LO2/RP-1 New Press 1B
VAB Platforms Doors	New/Mod ---	New/Mod	New/Mod ---	New/Mod	New/Mod ---
MLP Propellant Service Vent Masts	Tee X	Tee/New LO2	Tee X	Tee/New LO2	Tee/New LO2
Launch Pad ET GOX Vent Arm ET GH2 Vent Arm Prop Store & Xfer	New/Mod New/Mod ---	New/Mod New/Mod RP-1	New/Mod New/Mod LH2?	--- --- RP-1	New --- RP-1
Booster Process Fac					

## KSC LC - 39 FACILITY MODIFICATIONS

The LC - 39 facility modifications required to accommodate the three selected LRB configurations are shown by major facility, VAB, MLP, and launch pad. The platforms in the VAB that enclose the STS vehicle and provide access to all the STS elements must be modified to accommodate the larger diameter of the LRBs compared to the SRBs. The platform above the SRB must also be changed because of the longer LRBs. Because the three MLPs will be fully used for launching SRB Shuttles, at least one new MLP must be built, with a decision made later as to whether to build additional new MLPs or modify the existing ones. The MLP must have propellant servicing equipment installed: piping, valves, control skids and computer interface hardware to permit tanking control of the propellant system. Both LO2 and LH2 will be teed off the existing External Tank propellant systems whereas an entirely new system would have to be installed for the RP-1. Vent accommodations must be provided for the LH2 to insure the explosive gaseous hydrogen is removed from the vicinity of the Shuttle. LO2 vent may be required to prevent ice formation with the potential of ice damage to the orbiter tiles at lift-off. Because LRB configurations 5A & 1B are so much longer than the SRBs, they would protrude into the ET GOX vent arm; therefore, the GOX vent arm must be modified to prevent the physical interference. The bigger diameter (15+ feet) of LRB configuration 5A would also require a mod to the LH2 vent arm to prevent physical interference. The current LH2 storage capacity at the launch pads is marginal for servicing the ET plus both LRBs. The LH2 storage capacity may have to be increased; however, we would still plan to use the existing transfer system which has sufficient transfer capacity for all three LH2 tanks.

# 1.15 FACILITY OPTIMIZATION

## ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT - OFF SITE

LOCATION	REQS	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Off Site Assembly & Checkout	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inland water-way access</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Min impact to KSC</li> <li>Employ Impact</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ARF - RPSF utilization after LRB transition</li> </ul>
Local to KSC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New construct</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Optimize efficiency</li> <li>Rapid response to sched changes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Environmental hurdles</li> </ul>
Distant off site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Temp storage &amp; contingency maint at KSC (VAB HB 2&amp;4)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Michoud                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- exist gov facility</li> <li>- KSC &amp; NSTL access</li> <li>- co-locate manufac</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transportation costs                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ~\$100K/launch</li> <li>- \$7M/barge</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

## ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT - OFF SITE

The major advantage of locating a final assembly and checkout facility off-site is that there would be minimum impact to KSC during the construction of such a facility, plus the assembly and checkout operations themselves would not interfere with the KSC work. Local assembly and checkout has the advantages of rapid schedule response; however, if planned for the inland waterway, surmounting the environmental concerns could be a major hurdle. If the LRB were assembled and checked out at a distant location, it would require a temporary storage and contingency maintenance area at KSC, which the VAB highways 2 & 4 would be satisfactory for these functions. Distant assembly and checkout would also add some transportation costs to the program also; however, this should not be a determining factor. The final location for the final assembly and checkout facility will be selected during the manufacturing study to be conducted later in the LRB program.

# KSC FACILITY IMPACTS

Another major selection criteria was concept/propellant compatibility with the KSC facilities. In conjunction with our subcontractor, PRC, we listed significant changes which would be required. In the VAB, all concepts are larger in diameter and length than the SRB's, so modifications are required to the work platforms. Since storables are the smallest LRB, platform changes are the least. No concepts would require changes to the VAB doors.

On the MLP all types of propellants necessitate new propellant service lines, control skids, and service masts to fill and drain the LRB's. For LOX and LH2 these services can tee off the lines to the orbiter. Venting the east LRB requires a new vent mast, either on the MLP, or directly on the concrete deck with lines to the disposal system. RP - 1 and probably C3H8 can be vented to atmosphere. Since storable propellants can be loaded before the final countdown, a temporary vent system would be sufficient. All propellant types require new propellant storage and transfer except LOX and perhaps LH2 (Cx 39 capacity is marginal)

ROM cost estimates, made by PRC, varied from about 21 to 32 million dollars. LH2 and CH4 systems were the highest due to their requirement for expensive vacuum jacketed systems. These costs were not regarded as significant drivers in concept selection.



# KSC FACILITIES / IMPACTS

*LRB*

	LOX/LH2	LOX/RP-1	NTO/MMH	NTO/MMH
VAB				
PLATFORMS	NEW	NEW	MOD	NEW
DOORS	-----	-----	-----	-----
MLP				
PROPELLANT SERVICE	TEE OFF ORBITER SYS& NEW CONTROL SKIDS	LOX: TEE,FUEL:NEW & NEW CONTROL SKIDS	ALL NEW SYSTEM	LOX:TEE, FUEL:NEW
VENT MASTS (EAST)	NEW LOX AND LH2	NEW LOX	TEMPORARY	NEW LOX AND CH4
LAUNCH				
ET GOX VENT ARM	MOD	-----	-----	-----
ET GH2 VENT ARM	MOD	MAY MOD	MAY MOD	MOD
PROPEL. STORAGE & TRANSFER	EXISTING( MAY ADD LH2 STORAGE)	NEW SATURN TYPE FUEL	ALL NEW	NEW FUEL
DISPOSAL	ENLARGE LH2 LINES ADD LH2&GOX ARMS	GOX VENT ARM	SCRUBBERS & LARGER MOBILE CLEAN EQ.	NEW CH4 AND GOX VENT ARMS
COST ESTIMATES M \$	31	22-24	22	21-32

NOT A SIGNIFICANT DRIVER IN CONCEPT SELECTION

LIQUID ROCKET BOOSTER  
TRADE STUDY ERB  
February 26, 1988

TRADE STUDY 1.16  
MIDTERM ERB

## SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION TRADE STUDY

STUDY LEADER: PAUL R. BRENNAN

SYSTEMS ENGINEER: LOU PENNA

GENERAL DYNAMICS  
Space Systems Division

C-4

# 1.16 SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION TRADE STUDY Planning Sheet 1

OBJECTIVE: SELECTION OF THE MOST APPROPRIATE LRB SEPARATION SYSTEM. (THIS SYSTEM INCLUDES ELEMENTS TO INITIATE AND CONTROL THE SEPARATION SEQUENCE, RELEASE THE BOOSTERS, AND PRODUCE THE IMPULSIVE FORCE NECESSARY FOR SAFE TRANSLATION AWAY FROM THE ORBITER AND ET.)

## GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES:

### GROUND RULES:

- MAINTAIN CURRENT MOUNTING POINTS ON THE ET
- MAINTAIN CURRENT HARDWARE CONNECTIONS FOR RANGE SAFETY, DATA TRANSMISSION, AND POWER SUPPLY
- EXAMINE SEPARATION FOR CONTINGENCY ABORTS
- PROVIDE FOR FAIL-SAFE CAPABILITY

# 1.16 SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION TRADE STUDY Planning Sheet 1

## GROUND RULES/ASSUMPTIONS/GUIDELINES (CON'T):

### ASSUMPTIONS:

- LRB THRUST TERMINATED ( $\leq 60,000$  Lbf) PRIOR TO SEPARATION
- SEPARATION SYSTEM PROVIDES NORMAL AND LATERAL ACCELERATION; RELATIVE AXIAL ACCELERATION ACHIEVED BY THE THRUST FROM THE SSME's

### GUIDELINES:

- MINIMIZE MODIFICATIONS TO ETR FACILITIES AND LAUNCH PROCESSING SCHEDULE
- AVIOD DESIGNS WHICH REQUIRE EXTENSIVE VERIFICATION TESTING
- CONSIDER 95% WINDS AND SYSTEM DISPERSIONS

# 1.16 SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION TRADE STUDY Planning Sheet 2

## REQUIREMENTS:

NUMBER	REQUIREMENT STATEMENT	SOURCE
055	<p>CONTINGENCY ABORTS (MODIFIED)</p> <p>Contingency abort failures include: (a) Loss of thrust from 2 or 3 SSME (b) SSME TVC failures (c) <i>LRB</i> TVC failures (d) Premature Orbiter separation (e) Failure to separate <i>LRBs</i> from Orbiter/ET. The following criteria shall apply for contingency aborts: (a) Contingency aborts will not be used to determine hardware design criteria (b) The Orbiters's and SSME usable lifetime may be degraded (c) Software and hardware impact may be allowed where feasible and cost effective, with specific approval.</p>	<p>NSTS 07700 X Para 3.2.1.5.2</p>
008	<p>ENGINE-OUT PERFORMANCE</p> <p>Safe abort must be possible with engine out on the Orbiter and/or one <i>LRB</i>.</p>	HEALD
028	<p><i>LRB</i> SEPARATION SUBSYSTEM/ORBITER INTERFACE (MODIFIED)</p> <p>The separation subsystem shall include: a) The capacity to accept and respond to separation commands originating in the orbiter, (b) a release system, and (c) a system to translate the <i>LRBs</i> away from the Orbiter/ET. All sequencing commands shall come from the Orbiter. The release hardware and devices providing translation away from the Orbiter shall be the responsibility of the <i>LRBs</i>. Hardwire commands from the Orbiter to the <i>LRB</i> shall initiate the separation sequence.</p>	<p>SRB END ITEM SPECIFICATION Para 3.2.1.3</p>

# 1.16 SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION TRADE STUDY Planning Sheet 2

## REQUIREMENTS (CON'T):

NUMBER	REQUIREMENT STATEMENT	SOURCE
023	<p><b>SEPARATION DAMAGE (MODIFIED)</b> The <i>LRB</i> separation subsystem shall provide for separation of the <i>LRBs</i> from the ET without damage to or recontact with the ET or Orbiter during or after separation. Damage to the <i>LRB</i>/ET connectors on the aft upper struts at the <i>LRB</i>/ET interface during <i>LRB</i> separation after ATVC power is deadfaced is acceptable. Particulates or damaging gases emitted during booster separation shall not impinge on the Orbiter. The <i>LRB</i> separation subsystem shall not release any debris which could damage any Orbiter/ET system or subsystem.</p>	<p>NSTS 07700 X Para 3.2.1.1.9</p>
035	<p><b>SEPARATION SIGNAL INTERLOCK (MODIFIED)</b> The <i>LRB</i> separation subsystem shall incorporate signal interlocks to prevent <i>LRB</i> release and translation due to stray signals. The separation subsystem shall not release any debris which could cause damage to any Orbiter /ET system or subsystem during separation under conditions specified in design <i>LRB</i> staging conditions.</p>	<p>NSTS 07700 X Para 3.2.1.1.9.1</p>
029	<p><b>ORDNANCE CONTROL</b> All ordnance circuits shall utilize Pyro Initiators controllers per Rockwell International Space Division specification MC450-0018 and shall meet the requirement of pyrotechnic Specification JSC-08060 and AFETRM 127-1.</p>	<p>SRB END ITEM SPECIFICATION Para 3.2.1.5.5</p>

# 1.16 SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION TRADE STUDY Planning Sheet 2

## ASSUMED REQUIREMENTS:

NUMBER	REQUIREMENT STATEMENT	SOURCE
036	SEPARATION BODY RATE LIMITS (MODIFIED) LRB separation shall automatically be inhibited if vehicle body rates and dynamic pressure exceed those values for which the separation system has the capability to perform a separation without causing damage to or recontact of Shuttle elements, with the exception of damage to the aftLRB/ET electrical connectors after ATVC power is deadfaced. The crew shall be provided the capability to manually override these body rate dynamic pressure inhibits.	NSTS 07700 X Para 3.2.1.1.9.1
037	DESIGN LRB STAGING CONDITIONS (MODIFIED) TheLRB separation subsystem shall be designed to provide a safe separation for staging conditions which compose any combinations of values, within the separation limits, of these parameters: a) Roll rate between plus or minus 5 degrees/sec b) Pitch rate between plus or minus 2 degrees/sec c) Yaw rate between plus or minus 2 degrees/sec d) Dynamic pressure less than or equal to (TBD) psf e) Pitch and sideslip angles plus or minus 15 degrees	NSTS 07700 X Para 3.2.1.1.9.1
034	SEPARATION TORQUE (MODIFIED) Any component disconnect or breakwire at release shall not induce an impulse torque in excess of (TBD) ft-lb-sec about theLRB center of gravity at separation.	NSTS 07700 X Para 3.2.1.1.9.1

# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION


## Derived Requirements

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>REQUIREMENT STATEMENT</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
075	The LRBs shall use Solid Rocket Motors For Separation	Vehicle	Trade 1.16

298



# 1.16 SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION TRADE STUDY (REFERENCE INFORMATION)




DELTA

• SRM BURNOUT  
WT = 2,360 lbs

• SEP SYSTEM WT =

• TYPE = PNEUMATIC THRUSTER

• TOTAL  
IMPULSE =




TITAN

• SRM BURNOUT  
WT = 89,910 LBS

• SEP SYSTEM WT = 1,238 lbs

• TYPE = STAGGING ROCKETS

• TOTAL VAC  
IMPULSE = 113,600 LB-SEC  
(8 MOTORS)




SHUTTLE

• SRB BURNOUT  
WT = 192,118 LBS

• SEP SYSTEM WT = 1,343 lbs


• TYPE = BSMS

• TOTAL VAC  
IMPULSE = 118,080 LB-SEC  
(8 MOTORS)



SRB FORWARD BOOSTER  
SEPARATION MOTORS

SRB AFT BOOSTER  
SEPARATION MOTORS



## 1.16 SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION TRADE STUDY Planning Sheet 5

### INPUTS:


- CONTINGENCY ABORT STAGING CONDITIONS (RESULTS FROM ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION TRADE STUDY 1.3)
- BOOSTER MASS PROPERTIES & GEOMETRIC DEFINITION
- TRAJECTORY SIMULATION AND PROPULSION DATA
- BOOSTER AERODYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS

### OUTPUTS:

- SCALING RELATIONSHIPS (COST & WEIGHT) FOR SEPARATION SYSTEM
- PRELIMINARY SEPARATION SYSTEM DEFINITION AND SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
- PRELIMINARY SEPARATION AVIONICS REQUIREMENTS


### OTHER TRADES AFFECTED:

- TRADE 1.3, ABORT MODE OPTIMIZATION (MAY AFFECT CONCLUSIONS)
- TRADE 2.2, MANUAL OVERRIDE OPTIONS
- TRADE 2.3, AVIONICS - LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY
- TRADE 2.4, DEGREE OF AUTOMATION



## 1.16 SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION TRADE STUDY - OVERALL PLAN

# 1.16 SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION - TASK TIME LINE (MODIFIED)



\* WEIGHT ESTIMATE DERIVED FOR BSMs ONLY

\*\* ONLY ONE OPTION REMAINS (SOLID ROCKET MOTORS)


# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## Issues

- Earliest Time Desired To Have Separation Capability
  - Normal Separation
  - Earliest Press To RTLS
  - Earliest Downrange (Ocean Ditch) Contingency Abort
  - Warning Times (Detection+Evaluation) For Abort Cases
- Separation Forces
  - Large Dynamic Pressures At Separation
  - Booster Weight at Separation Large For Abort Cases
  - LRBs Develop Greater Aerodynamic Forces
- Vehicle Control During Separation
  - Alpha, Beta, Flight Path Angles May Be Different than SRB's
  - Thrust Mismatch During Shutdown
  - Propellant SLOSH Motions
  - Orbiter Engine Out Considerations
- Separation Cue And Sequence
  - State Vector; Fuel Level; Time; On Command (Or Combinations Of These)
  - Incorporating Abort Considerations In Separation Sequence
- Separation Method
  - NSTS BSMs Baseline, But Considering Other Methods
  - Must Provide Acceptable Clearances And Minimal Impingement On Orbiter/ET
- LRB Disposal
  - Range Safety Concerns/Impact Footprint

# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## Abort Considerations - Orbiter Failures




• For Orbiter Failures With LRBs Fully Operational, Contingency Abort Preferred Would Be A 'loft Return' With 'Fast Separation' From ET And LRBs

- LRB Separation Followed By ET Disposal May Be Substituted For The 'Fast Separation'
- Further Analysis Of Abort Trajectories Required To Establish Separation Conditions

# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## Abort Considerations - LRB Failures




- Early Separation Capability Desired To Have 'Press-To-RTLS' Capability
- LRB Separation Improves Survivability Of Downrange Abort (Ocean Ditch) Following Critical LRB Failure
  - Separation Of LRBs Rather Than Fast Separation From ET And LRBs Will Allow More Controlled, Predictable Glide And Descent For Crew Escape



# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## Abort Considerations - Response Time



• Time-Criticality Of Failure Is An Issue:

- Time To Separate Should Be Minimized To Reduce Number Of Failures For Which There Is Insufficient Time To Effect Stage Separation
- Assessment Of Warning Times And Thrust Decay Characteristics Required

# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## Design Criteria


Condition	Normal	Approx. Earliest Press To RTLS	Approx. Earliest Crew Escape
Time (sec)	119	100	75
Altitude (Ft)	132,250	91,420	49,850
Mach	4.5	3.35	2.0
Dynamic Pressure (Psi)	81	273	671
LRB Weight (LBs)	113,400	198,900	311,435

Data For LRB SSME-35 Option 5J (Dec. IPR Version)

- Hardware Design Criteria Will Be Driven By Abort Staging Conditions

# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEMS SELECTION

## Aero Data Comparison



### • AERODYNAMIC FORCES GREATER FOR LRB'S THAN FOR SRB'S


#### - SEPARATION CONDITIONS COMPARED:

	5J LRB (NOMINAL)	SRB (TYPICAL)
Altitude:	132,250 ft	154,000 ft
Mach Number:	4.5	4.5
Max Alpha at Staging	(TBD)	$\pm 15^\circ$

#### - SHUTTLE REFERENCE DIMENSIONS USED: Area = 2690 ft<sup>2</sup>, Length = 107.525 ft

# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEMS SELECTION

## Aero Force Data Comparison for Nominal Separation




# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## Control Considerations

- Currently, SRB Thrust Mismatch During Tailoff Can Saturate Orbiter Control Authority
- Control Authority During LRB Separation For Options 5J (Mid Term Review Version) And 1B Were Examined
  - 95% "Kennedy" Crosswinds
  - 300,000 Lbf Thrust Decay Differential Between LRBs For Both Options
  - Orbiter SSME's Providing TVC With Deflection Limits Of 11 Degrees, And Rate Limits Of 10 Deg/Sec
  - Nominal, Earliest RTLS, & Earliest Crew Escape Cases Examined For Both Cases
- Orbiter Control Authority Should Be Sufficient (But Further Analysis Req'd)
- Configuration 5J Is Not Controllable With LRB Separation Prior To 100 Seconds (Refer To The Next Two Sheets For Orbiter TVC Deflections And Rates Charts)

# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## Control Considerations Con't






# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## Control Considerations Con't

### • Results For Approximate Earliest Crew Escape Abort

- Time = 92 Sec.
- Max Pitch Gimbal Angle = -8.7 Deg (SSME Max =  $\pm 11$  Deg)
- Max Yaw Gimbal Rate = 10.0 Deg/Sec (SSME Max =  $\pm 10$  Deg/Sec)

LRB SJ DECO DELTA THRUST (SSME DERIVED BOOSTER ENGINES)  
(Root Sum Squared (RSS) Value for All 8 Engines)




# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## Separation Cue And Sequence

- SRB Separation Cued On SRB Chamber Pressure Decay (Initiated at  $P_c = 50$  PSIA)
- LRB Separation 'Cue' Determination Still In Work; Preliminary Investigation Indicates 'Cue' To Be Based Upon 'Low Fuel Level Sensor'
  - Assures Engines Will Not Be Run Dry
  - Will Require That LRBs Designed With Flight Performance Reserves (FPRs) To Meet Desired State Vector (Velocity And Position) Under Worst Case Scenarios, Or That Orbiter Second Stage Burn Makes-up Any Shortage In First Stage Performance

### Preliminary LRB Separation Sequence






# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## System Weight Trend

OPTION: Current NSTS BSMs			
AVERAGE THRUST PER BSM: 18,500 Lbf (min) (30-100 °F)			
TOTAL IMPULSE PER BSM: 15,000 Lbf-Sec (30-100 °F)			
ORIENTATION: Same Angles And Mounting Scheme As SRBs*			
TOTAL BSMS REQ'D FOR SAFE SEPARATION			
NOMINAL (118 SEC)	FWD: 4+Margin=6	AFT: 4+Margin=6	
RTLS (~100 SEC)	FWD: 6+Margin=9	AFT: 6+Margin=9	
CREW ESCAPE (~75 SEC)	FWD: 11+Margin=17	AFT: 6+Margin=9	


\* To Be Optimized



### NOTES:


- NASA Program SVDS Used To Evaluate Separation Dynamics & Clearances
- Nominal SRB Aerodynamic Interference Effects Used
- Free Stream LRB Element Aero Predicted With The Program: "USAF AUTOMATED MISSILE DATCOM" REV 11/85"
- LO2/LH2 SSME-35 LRB Option (December IPR Version) Used
- 5 Deg/Sec Roll Rate, 2 Deg/Sec Pitch Rate, And 2 Deg/Sec Yaw Rate Evaluated
- Alpha = +10 Degrees, And Beta = +10 Degrees Evaluated
- Weight Scaling Based On Number Of BSMSs Req'd
- Number Of BSMSs Req'd Multiplied By 1.5 As A Margin For Uncertainties
- All Orbiter SSMEs running

LHB SEPARATION 5J NOMINAL  $T=110^\circ \text{C}$   
 4F,4A BSM  $\alpha=\beta=0$  P,Q,R=0,0,0. SEP C...




ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY


LINE DIRECTION 3J NOMINAL I=119 SEC  
4F,4ABSM  $\alpha=\beta=0$  P,Q,R=0,0,0. SEP OK



LRB SEPARATION 5J NOMINA T=119 SEC  
 4F,4A BSM  $\alpha=\beta=0$  P,Q,R=0,0,0. SEP OK




4F,4A BSM  $\alpha=\beta=10$  P,Q,R=5,2,2. SEP OK




ORIGINAL PAGE IS  
OF POOR QUALITY

LHB SEPARATION 5J NOMINAL 1.119 SEC  
4F,4A BSM  $\alpha=\beta=10$  P,Q,R=5,2,2. EPOK



LHB SEPARATION 5J NOMINAL T=119 SEC  
 4F,4A BSM  $\alpha=\beta=10$  P,Q,R=5,2,2. SEP OK



# TRADE 1.16: SEPARATION SELECTION SELECTION




## Option Evaluation Summary

EVALUATION CRITERIA									
OPTION		SAFETY	RELIABILITY	STS INTEGRATION	PERFORMANCE (SYSTEM WT.)	COST	PROGRAM RISK	IMPINGEMENT ON ORBITER	GROWTH
1.1 A	NSTS BSMs	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	0
1.1 B	New Solid BSMs	+	+	+	Optimize For LRBs	0	+	-	0
1.2.1	Motors using LRB Tank Propellants	0	-	0	-	-	-	+	+
1.2.2 A	Motors using Hypergolics	-	0	0	-	-	-	+	+
1.2.2 B	New Liquid BSMs	0	0	+	+	0	+	+	0
2.1	Spring Thrusters	+	0	ET Mods	-	0	0	+	0
2.2	Pneumatic Thrusters	+	-	ET Mods	-	0	0	+	0
3.0	Pressure Bleed From He Tank	+	0	0	0	0	-	+	+

- ORIGINAL ROCKWELL TRADE STUDY IN 1973 RE-EXAMINED
  - CURSORY EXAMINATION OF OPTIONS INDICATES BSMs PREFERRED
- NOTE: KINEMATIC SYSTEMS NOT INVESTIGATED DUE TO ET MODS REQ'D



# SOLID ROCKET MOTOR SEPARATION OPTION



# Option Evaluation Sheet

Option 1.1 (A): Separation Motors - Solid Propellant (Existing NSTS BSM's)

## Description:

### Total required for safe separation:

Normal: (TBD)      RTLS: (TBD)      Down Range Abort: (TBD)  
Location: Forward Frustrum & Aft Skirt  
Orientation: Current BSM orientation (To Be Optimized)  
Thrust: 21,680 Lb (vac) per BSM  
Total Impulse: 14,760 Lb-sec per BSM  
System Weight\*: 168 Lb per BSM  
System Costs\*:

DDT&E: (Shuttle Ref 11.7 \$M)      Recurring: ??

## Qualitative Evaluation:

### PRO:

- Least complex of options considered
- Highly reliable
- Flight qualified for STS, low cost and risk
- Fast response time
- Can be resized or additional BSMs added for higher thrust requirements and for redundancy considerations
- Simple, minimal Avionics/Commands; no active control

### CON:

- Exhaust plume possibly detrimental to the Orbiter TPS

\* For Normal Separation

# Option Evaluation Sheet

Option 1.1 (B): Separation Motors - Solid Propellant (New; LRB-Optimized)

## Description:

### Total required for safe separation:

Normal: (TBD)	RTLS: (TBD)	Down Range Abort: (TBD)
Location: Forward Frustum & Aft Skirt		
Orientation: Current BSM orientation (To Be Optimized)		
Thrust: (TBD) per BSM		
Total Impulse: (TBD) per BSM		
System Weight*: (TBD) per BSM		
System Costs*:		
DDT&E: Shuttle Ref. \$11.7 M		Recurring: (TBD)

## Qualitative Evaluation:


### PRO:

- Can be optimized for LRB requirements
- Simple - Based on NSTS BSM's
- Simple, minimal avionics/commands; no active control
- Low cost and risk
- Fast response time
- Possibility of eliminating aluminum content of exhaust (new propellant)

### CON:

- Exhaust plume possibly detrimental to the Orbiter TPS
- Need qualification, greater cost to develop than BSM's
- For Normal Separation

Technical drawing of a mechanical part, likely a valve or actuator component. The drawing includes a side view and a cross-sectional view. The side view shows a cylindrical body with a flange and a handle. The cross-sectional view shows the internal structure, including a central shaft and a valve seat. Dimensions are indicated: 20° for the handle angle, 40° for the flange angle, and 20° for the internal angle. A callout circle contains the text "X LRB 2437".



# Option Evaluation Sheet

## Option 1.2.1: Separation Motors - Liquid Propellants (Drawn From LRB Tanks)

### Description:

Location: Forward Frustum & Aft Skirt (To Be Optimized)

Orientation: Current BSM orientation (To Be Optimized)

Thrust: (TBD - Expected to be 10-50 KLb) per BSM

Total Impulse: (TBD) per BSM

System Weight\*: (TBD) per BSM

System Costs\*:

DDT&E: (TBD)

Recurring: (TBD)

NOTE: Propellants would need to be drawn from main propellant feedlines at aft end of tanks to avoid vapor pull-through

### Qualitative Evaluation:

#### PRO:


- Can vary burn time and thrust
- Possible reusability
- Less Orbiter TPS damage concern because plume has lower temperature and no solid particulates

\* For Normal Separation  
1 ~ 1 Evaluation Con't

**CON:**

- Separation system intimately linked to main propulsion system; i.e.; main system failure jeopardizes separation capability
- Complex system imposes high cost, technical and schedule risk, hardware/software complexity and lower system reliability
- LO2/LH2 or LO2/RP-1 engines are large, requiring complex operations (purge, chilldown, etc.)
- Longer thrust rise time compared to solid motors
- Engines, presumably pressure-fed, would require DDT&E because such engines are not currently available
- Large system weight due to numerous pumps, valves, lines and power source needed to run the pumps
- Active control of fluid systems required. Active monitoring needs to be integrated with flight system. Avionics requirements estimated to be 10-15 times as great as NSTS BSMs

# LIQUID ROCKET MOTOR SEPARATION OPTION



## Option Evaluation Sheet

Option 1.2.2 (A) : Separation Motors - Liquid Propellants (Stored Elsewhere)

### Description:

Location: Forward Frustrum & Aft Skirt (To Be Optimized)

Orientation: Current BSM orientation (To Be Optimized)

Thrust: (TBD) - Expected to be 10-50 Klb) per BSM

Total Impulse: (TBD) per BSM

System Weight\*: (TBD) per BSM

System Costs\*:

DDT&E: (TBD)

Recurring: (TBD)

### Qualitative Evaluation:

#### PRO:

- Can vary burn time and thrust
- Possible reusability
- Less Orbiter TPS damage concern because plume has lower temperature and no solid particulates
- Hypergolic pressure-fed engines in the 10-20 Klb range have been tested by TRW
- Time from ignition to maximum thrust for the hydrazine fueled motor can be very short

- For Normal Separation




### 1.2.2 (A) Evaluation Con't

#### CON:

- Propellants likely to be hydrazine or hypergols with their associated safety hazards (explosiveness in air, toxicity)
- Separate propellant bottles at high pressure would be required for the forward and aft motors, although they may be built-in with engine as a single module
- The whole separation system would need to be developed, tested and qualified
- Increased weight over NSTS BSM system due to additional tankage, valves and lines
- System volume requirement larger than BSM's

# LIQUID ROCKET MOTOR SEPARATION OPTION (INTEGRAL PROPELLANTS)



# Option Evaluation Sheet

Option 1.2.2 (B) : Separation Motors - Liquid Propellants (Integrated Propellants) - Note: Rockwell concept shown

## Description:

### Total required for safe separation:

Normal: (TBD)      RTLS: (TBD)      Down Range Abort: (TBD)

Location: Forward Frustrum & Aft Skirt (To Be Optimized)

Orientation: Current BSM orientation (To Be Optimized)

Thrust: (TBD - Expected to be 10-50 KLb) per BSM

Total Impulse: (TBD) per BSM

System Weight\*: (TBD) per BSM

System Costs\*:

DDT&E: (TBD)

Recurring: (TBD)

## Qualitative Evaluation:

### PRO:

- Can be designed in compact propulsion modules
- Can be optimized for LRB requirements
- Less Orbiter TPS damage concern because plume has lower temperature and no solid particulates
- Can vary burn time and thrust



### CON:

- Propellant safety issues
- Complex design requiring larger DDT&E than BSM's
- Larger overall system weight than NSTS BSM's (~50% greater than BSM's for same thrust level)
- May require monitoring of propellants

Normal Separation

# SEPARATION OPTIONS

## MECHANICAL SEPARATION SYSTEM (FWD & AFT SPRING THRUSTERS)



## Option Evaluation Sheet

### Option 2.1 (A) : Spring Thrusters (FWD Spring Thruster Located in Intertank)

#### Description:

Location: FWD in intertank, AFT at LRB attachment ring

Orientation: To be optimized

Force: (TBD - Expected to be 100 - 200 K(lb)

Stroke: (TBD - Expected to be 2 - 10 Ft)

Action Time: (TBD - Expected to be .2 - 1 sec)

System Weight\*: (TBD - Approx 2,000 Lbs)

System Costs\*:

DDT&E: (TBD)

Recurring: (TBD)

#### Qualitative Evaluation:

##### PRO:

- Eliminates plume damage to Orbiter
- Simple, minimal avionics/control commands; no active control
- Fast response time

##### CON:

- Modifications to ET required: reinforce intertank center ring frame, modify forward stringers, add additional attachment fittings, strengthen LH2 tank major ring frame (total ET mods ~ 700 Lbs)\*\*

\* For Normal Separation


\*\* kwell Estimate

## 2.1 Evaluation Con't

- Additional structure required on LRB: large intertank ring frame, additional intertank skin and stringer structure
- Large total system weight due to additional structure (on LRB & ET)
- Costs will be prohibitive if requalification of entire ET is required
- Redundancy requirements may dictate use of dual separation thrusters

# SEPARATION OPTIONS

## MECHANICAL SEPARATION SYSTEM (FWD & AFT SPRING THRUSTERS)



## Option Evaluation Sheet

### Option 2.1 (B) : Spring Thrusters (FWD Spring Thruster Located on LO2 tank)

#### Description:

Location: FWD on LO2 tank, AFT at LRB attachment ring

Orientation: To be optimized

Force: (TBD - Expected to be 100 - 200 Klb)

Stroke: (TBD - Expected to be 2 - 10 Ft)

Action Time: (TBD - Expected to be .2 - 1 sec)

System Weight\*: (TBD - Approx 2,000 Lbs)

System Costs\*:

DDT&E: (TBD)

Recurring: (TBD)

Note: If the LBR FWD attachment is not in the intertank, then two forward separation thrusters are required

#### Qualitative Evaluation:

##### PRO:

- Eliminates plume damage to Orbiter
- Simple, minimal avionics/control commands; no active control
- Fast response time

##### CON:

- Modifications to ET required: reinforce intertank center ring frame, modify forward stringers, add additional attachment fittings, strengthen aft LH2 tank major ring frame (total ET mods ~ 700 Lbs)\*\*

\* For Normal Separation

\*\*Rockwell Estimate





## 2.1 Evaluation Con't

- Additional structure required on LRB: external ring frame, additional tank stringer structure
- Large total system weight due to addition
- Costs will be prohibitive if requalification of entire ET is required
- Redundancy requirements may dictate use of dual separation thrusters

# SEPARATION OPTIONS

## MECHANICAL SEPARATION SYSTEM (FWD & AFT PNEUMATIC PISTONS)



## Option Evaluation Sheet

Option 2.2 (A) : Pneumatic (GHe or GN2) Pistons (FWD piston Located in Intertank)

### Description:

Location: FWD in intertank, AFT at LRB attachment ring  
Orientation: To be optimized  
Force: (TBD - Expected to be 100 - 200 Klb)  
Stroke: (TBD - Expected to be 2 - 10 Ft)  
Action Time: (TBD - Expected to be .2 - 1 sec)  
System Weight\*: (TBD - Approx 2,000 Lbs)  
System Costs\*:  
DDT&E: (TBD)                      Recurring: (TBD)

### Qualitative Evaluation:

#### PRO:

- Eliminates plume damage to Orbiter
- Simple, minimal avionics/control commands; no active control
- Fast response time

#### CON:

- Modifications to ET required: reinforce intertank center ring frame, modify forward stringers, add additional attachment fittings, strengthen LH2 tank major ring frame (total ET mods ~ 700 Lbs)\*\*


- Normal Separation  
ckwell Estimate

## 2.2 Evaluation Con't

- Additional structure required on LRB: large intertank ring frame, additional intertank skin and stringer structure
- Large total system weight due to additional structure (on LRB & ET)
- Costs will be prohibitive if requalification of entire ET is required
- Redundancy requirements may dictate use of dual separation pistons
- Lower reliability than spring thruster due to additional high pressure seals required

# SEPARATION OPTIONS

## MECHANICAL SEPARATION SYSTEM (FWD & AFT PNEUMATIC PISTONS)



## Option Evaluation Sheet

Option 2.2 (B): Pneumatic (GHe or GN2) Pistons (FWD Piston Located on LO2 tank)

### Description:

Location: FWD on LO2 tank, AFT at LRB attachment ring

Orientation: To be optimized

Force: (TBD - Expected to be 100 - 200 Klb)

Stroke: (TBD - Expected to be 2 - 10 Ft)

Action Time: (TBD - Expected to be .2 - 1 sec)

System Weight\*: (TBD - Approx 2,000 Lbs)

System Costs\*:

DDT&E: (TBD)

Recurring: (TBD)

Note: If the LBR FWD attachment is not in the intertank, then two forward separation pistons are required

### Qualitative Evaluation:

#### PRO:

- Eliminates plume damage to Orbiter
- Simple, minimal avionics/control commands; no active control
- Fast response time

#### CON:

- Modifications to ET required: reinforce intertank center ring frame, modify forward stringers, add additional attachment fittings, strengthen aft LH2 tank major ring frame (total ET mods ~ 700 Lbs)\*\*


\* For Normal Separation

\*\*Rockwell Estimate

## 2.2 (B) Evaluation Con't

- Additional structure required on LRB: external ring frame, additional tank stringer structure
- Large total system weight due to additional structure (LRB & ET)
- Costs will be prohibitive if requalification of entire ET is required
- Redundancy requirements may dictate use of dual separation pistons
- Lower reliability than spring thrusters due to additional high pressure seals

# TANK BLOWDOWN OPTION (For Pressure-fed Boosters)





# Option Evaluation Sheet

**Option 3.0 : Tank Blowdown (Helium Bleed to provide impulse) - Note: this separation system would be considered for a pressure-fed LRB only.**

## Description:

**Location:** Forward Frustrum & Aft Skirt (To Be Optimized)

**Orientation:** Current BSM orientation (To Be Optimized)

**Thrust:** (TBD - Expected to be 10-50 KLb) per nozzle

**Total Impulse:** (TBD) per nozzle

**System Weight\*:** (TBD)

**System Costs\*:**

**DDT&E:** (TBD)

**Recurring:** (TBD)

## Qualitative Evaluation:

### PRO:

- Moderately simple: No combustion required, but control valves and sensors needed
- Can vary thrust & durations
- Possible reusability
- Eliminates plume damage to Orbiter
- Pressure in He tank(s) will be greater for abort (early) separation
- Fast response time

### CON:

- Serious concerns about feasibility to generate enough thrust/impulse
- Separation system intimately linked to main propulsion system; i.e.; He tank failure jeopardizes separation capability
- Heavier than NSTS BSM's
- Active control required and timing of operations may be critical

- Normal Separation

## Option Evaluation Sheet

Option 3.0 : Tank Blowdown (Helium Bleed to provide impulse) - Note: this separation system would be considered for a pressure-fed LRB only.

### Description:

Location: Forward Frustrum & Aft Skirt (To Be Optimized)

Orientation: Current BSM orientation (To Be Optimized)

Thrust: (TBD) - Expected to be 10-50 KLb per nozzle

Total Impulse: (TBD) per nozzle

System Weight\*: (TBD)

System Costs\*:

DDT&E: (TBD)

Recurring: (TBD)

### Qualitative Evaluation:

#### PRO:

- Moderately simple: No combustion required, but control valves and sensors needed
- Can vary thrust & durations
- Possible reusability
- Eliminate plume damage to Orbiter
- Pressure in He tank(s) will be greater for abort (early) separation
- Fast response time


#### CON:


- Serious concerns about feasibility to generate enough thrust/*IMPULSE*
- Separation system intimately linked to main propulsion system; i.e.; He tank failure jeopardizes separation capability
- Heavier than NSTS BSM's
- Active control required and timing of operations may be critical
- For Normal Separation

# TRADE STUDY 1.16 - SEPARATION SYSTEM SELECTION

## LRB Disposal After Separation

- Disposal Of LRBs Will Be An Important Issue If They Are To Be Recovered
- Impact Footprint Of Debris After Near Pad ( < 10 Miles Downrange)  
LRB Separation And Commanded Booster Debris Must Be Analyzed





Date: March 1, 1988 GDSS-LRB-MIN-88-027

To: Distribution

From: Dan Heald

Subject: Minutes of an LRB Interim Engineering Review Board (ERB) for Separation System Selection (T.S. 1.16) conducted 26 February 1988.

Attachment: Trade Study ERB Viewgraph Charts

Purpose: This was an interim ERB for this Trade Study and was held to present the current results to provide information and obtain concurrence or redirections on this trade before the final review.

Discussion: ERB members present: Dan Heald - Chairman, Paul Brennan, Steve Seus, Ed Russ, Ron Koontz, Peter Stubner, Frank Hauser, Tina Nguyen, Scott Stumpf, Don Schnattschnieder, Guy Buchanan, and Carol Pouliot.

Paul Brennan, the Trade Study Leader, presented the preliminary results of the trade using the attached charts. Paul presented the key considerations for abort, including orbiter failures, LRB failures and response times. In reference to the Aero Data Comparison chart, it was suggested that the subtitle read "Aero Data Comparison for Nominal Separation." Paul Brennan received an action item to convert the coefficients to forces on the graphs of this page.

On the chart of Control Considerations, it was decided that the Maximum Pitch Gimbal and the Maximum Yaw Gimbal values were reasonable, but that for a conservative estimate one should analyze a flex body. It was suggested that Paul show nominal separation vs. early separation and that the method for doing the statistical correlation (root sum square) for determining the shut down thrust differential be added to the chart.


The Separation Cue and Sequence chart indicates that the cue will be based on a "low fuel level sensor." This should be discussed with Eagle Engineering. The question remains as to what will control separation for aborts: vehicle, ground control, or crew.

In discussing the preliminary sizing results, it was determined that early separation has a weight penalty of only about 2300 lbs. compared to normal separation. Need to discuss benefits of early separation with Walter Thompson. Range safety issues must be investigated. Action item for Paul Brennan to locate newest safety document.

Conclusion was to stop further work until Walter Thompson, et al, can establish the early LRB separation design conditions.

Prepared By: Carol J. Pouliot  
Systems Engineering

Approved By:

  
D.A. Heald  
Chief Engineer - LRB

**TRADE STUDY 1.17**  
**LRB STIFFNESS, STRENGTH, LOADS**

**Contents:**

**1.0 Introduction**

**2.0 GSE Interface - ET Umbilical**

**3.0 Stiffness Requirement**

**4.0 Stiffness vs Strength- Monocoque**

**4.1 Options for Reducing ET Umbilical Deflections**

**5.0 Strength designed LRBs, SRB, FWC SRB and ASRM stiffness**

**6.0 On pad Response of Strength Designed LRBs**

**6.1 LO2/LH2 Pump fed LRB**

**6.2 LO2/RP1 Pump Fed LRB**

**6.3 LO2/RP1 Pressure Fed LRB**

**7.0 Maximum T/W Ratio for LO2/LH2 LRB Configurations  
At Release**

**8.0 Conclusions**

## 1.0 Introduction

Prior to holddown release the space shuttle engines are ignited sequentially and health monitored. The SSMEs rise to full thrust level in approximately 4 seconds and during this period the whole stack, due to asymmetry of configuration and eccentric SSME thrust load paths, is pushed over laterally responding dynamically with high lateral displacements and base bending moments while the space shuttle is still attached to the ground support equipment (GSE) and MLP. There are limits to which the ground support equipment can track the lateral excursions and the holddown system can sustain the base loads. From the studies performed with candidate LRBs, an LRB 16 ft or less in diameter, designed purely on the basis of strength, responds dynamically to the SSME thrust buildup with greater amplitudes of displacements and loads. The options for the flexible LRBs are either to simply increase the stiffness which results in additional weight, or to decrease the SSME thrust rise rate which is accomplished by staggering the ignition of SSME engines. In this study the impact of SSME ignition staggering was studied in detail for LRB configurations for load and deflection relief.

The launch sequence with LRBs is considered to be very similar and qualitatively result in similar response. There are however some differences between LRB liftoff and SRB liftoff. LRBs have more engines which require health monitoring, similar to SSME engines, before holddown release. As a result LRBs will be held on pad with T/W ratio considerably higher than SRBs before holddown bolts are released. Whether or not a slow release system is required depends upon the T/W ratio of stack at the time of release. Included in this trade study is the determination of maximum T/W ratio, for LO<sub>2</sub>/LH<sub>2</sub> pump LRB configuration, at which the explosive bolt release system could be used.

**Objective:**

Establish the structural stiffness requirements for LO2/LH2 Pump, LO2/RP1 pump and LO2/RP1 pressure fed Boosters. Determine minimum Stiffness that does not impact the current Ground support equipment and the SSME ignition sequence. Determine Loads and perform a preliminary design. Determine the maximum T/W ratio with the current explosive bolt release system.

**Ground Rules:**

- Maintain the current ignition sequence for SSME engines
- Maintain current load levels at the attach points
- Maintain twang level similar to current STS

**Assumptions:**

- Nominal Thrust Buildup Sequence
- Booster Stiffness Primarily dominated by the Tank stiffness

**Guidelines:**

- Minimum Impact to ET and Orbiter
- Minimum Impact to the GSE
- Minimize Release loads

## **2.0 GSE Interface - ET Umbilical**

ET umbilical follows the STS stack deflections during pushover (SSME thrust buildup) and is the primary interface area of concern between the Space Shuttle Vehicle and the GSE (Ground Support Equipment). The objective in this study is to predict the deflections of the ET umbilical and establish the minimum booster stiffness required to maintain the umbilical excursions to within the current ICD limits imposed on the current GSE . The ET umbilical is currently designed to track approximately 20 inches during SSME thrust buildup and 17 inches during the rebound (Shutdown).

## **3.0 Stiffness Requirement**

The space shuttle is an asymmetric launch vehicle. During liftoff it subjected to a large lateral component of SSME thrust causing high lateral excursions of the stack on pad prior to release. The magnitude of SSME thrust and its very sharp rise rate are both responsible for large amplitude of lateral displacements and bending loads in the LRBs. The LRB structure ,therefore, should satisfy two requirements; first that excursions of the STS stack remain within the current GSE tracking limits and secondly that the base bending moment at the release time does not exceed the current levels. Both these requirements are influenced by the SSME thrust rise rate and the stiffness of the LRB structure.



### 3.1 Stiffness vs Strength- Monocoque


For LH2/LO2 boosters less than 16.5 ft diameter (approx.) the stiffness criterion governs the design and strength is automatically achieved. Lower diameter boosters designed for stiffness pay penalty in structural weight. This penalty is gradually reduced as the diameter is increased. Beyond 16.5 ft diameter the booster structure can be designed for strength. Figure 3.1-1 schematically illustrates stiffness and strength boundaries for various LRB diameters.

Monocoque tanks are designed to withstand loads up to onset of buckling of the cylindrical section.

Isogrid tanks are designed very similar to monocoque tanks- up to buckling load of the tank.

Skin Stringer tanks are designed to withstand applied loads until the buckling load of the stringer is reached. The skin between the stringers is allowed to buckle.

Figure 3.1-1 Stiffness vs Strength - Monocoque



#### 4.0 Options for Reducing ET Umbilical Deflections

There are two options to reduce the dynamic excursions of the stack:


- Stagger the ignition of SSME engines
- Stiffen the structure

The dynamic amplitude of lateral excursions are a function of the ratio of the period of the structure and the thrust rise time of SSME engines. To maintain deflections within ICD limits, this ratio is maintained either by increasing the thrust rise time of SSME engines (staggering the start of SSME engines) or by stiffening the structure (reducing the period, increase frequency). Figure 4.1-1 shows the dynamic amplification factor against this ratio. The higher the ratio of periods, the lower the dynamic amplification factor and lower the amplitude of dynamic response.

LRB structure designed for strength and using SSME stagger to limit deflections are lighter in overall weight but impact the orbiter on board software. The bending loads at release are lower side and the twang is mild.

LRB structure designed for stiffness weigh more and may exceed the current base bending moment at the release. The twang may be more than current STS.


Figure 4.1-1 Dynamic Amplification of LRB response to SSME Thrust Rise



#### 4.1 Option -1 Stagger SSME ignition sequence

The option to stagger the SSME ignition sequence is beneficial in reducing the maximum loads during pushover but delays the liftoff and also causes higher base bending moment at liftoff. Figure 4.1-2 schematically illustrates the consequences of staggering the ignition of SSME 2 and 3 engines. There is a trade-off between the maximum bending moment (or deflections), the bending moment at release, and the time to liftoff. The SSME fuel consumption may not be much affected as late ignition of SSME 2 and SSME 3 is compensated by the longer liftoff times. This option is, therefore, attractive if weight saving is very important. This is the case with lower diameter boosters which will require considerable increase in wall thickness to meet the stiffness requirements.

Figure 4.1-2 Influence of SSME Ignition Stagger on Loads



#### BENIFITS


- Lower stresses in aft skirt better margin for safety
- lower ET umbilical excursions
- Lower structural weight

#### IMPACTS

- Change in GPC software only

#### 4.1.2 Optimal SSME Ignition Stagger

The optimal SSME ignition stagger is approximately equal to half the first fundamental period of the stack. If the start of SSME 2 and 3 engines is staggered by more than half the period then the displacement decreases in the first cycle of the displacement oscillation but builds up in the subsequent oscillations. Figure 4.1-3 illustrates the LO2/RP1 pump fed LRB response to stagger times of 1 seconds, 2 seconds, and 4 seconds and shows that for 2 seconds stagger, which is about half the period of the stack, the response is stabilized to a harmonic with lowest amplitude after 7 seconds. Normal liftoff takes place during first cycle of oscillation but FRF, which is a 20 second event, several oscillation cycles. The stagger values higher than half the stack period are ineffective in limiting deflections during FRF and therefore are not recommended. The optimal stagger for RP1/LO2 booster is 2 seconds, at other values the deflections are higher during FRF.




## 4.2 Option -2 Stiffen LRB Structure

### Weight Impact

A monocoque construction with a first fundamental frequency of .2 Hz is 42000 lbs lighter than a monocoque construction (of same diameter) of the fundamental frequency of .3 Hz. This holds for LH2/LO2 pump fed booster approximately 15.8 ft diameter. Similar trends hold for other LRBs. Figure 4.2-1 Illustrates the impact of increasing the first fundamental frequency by maintaining the same diameter but increasing the wall thickness of the propellant and oxidizer tanks.

Figure 4.2-1 LH2 tank structural weight with first fundamental LRB frequency



## **5.0 Strength designed LRBs, SRB, FWC SRB and ASRM stiffness**

The FWC motor case SRB which was to fly from Vandenberg Air Force Base had natural frequency of approximately .24 Hz. This booster was flight certified and was about to fly its intended mission. The deflection of ET umbilical is approximately 32 inches which exceeds the current specified ICD limit of 20 inches during buildup and 17 inches during rebound. ET umbilical modifications were performed to accommodate these deflections.

The ASRM (Advanced Solid Rocket Motor) request for proposal to the industry specifies ,in very specific terms , the minimum stiffness requirements for the new rocket motor case. The ASRM motor case stiffness is allowed to equal approximately to that of FWC motor case SRB. When ASRM is operational, the booster will weigh less, can be less stiff compared to current SRB, and consequently deflect more than current SRB.

The deflections of the strength designed LRBs and the current SRB are shown in the table 5.1-1. The LO2/RP1 pump fed booster is most flexible and deflects most. The LO2/RP1 pressure fed is most stiff and deflects less than SRB.

Extrapolation of our analyses results and the data on the current and previously designed boosters suggests a minimum frequency of .24 hz .At this stiffness level,the LRBs remain within the deflection envelope of Ground Support Equipment with the current liftoff sequence.

Table 5.1-1 ET Umbilical Deflections for Strength Designed LRBs and the SRB

	SRB	RP1/LO2 PUMP	LH2/LO2 PUMP DIA DIA 16.25 18.0FT		RP1/LO2 PRESSURE
First Natural Frequency (HZ)	.31	.21	.22	.29	.28
ET Umbilical Deflection (Inches)					
Current SSME Ignition sequence	16.0	27.0	22.0	13.0	11.0
With 2 seconds delay in SSME#2 and SSME#3 Ignition		22.0	16.0		8.0

FLIGHT QUALIFIED FILAMENT WOUND CASE SRB DEFLECTED 30 INCHES

## 6.0 On pad Response of Strength Designed LRBs

### 6.1 LO2/LH2 Pump fed LRB

Two LO2/LH2 pump fed booster concepts, a 16.25 ft diameter and a 18.0 ft diameter ,were studied for the SSME thrust buildup and shutdown transient response.


#### 6.1.1 16.25 ft Diameter LO2/LH2 pump fed booster

##### SSME Thrust Buildup

The strength designed 16.25 ft diameter LO2/LH2 pump fed booster has a frequency of .22 Hz and its maximum ET Umbilical deflection with current SSME ignition sequence is approximately 27 inches. Figure 6.1-1 illustrates the SSME thrust buildup transient with current SSME ignition sequence, with 2 seconds delay in SSME 2 and SSME 3 ignition, and the corresponding SRB response. With the current SSME ignition sequence the deflection exceeds the current ICD limit on ET umbilical tracking capability and ,therefore, either the SSME ignition stagger or stiffening of the tank structure is required to satisfy the GSE constraints. If ET umbilical tracking capabilities are modified to track 27 inches then with the current SSME ignition sequence the liftoff takes place at 7.8 seconds. The Stack stays on the pad for approximately 1.1 seconds more than the current SRB system.

The deflections during SSME buildup are brought to SRB level by staggering the SSME engines; start engine 1 first and ignite SSME 2 and 3 engines simultaneously 2 seconds later. Although the deflection is approximately same as SRB deflection, the transient stretches and consequently the time to liftoff increases from 7.8 seconds (without stagger) to 9.4 seconds.

Figure 6.1-1 ET Umbilical Deflection during SSME Thrust Buildup  
16.25 ft Diameter LO2/LH2 Pump LRB





SSME Shutdown The worst shutdown sequence for SSME 1 failure is if SSME 1 abort occurs at 16.6 seconds. Figure 6.1-2 illustrates the ET Umbilical displacement transient due to SSME 1 shutdown at 15.5, 16.6 seconds, 17.8 seconds, and 18.9 seconds. This covers engine shutdown during a time span equal to half period of the Stack. The response repeats in the interval equal to the period of the STS stack and therefore illustrates a situation during liftoff, at 4.6 seconds, 8.6 seconds, and during FRF which is a 20 second test event. For FRF the maximum response occurs when SSME 1 shutdown at 16.6 seconds. If the shutdown is due to an abort situation then, for a safe abort the SSME 2 and 3 are to be shutdown at 17.8 seconds and 18.9 seconds respectively. Figure 6.1-3 shows the combined response for this case. The maximum rebound due to this transient is 11 inches which is within the current GSE capability.

Figure 6.1-2 SSME 1 Shutdown Transient for ET Umbilical at various shutdown /abort times  
16.25 Ft Dia., LO2/LH2 pump






Figure 6.1-3 SSME Thrust Buildup and Shutdown Transient for ET Umbilical  
16.25 Ft Dia., LO2/LH2 pump



### 6.1.2 18 ft Diameter LO2/LH2 pump

The buildup and shut down transient for a normal buildup and shutdown as in FRF is shown in the figure. The maximum deflections remain within the current GSE capabilities. There is no need to stagger the SSME engines or increase the stiffness. The optimal shutdown sequence is to shutdown SSME 3 at 16.8 seconds, SSME 2 at 17.8 seconds and SSME 1 at 18.8 seconds. Figure 6.1-4 shows the SSME thrust buildup and shutdown ET umbilical deflection response for 18 ft diameter LO2/LH2 pump.

Figure 6.1-4 SSME Thrust Buildup and Shutdown Transient for ET Umbilical  
18 Ft Dia., LO2/LH2 pump




### SSME Thrust Buildup loads


The lower segment of LRB experiences the maximum load during pushover. This condition is the design condition for overall design of LH2 tank. The bending moment at the base for LO2/LH2 boosters is slightly higher than the corresponding SRB values but poses no problem as the aft structure can be designed to accommodate these loads without impacting other Space Shuttle Components.

Shown in the figure 6.1-5 are the maximum design loads along the LRB length.

Figure 6.1-5 LO2/LH2 pump design loads- SSME thrust buildup



**SSME THRUST BUILDUP  
LIMIT LOADS AT LRB STATIONS**



## LH2 Tank Design

Based upon the derived loads and noting that the booster is more stiff than necessary two designs are developed. The first is the monocoque design in which the booster maintains slightly more stiffness and the skin stringer design which has lower stiffness than the monocoque.

The skin stringer design allows for limited skin buckling between the stringer and is therefore a weight efficient design. The monocoque is designed for stress levels below the the shell buckling limits. The skin stringer configuration for LH2 tank is shown in figure 6.1-6. Also shown in the figure is the thickness for a monocoque LH2 tank.

### LH2 Tank Skin Stringer vs Monocoque

The skin stringer construction is lighter and more flexible than the monocoque. It experience higher dynamic base bending moments than the monocoque. Although its frequency is lower its deflections are maintained within the current GSE limits.


A monocoque tank is very stiff , has small on pad deflection, experiences lower dynamic base bending moment during pushover, is heavier, and responds with a higher base bending moment at the time of release (higher twang).

From all the considerations a skin stringer configuration for 18 ft diameter booster is an optimal design and is recommended.

Figure 6.1-6 LO2/LH2 pump LRB LH2 tank design based on current Loads  
2219/T87 Al Alloy

SKIN- STRINGER DESIGN - INCLUDES CONSIDERATIONS FOR  
PLATE PROCUREMENT AND FABRICATION

104 STIFFNERS SPACED 6.5 INCHES APART  
FRAMES EVERY 30 INCHES APART



**MONOCOQUE DESIGN**  
**WALL THICKNESS = .66 INCHES**

## **6.2 LO2/RP1 Pump Fed LRB**

The strength designed LO2/RP1 pump fed booster is the most flexible of all the designs. The booster deflection with current SSME ignition sequence is approximately 30 inches. Even with SSMEs staggered the deflection remains high. The dynamic response of this LRB is illustrated in figure 6.2-1. Staggering the SSME engines produces response to 22 inches which is still high.

The options to limit deflection are either stiffen the structure or stagger the SSME engines along with lowering gimbal angles of SSMEs or perform ET umbilical facility modifications. These Options are illustrated in figure 6.2-2.

The recommendation is to stiffen the structure up to .24 Hz natural frequency. From analyses this is the optimum level of stiffness with minimum weight penalty.

Figure 6.2-1 Influence of SSME ignition stagger on LO2/RP1 pump ET Umbilical Response





Figure 6.2-2 Options to lower the ET Umbilical Response






### 6.3 LO2/RP1 Pressure Fed LRB

The LO2/RP1 pressure fed LRB is stiffer than the current SRB and therefore has no deflection problem. With stagger this booster has even smaller deflections. Figure 6.3-1 shows a typical pressure fed LO2/RP1 response.

Figure 6.3-1 SSME Thrust Buildup and Shutdown Transient for ET Umbilical  
LO2/RP1 pressure



## **7.0 Maximum T/W Ratio for LO2/LH2 LRB Configurations At Release**

LRB holddown and release requires all LRB engine health monitoring prior to holddown release somewhat similar to the way SSME s are currently monitored during launch. This engine health monitoring creates a new launch environment namely - liftoff at considerably high T/W ratio than the current STS with SRBs and results in a load transient at forward ET/LRB thrust fitting. An analytical study was performed to evaluate the forward attach fitting loads, generated from a sudden release (like the current explosive bolt release), for LO2/LO2 pump fed LRB configurations for different LRB thrust levels and thrust rise times. From this study the maximum LO2/LH2 pump LRB thrust on pad prior to release is established to be approximately 87% of the full LRB thrust level. The LO2/LH2 monocoque and LO2/LH2 skin stringer configurations both could be held on pad up to 87% of the full LRB thrust. The difference is in the time at which the forward attach fitting peaks.

The thrust fitting load transient for the monocoque is shown in figure 7.1-1 and the transient for the skin stringer configuration is shown in figure 7.1-2. The monocoque LO2/LH2 pump LRB achieves the limit load of 1634 KLBS at 1000 milliseconds while the skin stringer LRB achieves the limit at approximately 1400 milliseconds after holddown release. The current explosive bolt release system can be used if the LRB engine health monitoring can be performed below 87% of full LRB thrust level. Beyond 87% a slow release system is required to damp the transient.

Figure 7.1-1  
 LO2/LH2 Monocoque Pump  
 Thrust Fitting Load Transient after Holddown Release  
 Holddown Release at 87% of LRB Thrust Level





Figure 7.1-2  
 LO2/LH2 Pump -Skin Stringer  
 Thrust Fitting Load Transient after Holddown Release  
 Holddown Release at 87% of LRB Thrust Level



## 8.0 Conclusions

The 18 ft diameter LO2/LH2 LRB monocoque or skin stringer designs are sufficiently stiff on pad and can be released using the current SSME ignition sequence. The current GSE equipment is capable of tracking the STS deflections during pushover. The quick release system (explosive bolt release) used currently with SRBs can be used for LO2/LH2 pump LRBs provided that the maximum LRB thrust at the time of release is less than 87%. The LRB engine health monitoring should be accomplished within 87% of full thrust level for LRBs. If the LRBs are released at higher than 87% of full LRB thrust level then a damped or slow release system is necessary to maintain thrust fitting loads to safe level.

The most flexible configuration is LO2/RP1 pump which either requires SSME ignition stagger and SRB structural stiffening to maintain deflections within the GSE capabilities. Limiting on pad deflections by increasing the structural stiffness only, while maintaining the diameter (13.7ft) results in considerable structural weight increase.

LO2/RP1 pressure fed booster is the most stiff configuration. The on pad deflections are well within the current GSE capabilities.